Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
1993

The Habeas Hagioscope
Larry Yackle
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Larry Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 Southern California Law Review 2331 (1993).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/1722

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

ARTICLES

THE HABEAS HAGIOSCOPE
LARRY W. YACKLE*

If you would understand American law, American politics, and the
elusive difference between the two, look no further. Federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners opens a window on the workings of our
national government, overt and covert. I mean in this Article to describe
the scene that is revealed. A rich account of experience in recent years
can contribute to a deeper understanding of our government by arranging the players and the set in context and sequence. The record will
show a number of things to be true.'
The battle over habeas is driven, in the main, not by relatively sterile
concerns for federalism and congested federal dockets, but by an ideological resistance to the Warren Court's innovative interpretations of substantive federal rights. The objection in "conservative" 2 circles is not so
* Professor, Boston University School of Law; A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, University of Kansas;
LL.M. 1974, Harvard University. I would like to thank Jack Beermann, Erwin Chemerinsky, Fred
Lawrence, Evan Lee, Jim Liebman, Tracey Maclin, Avi Soifer, and a host of colleagues at Boston
University for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Certainly I would like to thank the other participants in this symposium, Susan Bandes, Judge Patrick Higginbotham, Barry Friedman, and Dan
Meltzer, for valuable constructive criticism. Rob Kwon, Jenifer Magyar, Tracey Norberg, and Brad
Steiner helped with research-together with Dan Freehling's excellent staff at the Pappas Law
Library.
I. Readers should know that I paced the sidelines at many of the events I will recall in this
Article. I consulted with several organizations, including the American Bar Association ("ABA"),
the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys, the NAACP Legal Defense & Education
Fund ("LDF"), the National Association of Legal Aid and Defender Associations ("NLADA"),
and the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), and with several members of Congress and their
staffs. I prepared memoranda, drafted bills, and offered testimony. On two occasions, I wrote letters
to congressional leaders on behalf of several hundred law faculty members. See 137 CONG. REC.
E3719 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991). 1 also took part in preparing amicus curiae briefs on behalf of LDF,
the ACLU, groups of prominent citizens, and, in Wright v. West, 112 S.Ct. 2482 (1992), an ad hoe
group of federal courts specialists. I loaned some of those briefs ideas and language from this
Article.
2. I use the term "conservative" in what I think is the conventional fashion, at least since the
emergence of the statist American right behind Ronald Reagan's presidential candidacy. In some
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much that habeas petitions are heard by national tribunals that have bet-

ter things to do, but that collateral litigation is undertaken at all, particularly in death penalty cases, and, accordingly, that criminal defendants
may effectively upset their convictions and sentences. The rhetoric in
political debates and judicial opinions often flags the delays associated
with habeas practice and multiple federal petitions from the same pris-

oner. Yet the principal remedy proposed is not procedural reform, but
the practical elimination of the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction.
The same ideas for undercutting the writ turn up time and again, in
essence offering alternative ways to give state judgments preclusive effect
in federal proceedings. Sometimes preclusion proposals are put forward
as plausible elaborations of, or acceptable departures from, existing
law-and thus appropriate matters for judicial decision. Sometimes they
are offered as legislative bills in Congress. Often, they come in either
flavor and are pressed upon the body that seems at the moment to be
receptive. Just as the same ideas for curbing habeas repeatedly show up

in different clothing, the same individuals repeatedly appear to champion
them, albeit wearing different hats. Over a career spanning forty years,
Chief Justice Rehnquist has been witness to, or has participated in,
numerous efforts to import preclusion into the law of habeas corpus-as
respects, American conservatives approach the classical libertarian model, which regards governmental regulation as appropriate primarily to preserve order, internally and externally, so that
human affairs can generally be governed by private ordering. Conservatives typically resist governmental regulation of economic activity as an ill-advised attempt to use public power for self-regarding ends of doubtful utility. Conservatives may accept the New Deal as settling the framework of
American government, but they draw no comfort from the distributive implications of the regulatory
system that Roosevelt ushered into being. Deregulation and "privatization" are the themes that rally
conservatives around a vision of the night-watchman state. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, American conservatives are typically comfortable with the exercise of majoritarian governmental power, particularly executive power, to defeat individual interests in racial and gender
equality, dissident ideology, sexual intimacy, and personal value choices-interests thought to
threaten the stability essential to efficient production in a capitalist system. Conservatives typically
support governmental efforts to enforce selected social and religious mores they regard as constitutive of the bedrock, orderly, and therefore desirable status quo. Modern American conservatives
thus bear a mirror image of liberals' burden. Where liberals must justify subjecting economic liberty
to social-welfare legislation while holding personal rights inviolate, conservatives must explain why
some widely recognized personal rights can be compromised in the name of majoritarian morality
and community stability while economic liberty is given a broader field of operation. For conservatives, it is not the Warren Court's decisions expanding personal rights that draw praise, but more
recent decisions endorsing the exercise of governmental power and thus diluting personal rights,
issued by the Nixon and Reagan appointees of the 1970s and 1980s, such as William H. Rehnquist,
Sandra Day O'Connor, and Antonin Scalia. Not all Republicans are conservatives, but the platform
of the national Republican Party reflects the rough grouping of views this account ascribes to American conservatism.
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a law clerk to Justice Jackson, as an assistant attorney general in the

Nixon administration, and as a member of the Court.
I will criticize the principal assaults on habeas corpus, concentrating
on the legislative program advanced by conservative critics of the writ,
and on the counterproposals marshaled by "liberals ' 3 in Congress. I will
also criticize the Supreme Court's cases undermining the habeas jurisdiction, cases that threaten to do by judicial decision what jurisdiction-stripping bills would do by statute. I will examine the Court's treatment of
the deference owed to state findings of fact and the federal courts'
authority independently to determine legal issues and "mixed" questions

of law and fact. I will also examine the Court's approach to the retroactive application of "new rules" of law, its exclusion of Fourth Amendment claims from the purview of the writ, and its relaxation of the

conventional standard for harmless error in habeas corpus cases.
Finally, I will offer an alternative prescriptive program. The Supreme
Court should cease its efforts to block the federal courts from acting on
habeas petitions from state convicts and should, instead, defer to the pol-

icy judgments made by the legislative branch. Congress, for its part,
should locate habeas within a coherent conceptual framework providing
a federal judicial forum for the enforcement of federal rights. Specifically, habeas should accord state prisoners an opportunity to litigate fed-

eral claims in federal court that is roughly equivalent to the opportunity
they would have had if they had been allowed to remove the prosecutions
against them to federal court for original disposition.4
3. I also use the term "liberal" in what I think is the conventional way-to connote a general
belief in a large role for legislatures in the regulation of economic affairs, tempered by the rigorous
judicial enforcement of personal liberty. American liberals, by this account, are not libertarians in
the classical mold. Liberals do not insist that the exercise of governmental power should be minimally invasive of individual liberty in all forms. On the contrary, liberals believe that government
ought to be used, actively and affirmatively, in search of a better life for collective society. American
liberals welcome social-welfare legislation that sacrifices the freedom of individuals and corporations
to operate in the market as they please. The intellectual challenge facing modem liberals is to justify
this distinction between economic rights, which can and should be subject to regulation in the public
interest, and personal rights, which should be accorded judicial protection. Roughly speaking, liberals trace their roots to the New Deal and draw their zeal for individual rights from the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices William 0. Douglas and William J. Brennan in
the 1960s. By this definition, many Democrats are not liberals. And in a time when this category
has lost its appeal in some quarters, many Americans who are mainstream liberals within these
terms probably would prefer another label. Still, the platform of the national Democratic Party
reflects liberal positions on most issues. Lest there be any doubt, I am a liberal by this rough
definition.
4. I reject, then, the appellate model for habeas corpus championed by Dan Meador and
other knowledgeable and well-intentioned observers. Daniel J. Meador, Straightening Out Federal
Review of State CriminalCases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 273 (1983). Barry Friedman has made a valiant
effort to explain much existing doctrine as in service of an appellate model for the lower federal
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PRELIMINARIES

PARITY AND PRECLUSION

Habeas corpus is laced with doctrinal intricacy, which conceals
underlying disagreements over values: the vindication of individual
rights, the decentralization of governmental power, and, cutting across
these themes, the role of the federal courts in our national life. Plainly,
the current Court's sympathies lie with the writ's critics. Doubts about
the wisdom of habeas corpus are reflected in barriers to the federal forum
having the effect, if not always the acknowledged purpose, of forestalling
federal adjudication on the merits. To explore foundational values, it
would be necessary to rehearse the empirical and ideological arguments
over whether the federal and state courts are essentially fungible-what
Burt Neuborne called the "parity" question.5 Those worries occupied us
two years ago.6 Here, let me say only that, with respect to habeas
corpus, proponents of the federal forum have a heavier burden than
usual. It must be contended not merely that litigants who wish to go to
federal court in the first instance should be allowed to do so, but also that
parties who have litigated once in state court should be able to litigate
again in the federal courts. In this Article, I posit that it is a good idea to
put federal claims in federal court most of the time. I only posit this; I
do not defend it, except to say that the framework of federal jurisdiction
courts in habeas corpus. Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REv. 247 (1988).
Judge Higginbotham would build on that idea--albeit in a manner that I suspect Professor Friedman would not approve. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Reflections on Reform of§ 2254 Habeas Peti-

tions, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005 (1990). I think Professor Friedman's appellate model fails to
capture enough cases to succeed as a positive descriptive account, and I further think that an appellate model would not furnish an appropriate goal for normative, prescriptive change. I agree with
Friedman that petitioners should have one meaningful opportunity to litigate federal claims in federal court, but I would insist that that opportunity include independent, trial-level adjudication. In
my view, it makes all the difference in the world whether a federal court is given authority to address
a claim afresh or merely to review, even on a de novo standard, a judgment already reached in state
court. The former, I think, is essential. I will develop the rest of the overarching framework for
federal jurisdiction within which this conception of habeas corpus fits in LARRY W. YACKLE,
(forthcoming 1994).
5. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
6. See Symposium, Federalism and Parity, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1991); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, ParityReconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciary,36 UCLA L. REV. 233
(1988); Erwin Chemerinsky, FederalCourts, State Courts, and the Constitution:A Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 UCLA L. REv. 369 (1988); Martin H. Redish, JudicialParity,Litigant Choice, and
Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and ConstitutionalRights, 36 UCLA L.
ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH: FEDERAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL COURTS

REV. 329 (1988). I also defer to the literature on the federal courts' discretion to decline jurisdiction
conferred by statute. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
JudicialFunction, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 543 (1985); see also Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress
and FederalJurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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already manifests this same policy judgment and that departures from it
are notable precisely because they disrupt the internal consistency appar-

ent elsewhere. At the same time, I would not abandon the longstanding
policy that criminal defendants in state court cannot remove the prosecu-

tions against them to federal court for trial. If, then, criminal defendants
are to have an opportunity to litigate federal claims in federal court, it
must come later-after the state courts have finished their work. The

vehicle for access at that point is federal habeas corpus, which, accordingly, must be exempt from preclusion doctrine.7

Ordinarily, a final judgment8 is entitled to deference in later litigation between the same parties or their privies. Along one branch of
conventional doctrine, denominated "issue preclusion," factual determinations or applications of law to fact essential to an initial judgment may
not be relitigated in subsequent proceedings.9 Along a second branch,

denominated "claim preclusion," issues of fact or applications of law that
may be, but are not, raised and determined in initial proceedings cannot
be pursued in a later action.' 0 Preclusion protects the parties' reliance
7. See generally lB JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.405-0.448
(2d ed. 1993). Preclusion doctrine is typically judge-made law fashioned by the courts, either state
or federal, where the doctrine operates. Accordingly, the preclusive effect to which a judgment is
entitled depends on the law of the jurisdiction in which it is rendered. Minor variations are common
but central propositions tend to be accepted everywhere. Interjuridictional cases are subject to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, which has always been read generally to require state courts to accord
judgments rendered in other states the preclusive effect those judgments would have in the courts of
the rendering state: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S.

CONsT. art. IV, § I.
The federal full faith and credit statute both implements the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
subjects the federal courts to the requirements constitutionally imposed upon state courts:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any... State... shall be proved
or admitted in other courts within the United States ... by the attestation of the clerk and
the seal of the court annexed....
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) (emphasis added).
8. A judgment is final in conventional understanding when it is affirmed on direct review or
when the time allowed for an appeal passes without the initiation of appellate processes by a party
entitled to seek direct review. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965).
9. ALLAN D. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION at V-189 to V-206 (1969).
10. Id. at V-61, V-129.
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interests, conserves judicial resources, and, particularly in cross-jurisdictional cases, mitigates institutional stress."1 The Supreme Court has consistently held that if a prior state judgment would be entitled to
preclusive effect in the state concerned, it is equally entitled to preclusive

effect in federal court-provided the state court had jurisdiction to act
and employed procedures that offered a "full and fair" opportunity for
adjudication.1 2
The federal courts' power to entertain habeas corpus applications
from state prisoners has always been an exception to conventional pre-

clusion doctrine.1 3 Petitioners may apply for the writ on grounds that
14

either were or could have been raised and determined in state court.
And necessarily so. If state court judgments regarding federal claims
were entitled to preclusive effect in federal court, the core function the
federal courts serve in habeas would be eviscerated. Those courts would

no longer offer litigants with federal claims an independent federal forum
for the vindication of their federal rights. Mark you this, and well.

Within the current controversy over habeas, the root difference between
the two sides is that liberals would retain the federal courts' authority to
exercise independent judgment regarding prisoners' claims, while conservatives would terminate the writ's exemption from preclusion. All
11. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1333
(1977).
12. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985);
Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984). The threshold reference to the
preclusion rules in play in the relevant state is, of course, commanded by the full faith and credit
statute, section 1738. See supranote 7. The additional "full and fair opportunity" standard has long
been associated with preclusion law generally and, indeed, has come by dint of experience to capture
the fundamental point of preclusion, that is, that judicial outcomes are not to be reexamined unless
the procedures by which they are produced are so shockingly inadequate as to undermine confidence
in the integrity of the enterprise. The Court has not specified the precise content of the procedures
deemed necessary to "full and fair" adjudication, but has explained that, at a minimum, state process
must comport with fundamental "due process" in the constitutional sense. The theory is that since
no state may give preclusive effect to a judgment obtained in violation of due process, a federal court
may ignore such a profoundly flawed state judgment without doing violence to 28 U.S.C. § 1738which requires deference only to previous state judgments that would constitutionally be entitled to
preclusive effect under state law. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982). To
the extent Kremer looks to constitutional due process for the content of "full and fair" state procedures for modem preclusion purposes, however, one should not assume that the Court means to
embrace the limited understanding of due process reflected in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915). See infra text accompanying note 30. It is not at all clear that even the Rehnquist Court
would hold that formally sound state corrective processes obviate violations of due process at the
trial level and thus block later federal adjudication.
13. Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122, 124-25 (1968).
14. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 485 n.27 (recognizing that habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 is an express statutory exception to § 1738).
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other issues are marginal to the point of irrelevance unless and until this
fundamental question is laid to rest.
B.

BACKDROP

Habeas corpus had a long and distinguished history in England
before it was imported to the American colonies. The courts at West-

minster and Parliament contributed to its development as the Great Writ
of Liberty-the means by which English courts could enforce the "law of
the land" against governmental power.15 The American colonists also

linked habeas corpus with due process of law. 16 In 1787, the drafters of
the Constitution assumed that some form of habeas corpus would be
available and thus provided that the privilege of the writ could not be
"suspended" except in "Cases of Rebellion or Invasion."'" When the
new national government was organized, the legislative branch asserted
primary responsibility for prescribing the scope of the writ at the federal
level. The Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the federal courts to receive

petitions from prisoners held in the custody of federal officers in violation
of federal law;18 and one of the most significant enactments of the Reconstruction era, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, extended that jurisdiction
to cases in which petitioners charged they were unlawfully detained by

state officials. 9 The provisions of the 1789 and 1867 Acts conferring
basic subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts are codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2241.20 This congressionally prescribed writ figured early and
15. See LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 4-5, 19-20 (1981) [hereinafter
REMEDIES] (relying on ROBERT S. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY (1960)); 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSwORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 111 (4th ed. 1926); ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL
LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 122-27 (1858).
16. By some accounts, the writ could be sought only to contest detention before or without
trial; by other accounts, habeas was available after trial as a means by which some courts reviewed
the work of others. Compare Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-]776-1865, 32 U. CHI.
L. REV. 243, 258-61 (1965) (pretrial detention) with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 405 (1963) (post-trial
review).

17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
2.
18.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.

19. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (amending Act of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, 14 Stat.
46).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988):
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,
the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. ...
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless--...
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States ....
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often in national affairs.2 1 In the wake of Reconstruction, habeas helped
shape the relations between the federal government and the states.2 2
Importantly for our purposes, the writ provided the means by which the
federal courts came to have ultimate authority to vindicate federal claims
arising in state criminal cases.23

Many of us have quarreled over the time and manner in which
habeas corpus developed as a sequel to state criminal prosecutions and
whether Congress or the Court was primarily responsible. The 1867 Act

itself was explicit only in the sense that its sweeping language admitted
no exception for cases in which the state courts had already decided a
claim against the applicant. Yet naive originalists would have a hard
time arguing that the Reconstruction Congress could have "intended"
that the federal courts would defer to state judgments. If we know anything about that period, we know that Congress distrusted state officials
and institutions in the South. That distrust was surely the point of introducing the federal courts in the first place. Early Supreme Court opinions similarly cut against preclusion in federal habeas in that they, too,
painted with an extremely broad brush.24
21. When Aaron Burr recruited troops for an assault on the Mexican provinces, the Supreme
Court relied on habeas Lorpus in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 100 (1807), to decide
whether the facts made out the case for treason. When military officials brought a civilian to trial in
the wake of the Civil War and the Court threatened to invalidate martial law in the South in Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 108 (1866), again the vehicle was habeas corpus. And when, in
Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 575 (1868), Congress' power to restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction was tested for the first time, once again the proving ground was a petition for the
Great Writ.
22. Recall, for example, that it was in a habeas corpus case, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), that the Court squared the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment with the embarrassment
of the Eleventh Amendment.
23. Dan Meador once drew an illuminating analogy to the writ's role in settling rivalries
between the English central courts and the tribunals operated by local barons. DANIEL J. MEADOR,
HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA 12-13 (1966).

24. Sponsors of the 1867 Act declared it would extend to the federal courts a jurisdiction in
habeas "coextensive with all the powers that can be conferred upon them." CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence). The Supreme Court was equally expansive. In Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. at 326, the first case to arise under the new Act, the Court
acknowledged that Congress had brought within the federal courts' authority "every possible case of
privation of liberty contrary to the National ... laws"-a jurisdiction it would be "impossible to
widen." Again in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 247 (1886), the Court read the Act to confer
judicial power "in language as broad as could well be employed." See William M. Wiecek, The
Reconstruction of FederalJudicialPower, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 333, 342-48 (1969). For excellent
reevaluations, see Marc M. Arkin, A New Look at Antebellum Habeas Corpus: Revisiting the Relitigation Debate (forthcoming); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time? The AnachronisticAttack on
Habeas Corpus/DirectReview Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993).
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To be sure, the Court appreciated that the exercise of such a plenary
federal jurisdiction would create friction with the state courts. Accordingly, in Ex parte Royall,2 5 the Court held that the federal courts ordinarily should postpone federal adjudication until proceedings in state court
are complete. That holding mitigated the effect of federal habeas on the

ability of the states to enforce local criminal law. Yet it also presupposed
that preclusion was inapplicable in habeas corpus. Because the exhaustion of state remedies was merely a matter of proper timing, it surely had
to follow that when the federal courts acted later in a timely way, they
were not obliged simply to accept the results reached previously in state
court. Although the Court in Royall did not explicitly hold that the federal courts must totally ignore state outcomes, it articulated an exhaustion doctrine that would conflict with a strong deference rule.26
Still, as late as the notorious Leo Frank case, Frank v. Mangum,2 7
the Court repeated the confused boilerplate that had attached itself to the
writ over the preceding century. On the one hand, said Justice Pitney for
the majority, the federal courts had authority to entertain Frank's due
process claim that his trial had been dominated by an anti-Semitic mob.
In that effort, moreover, the federal courts would not have to accept the
warden's version of the facts, but rather could conduct a "more searching" investigation of the case.2" On the other hand, Pitney warned, the
25. 117 U.S. at 241.
26. Accord Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963). But see Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,
336 (1915) (stating that the exhaustion doctrine would "lose the greater part of its salutary force if
the prisoner's mere allegations were to stand the same in law after as before the state courts had
passed judgment upon them"); accord Paul M. Bator, Finalityin CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas
Corpusfor State Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 483 (1963). I also tend to think that the contemporaneous criticisms of federal habeas would have been muted, but for concerns that the federal
courts would exercise independent judgment on the merits. See Seymour D. Thompson, Abuses of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1884); Note, FederalAbuses of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 149 (1891).
27. 237 U.S. at 309.
28. With respect to fact finding, Justice Pitney conceded that the 1867 Act had "liberalized"
the common law, under which it "seem[ed]" that a warden's statement in a return to the writ that
the prisoner was held on the basis of a previous judicial judgment, for example, a criminal conviction, "closed the inquiry" into the truth. Id. at 330. In the Act, by contrast, Congress had empowered the federal courts to listen to a petitioner's contrary allegations, determine the "actual facts,"
and then dispose of the matter "as law and justice require[d]." Id. at 330-31. Pitney was not content
with this. He intimated that the federal courts might nevertheless be required to give the factual
findings made by the Georgia Supreme Court "res adjudicata" effect. Id. at 334. In the end, however, he chose not to invoke preclusion doctrine as the formal basis of his decision and, instead, held
that the state appellate court's findings must be "taken as setting forth the truth," in the absence of
"some reasonable ground" for thinking that the state court had "erred." Id. at 336. The prisoner's
allegations did not constitute such a ground, given the state appellate court's "full investigation."
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federal courts had no jurisdiction to review the Georgia Supreme Court's
judgment directly for error, but could reject that court's determination of
Frank's constitutional claim only if its judgment was not only "voidable," but "void"-the outcome of proceedings so fundamentally flawed
as not to be entitled to respect as judicial process at all.29 In other words,
federal habeas was open only if the state court had exceeded its jurisdiction-if it had ceased to act as a court. In turn, that articulation assimilated habeas to conventional preclusion doctrine, which, of course, would
not command the federal habeas courts to follow a previous state decision rendered by people wearing robes, but otherwise lacking judicial
authority and institutional warrant for their actions.
Justice Pitney also elided the scope of the federal courts' authority
in habeas corpus and the substantive content of the Fourteenth Amendment. The "state action" to which the Fourteenth Amendment was
addressed, he explained, included not only Frank's trial in state court,
but also the appellate process in the Georgia Supreme Court. Even if
Frank had a legitimate complaint that the state had treated him unfairly
at one stage (the trial stage), he could establish a violation of due process
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment only by demonstrating that the state had failed to provide adequate "corrective process" for
trial errors at another stage (the appellate stage).30 That, Justice Pitney
insisted, Frank could not do. Georgia had given him the process he was
"due" when it accorded him an appeal in compliance with the "settled
course of judicial proceedings as established by the law of the State,"
provided those practices included "notice, and a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard" regarding his complaints.3 1 Here again, Justice Pitney
asserted that the federal habeas courts must defer to prior state court
decisions on the merits, if the state courts provided an adequate opportunity for adjudication at some point in their own processes. This was true
not only because the federal habeas jurisdiction was limited in this way,
but also because, in the period before World War I when Frank was
decided, the Court judged that due process only required some means of
correcting any constitutional flaws in the proceedings at trial.3 2 Habeas
buffs will recall that it was in his dissent from this reasoning in Frank
29. Id. at 331.
30. Id. at 335.
31. Id. at 326; see In re Converse, 137 U.S. 624 (1891) (taking the same view of the content of
due process in a direct review posture).
32. Accord Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2494 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that Justice Holmes offered his classic statement of a wider authority in
habeas corpus. 3
The meaning of due process developed rapidly between the two
world wars. Concomitantly, the federal habeas courts' authority to reexamine claims rejected in state court also expanded. The matter was

essentially settled by Justice Holmes' majority opinion in Moore v. Dempsey in 1923. 34 To be sure, Holmes conceded that prisoners were not enti-

tled to federal relief for any federal error at trial. 35 He did not expressly
overrule Frank. Yet in the factually similar circumstances presented in

Moore, Holmes reached a different conclusion regarding the availability
of the federal writ. Moreover, his rhetoric plainly recalled his great dissent in the Frank case.36 State adjudication, however "full and fair" in
form, could not insulate convictions from reconsideration by way of
habeas corpus.3 7 In Moore, the argument that state judgments were entitled to preclusive effect if state appellate procedures had been adequate
was pressed by Justice McReynolds, dissenting from Holmes.38
In the 1940s, a special committee of the Judicial Conference of
Senior Circuit Judges, chaired by Judge John J. Parker, drafted several

reform proposals, one of which would have given state judgments the
very preclusive effect that decisions like Moore had read the 1867 Act to
deny.39 Chief Justice Stone doubted the wisdom of such a step, fearing
that it would only channel business to the Supreme Court on direct
review.' The attorney general at the time, Tom C. Clark, threatened to
33. Whatever disagreement there might be regarding the content of due process, he said, the
state had acted when it had condemned Leo Frank at trial, and it was no defense to his claim that
the state had acted unconstitutionally that, thereafter, the state appellate courts had been willing to
hear his appeal. In any event, the federal habeas courts were empowered to look beneath the form of
state process. For the writ, according to Holmes, "comes in from the outside, not in subordination
to the proceedings [in state court], and although every form may have been preserved opens the
inquiry whether they have been more than an empty shell." Frank, 237 U.S. at 346 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
34. 261 U.S. 86 (1923); see Herbert Wechsler, Habeas Corpus and the Supreme Court: Reconsidering the Reach of the Writ, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 173 (1988).
35. Moore, 261 U.S. at 91.
36. According to Holmes, when it appeared that the "whole proceeding" in state court was a
"mask" and that the state courts had "failed to correct the wrong," then "perfection in the machinery for correction [of trial error]" could not prevent the federal courts from "securing" federal
rights. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 92 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
39. John W. Winkle, III, Judges as Lobbyists: Habeas Corpus Reform in the 1940s, 68 JUDICATURE 263 (1985).
40. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone, Chief Justice of the United States, to John J. Parker,
Circuit Judge (Aug. 1943), cited in Winkle, supra note 39, at 267.
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oppose the Parker plan in the Senate."' In the face of that opposition, the
committee dropped the preclusion idea, fell back, and regrouped around
a number of procedural reforms, which then were built into the general
revision of the judicial code in 1948. On the committee's recommenda-

tion, Congress actually codified the exhaustion requirement, which,
again, contemplated that the federal courts were empowered to consider
claims the state courts found wanting.4 2

With the 1948 amendments in place, the Court confirmed in Brown
v. Allen4 3 that habeas corpus was, indeed, exempt from ordinary preclusion rules. Justice Reed was explicit on the point, declaring that while a
previous state court decision on a federal claim was due the respect the
federal courts always gave judicial decisions in "another jurisdiction,"
such a judgment was "not resjudicata." Elaborating for the majority
in Brown, Justice Frankfurter explained that a prior state judgment could
not foreclose federal adjudication, "else the State court would have the
final say which the Congress, by the Act of 1867, provided it should not
have."'45 Importantly, Frankfurter recognized that in some instances the
federal courts might accept state findings regarding the facts underlying
prisoners' claims.4 6 Yet when the facts alone did not dispose of a claim
and the occasion called for a judicial "interpretation of the legal significance" of the facts, the federal courts would have to exercise independent
judgment.4 7 Clearly, the determination of mixed questions of law and
fact-that is, the "application of constitutional principles to the facts" of
individual cases-was a matter for the federal courts.4 8
41. Letter from Henry P. Chandler, Director, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, to Kimbrough Stone, Circuit Judge (Mar. 26, 1946), cited in Winkle, supra note 39, at 270.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c); see S. REP. No. 1527, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) (describing
other procedural adjustments in the bill). Judge Parker argued that the exhaustion doctrine did not
contemplate federal adjudication later. Since prisoners were formally able to file multiple applications for state relief, there would never be a time when no state opportunity existed to try yet againand thus never a time when federal habeas corpus would be timely. John J. Parker, Limiting the
Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 176 (1948). In Brown v. Allen, the Court rejected such a
cynical reading of the legislation. 344 U.S. 443, 448-49 n.3 (1953).
43. 344 U.S. 443 (1953); accord Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2487 (1992).
44. Brown, 344 U.S. at 458.
45. Id. at 500 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
46. Id. at 507.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 507-08. It may seem puzzling that Justice Frankfurter took such pains to spell out a
plenary authority for the federal courts in habeas corpus. After all, Frankfurter was a major figure
in the Legal Process school, which typically regarded the state courts as the primary American
tribunals, even when federal issues were at stake. Moreover, Frankfurter was ever sensitive to the
place of the states and the state courts in the constitutional scheme. In this instance, however,
Frankfurter's conception of the proper distribution of judicial responsibility led him to conclude that
the federal courts should be available. One tends to think that Frankfurter, like Stone, feared that if
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Brown, too, evoked resistance. Justice Jackson attached a pointed
separate opinion in which he insisted that Frankfurter's opinion invited
prisoners to flood the federal courts with frivolous petitions.4 9 Coining
his own colorful line, Jackson declared that "[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.
[One who must] search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with
the attitude that the needle is not worth the search." 5 ° Put bluntly, Jackson doubted that the state courts made enough mistakes regarding
defendants' rights to render later federal habeas corpus adjudication
worth the bother. Accordingly, he was prepared to give the state courts
the very "final say" that Frankfurter insisted Congress had assigned to
the federal courts.5 ' Importantly, I think, Justice Jackson was fortified
in his position by a memorandum from one of his law clerks-William
Hubbs Rehnquist:
The basic problem.., is one of res judicata; to what extent does
an adverse judgment in the state system of cts [sic] preclude a petitioner from raising anew the same questions in federal district court?
I respectfully submit that the Court would perform a signal service to the federal system if they [sic] would lay down a rule which
required federal district judges to observe the ordinary principles of res
judicata in passing on
habeas corpus petitions from those confined
52
under state sentence.
Justice Jackson lost in Brown, but his insistence that state judgments
should typically foreclose subsequent litigation in federal habeas corpus
the inferior federal courts could not enforce federal rights in habeas corpus, the Supreme Court itself
would have to deal with state prisoner claims on certiorari. In this vein Frankfurter's opinion in
Brown announced the majority's view that the lower federal courts were not barred from entertaining habeas petitions from state prisoners merely because the Supreme Court itself had previously
declined to accept their cases for direct review. Then, too, it seems clear that Justice Frankfurter
genuinely believed that the allocation of jurisdiction that he found so sensible was, in fact, the allocation that Congress had made in 1867-and that cases such as Moore had recognized over the years.
The honest explanation for Brown, then, was judicial respect for majoritarian policy-making, a powerful theme in Legal Process thinking.
49 Brown, 344 U.S. at 537 (Jackson, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51, Id. at 544-45.
52. William H. Rehnquist, Habeas Corpus Then and Now; Or, "If I Can Just Find the Right
Judge, Over these Prison Walls I Shall Fly .... (undated) (on file with the author). I want to thank
Professor Saul Brenner of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte for fishing this memo out of
Justice Jackson's papers and providing me with a copy. See Saul Brenner, The Memos of Supreme
Court Law Clerk William Rehnquist: Conservative Tracts, or Mirrorsof the Justice'sMind?, 76 JUDICATURE 77 (1992).
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survived in the minds of Brown's detractors. It is fair, I think, to count

among their number the man who now sits in the Court's center chair.
Others, too, objected to Brown. Judge Parker contended that the

Court had only compounded earlier mistakes regarding the writ. In
short order, his committee put forward another bill that would have
given preclusive effect both to state findings of fact and to state conclusions of law-as long as the state courts arrived at outcomes in a "fair
and adequate" manner.53 Initially, the new "Parker bill" was warmly
received in Congress, where it was taken to be of a piece with a host of
other measures attacking the Warren Court for the Segregation Cases.54
Ultimately, however, it died-along with many other jurisdiction-stripping bills introduced in the decade following the two Brown decisions."
Resistance to Brown v. Allen also surfaced in the academic community. In 1963, Professor Paul Bator produced his famous attack on the
very idea of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners articulated by Justice Frankfurter.5 6 Bator, who had formerly served as a law clerk to
Justice Harlan, drew heavily upon the same Legal Process tradition on
53. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HABEAS CORPUS, reprinted in 33 F.R.D. 363, 367
(1964).
54. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55. By one count, the bill was introduced six times over the next several years. Brief on behalf
of Benjamin R. Civiletti, Nicholas Katzenbach, Edward H. Levi, Elliot L. Richardson, et al., Wright
v.West, 112 S.Ct. 2482 (1992) (No. 92-1296). It was endorsed by the Conference of Chief Justices
and the National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG"), and opposed by the ACLU and the
NAACP, whose spokesman was Thurgood Marshall. See H.R. REP. No. 548, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959); H.R. REP. No. 1293, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). The bill was passed in the House on two
occasions, but the Senate failed to act on it-in part because the Department of Justice ("DOJ") had
begun to worry that it would not successfully curtail the "abuses" it aimed to address, but largely
because the majority leader, Lyndon Johnson, and other liberal members held the line against all
bills to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction in constitutional cases. The Parker Committee went
back to the drawing board and emerged with a new plan meant to mollify state judges by prohibiting
a single federal judge from awarding relief in habeas corpus and requiring, instead, that three-judge
federal panels handle habeas petitions. A bill incorporating that idea garnered considerable support
and passed the House by unanimous consent. It, too, stalled in the Senate, however, and the idea of
exacting more time from busy federal judges in habeas cases was ultimately discarded as needlessly
expensive. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HABEAS CORPUS (1965), reprinted in H.R. REP.

No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966). In the end, by another count, during the ten years following Brown v. Allen, Congress considered more than a half-dozen habeas bills, conducted at least two
sets of hearings, and issued seven reports-but enacted no actual amendment to the 1867 Act. Brief
on behalf of Sen. Biden and Rep. Edwards, West, 112 S.Ct. at 2482 (No. 91-C399); see also BRUCE
R. EWING, HABEAS CORPUS LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1955-1966 (1992)
(background memorandum prepared in connection with the amicus briefs filed in Wright v. West);
Louis H. Pollak, Proposalsto CurtailFederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners:CollateralAttack on
the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956) (discussing the merits of proposed legislation restricting
habeas).
56. See Bator, supra note 26.
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which Frankfurter had relied. Yet he reached an entirely different conclusion. Building on Justice Jackson's dissent, Bator urged the Court to
discard Brown and replace it with the long-abandoned approach in the
Frank case. 7 Bator's "process" model for habeas corpus has always had
a significant following among the writ's critics-for the self-evident reason that it amounts to preclusion by another name. Accordingly, it is
well to spend a paragraph or two getting his argument straight.
Invoking classic Legal Process thinking, Bator insisted that no matter how many times a prior judgment was reviewed, the possibility
remained that the last court to entertain a question could still make some
mistake. For Bator, this was true of all legal issues, including federal
constitutional questions. The point was made graphically in another line
from Justice Jackson in Brown v. Allen, this one about the Supreme
Court itself: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."" 8 Setting any evaluation of outcomes
aside, Bator argued that the focus should be on the institutional processes
by which results were produced. The goal, in Bator's view, should be to
establish a "set of arrangements and procedures which provide[d] a reasoned and acceptable probability that justice [would] be done."5 9 Applying this model to habeas corpus, Professor Bator contended that the
reexamination of state court outcomes by the lower federal courts could
not be justified as a means of ensuring that the right judgment was
reached. Rather, he argued that an inquiry into the validity of a prisoner's detention should "meaningfully address itself, at least initially," to
whether the "arrangements and processes which previously determined
the facts and applied the law" were "adequate to the task at hand."' On
this basis, Bator argued that the federal courts should defer to previous
state judgments, provided the processes by which those results were generated furnished the prisoner with a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate
any federal claims.6 1 In this, of course, Bator's process model collapsed
into conventional preclusion doctrine.
Recalling Justice Pitney's opinion in Frank, Bator specified that an
adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims in state court must include
some state appellate process for correcting errors at trial.62 Thereafter,
when the federal courts received cases, they should accept the judgments
57. Id. at 523.
58. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
59. Bator, supra note 26, at 448 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 449.
61. Id. at 462.
62. Id. at 486-97; 491-92.
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reached by the state appellate courts in a proper manner-even if it
appeared (to the federal courts) that the trial court had been wrong initially and that the state appellate courts should have reversed.6 3 Given
procedurally adequate review in state court, the federal courts should not
substitute their different assessments of correct outcomes. Bator recognized that the federal courts had authority to issue the writ if they concluded that a prisoner's detention violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
but, again tracking Justice Pitney, he contended that the state courts provided the process that was "due" if they accorded the prisoner a "full
and fair" opportunity to litigate federal claims at some point in their
procedures." 4
Clearly, however, Professor Bator did not propose to return completely to the primitive understanding of due process on which Justice
Pitney relied in Frank. Bator acknowledged that when federal issues
were treated on direct review in the Supreme Court, that Court could
well reverse the state appellate courts despite the corrective process they
had provided. He argued that an opportunity for "full and fair" adjudication in state court sufficed for due process only when prisoners raised
trial errors in federal habeas corpus. 65 As I have said elsewhere, Bator
evidently conceived that due process meant one thing on direct review of
a state court judgment and another in habeas corpus.66 He was forced
into such a startling view in order to reconcile his conception of habeas
with the terms of the 1867 Act, which clearly empowered the federal
courts to entertain petitions raising constitutional claims. His processmodel limit on the scope of the writ could not be squared with the governing jurisdictional statute unless he denied that state prisoners who had
been given an adequate chance to litigate in state court could still have
due process claims to present in habeas corpus.
Finally, it must be said, Bator relied on Frank without attention to
the injustice that had been done in that case. When Bator did refer to the
actual circumstances of a celebrated case, he chose the "redlight bandit"
episode in the 1950s, which saw Caryl Chessman take nine trips to the
Supreme Court in an attempt to overturn his death sentence.67 To Bator,
the redundancy of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners was magnified in capital cases, which typically consumed considerable time and
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 509.
Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 453-57; 486-87.
Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1016 (1985).
Bator, supra note 26, at 506; see FRANK J. PARKER, CARYL CHESSMAN: THE REDLIGHT

BANDIT (1975).
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effort as they wound their way through the system. In this, Bator signaled the essentially ideological sentiments that his model for habeas
could be made to serve.
The point to remember now is that none of the opposition to Brown
v. Allen bore fruit. None of the restrictive bills was enacted into law, and
the Court promptly rejected Professor Bator's thesis. The great trilogy of
habeas corpus decisions that followed in 1963 confirmed Brown in the
clearest of terms and, indeed, built upon that decision in setting down
guidelines for the exercise of independent federal judgment on the merits
of federal claims. In Townsend v. Sain,68 Chief Justice Warren elaborated the way in which the district courts should set about their work; in
Fay v. Noia,6 9 Justice Brennan explained that federal claims could be cut
off because of procedural default in state court only if prisoners deliberately bypassed state procedures; and in Sanders v. United States,70 Justice
Brennan fashioned similar guidelines for handling multiple federal petitions from a single prisoner. Bator's framework was evident only in the
dissent filed by Justice Harlan, who alone among his colleagues found his
former clerk's views persuasive.7" Tom Clark, now himself a Court
member, said that he had previously opposed efforts to curb the writ, but
legislation. Yet those misgivings, too,
that he now might favor restrictive
72
dissent.
in
only
were offered
When Congress did legislate three years later, it enacted quite different proposals developed by the Judicial Conference of the United
States-amendments to the 1867 Act that took the interpretation of that
Act in Brown as their premise. 73 The Conference anticipated that the
Court's decisions in Townsend, Noia, and Sanders would invite more
prisoners to apply for habeas relief. Yet the debates over the Parker bill
either persuaded habeas critics that state judgments on the merits of federal claims should not be given preclusive effect or, at least, that Congress was unwilling to adopt such a program. 74 Accordingly, the
Conference proposed, and Congress enacted, legislation that codified the
essentials of Brown. The initial paragraph of an amendment to section
68. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The Court in Townsend embraced the process model only in connection with state court findings of historical fact, a matter to which we will return. See infra note 180
and accompanying text.
69. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
70. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
71. Fay, 372 U.S. at 448 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 447-48 (Clark, J., dissenting).
73. See S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
74. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 55.
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2254 embraced the holding in Brown that section 2241 empowered the
federal courts to examine prisoners' federal claims, notwithstanding previous state adjudication.7" Another paragraph built on Justice Frankfurter's discussion of fact finding, directing the federal courts to defer to
state court findings of primary fact, but not to state judgments on legal or
mixed questions.7 6 I mean to return to the 1966 amendments below and
to argue that rumblings of discontent with Brown within the Rehnquist
Court run squarely into this critical, controlling, post-Brown legislation.
In sum, allowing for the usual fits and starts in the development of
legal doctrine, either by legislation or judicial decision, and for occasional backing and filling, both Congress and the Supreme Court, aided
at times by the executive branch, gradually fashioned federal habeas
corpus into an effective vehicle for federal court enforcement of federal
claims arising from state criminal prosecutions. The exercise of federal
jurisdiction was postponed, pursuant to the exhaustion doctrine, but
when the time was right the federal courts acted independently. They
did not give preclusive effect to prior state judgments on the merits of
federal claims. Moreover, and this is the really critical point, the evolution of federal habeas went hand in hand with the development of constitutional safeguards in criminal cases, which began about the time of the
Moore case, gained momentum in the period following World War II,
and then blossomed in the Warren Court period. Recall that in Frank v.
Mangum the Court scarcely recognized that due process had any content
of its own and pronounced the Fourteenth Amendment satisfied if state
authorities offered citizens some process for registering their grievances.
With Moore in 1923, the Court began to see that prisoners might have
due process claims against state proceedings, whether or not the state
courts themselves provided corrective process. Yet even then-nay even
in Brown thirty years later-such claims were limited to generalized
complaints about the fairness of criminal trials. In the Warren Court
years, by contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment was read to incorporate
most of the safeguards in the Bill of Rights. Accordingly, by the mid1960s lots of federal claims were available to state convicts, who could
petition for the writ of habeas corpus in order to vindicate those claims in
75. The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988).
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That was the era of Mapp v. Ohio,78 Gideon v. Wainand Miranda v. Arizona.80 It was no accident that Gideon and
Fay v. Noia were handed down on the same day: The writ of habeas
corpus was the procedural analogue of the Warren Court's substantive
interpretations of the Constitution-providing federal machinery for
bringing new constitutional values to bear in concrete cases.
federal

court.

77

wright,79

In some minds at least, that was precisely the problem. Early resistance to habeas for state prisoners may well have been grounded in concerns that the federal courts' jurisdiction was both an affront to the state
courts and a burden on federal dockets. I count the work of Judge
Parker's committee in that direction. More recent opposition springs,
however, from a different source: a conservative reaction to the Warren
Court's criminal procedure decisions. It is because the current criticism
of the writ is basic, substantive, and ideological that proposals advanced
for change are insufficient (to critics) if they promise merely to expedite
or streamline habeas litigation, but would not abolish the writ altogether.
II.

THE CONSERVATIVE BACKLASH

It is trite to say that the decade of the 1960s was tumultuous. A
collage of developments-the Civil Rights movement, the Vietnam War
and the opposition to it, urban riots-contributed to a profound unsettlement about the direction the country was taking. The Warren Court's
constitutional decisions figured in the mix-not only the cases on busing
and school prayer, but also Mapp, Gideon, Miranda, and other decisions
regarding criminal procedure.8" The crime rate was rising, people were
frightened, and society needed someone or something to blame. Eyes fell
on the Court, which was suspected of abusing its authority to protect the
rights of criminal suspects and placing law-abiding citizens at risk. The
facts did not support the charge, but in the context of the times the
charge was laid nonetheless. And it stuck. Billboards calling for Warren's impeachment sprang up in the South, and open hostility to the
Court broke out in Congress.
77. See Curtis R. Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1330 (1961); Curtis R. Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for
State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 461 (1960); cf William J. Brennan, Jr., FederalHabeas Corpus

and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961) (following Professor
Reitz).
78. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
79. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
80. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81. See cases cited supra notes 78-80.
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In the spring of 1968, Senators Ervin and McClellan launched an
assault on both the substance of Miranda and the federal courts' ability
to enforce that decision. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets

Act of 196882 proposed to make confessions admissible in federal prosecutions, notwithstanding the failure of arresting officers to warn suspects
of their rights, and to abolish the federal courts' habeas jurisdiction to
examine Miranda claims or, indeed, any other claim previously rejected
in state court-thus overruling Brown v. Allen. 83 The notion that Congress might attempt to displace Miranda legislatively and scrap habeas
corpus in the bargain elicited cries of alarm across the political spectrum.
The Judicial Conference opposed the bill, as did the American Bar Association ("ABA")-initiating, by the way, an ABA commitment to habeas
corpus that has been essential to the writ's survival ever since. Academicians also protested; hardly a prominent specialist in public law failed to
stand and be counted. Even Professor Bator signed a letter insisting that
the abolition of habeas corpus for state prisoners was ill-advised and
might be unconstitutional.84 The Senate relented, and the habeas provi85
sion was deleted from the Ervin-McClellan bill.

82. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
and 42 U.S.C.).
83. The bill stated:
The judgment of a court of a State upon a plea or verdict of guilty in a criminal action
shall be conclusive with respect to all questions of law or fact which were determined, or
which could have been determined, in that action until such judgment is reversed, vacated,
or modified by a court having jurisdiction to review by appeal or certiorari such judgment;
and neither the Supreme Court nor any inferior court ordained and established by Congress under article III of the Constitution of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
reverse, vacate, or modify any such judgment of a State court except upon appeal from, or
writ of certiorari granted to review, a determination made with respect to such judgment
upon review thereof by the highest court of that State having jurisdiction to review such
judgment.
S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 702 (1968).
In theory, habeas corpus operates only on the custody of which the prisoner complains and,
even when a federal court awards relief, the state criminal conviction is left formally undisturbed.
Accordingly, the purist would contend that the language used in this section of the bill would have
been ineffectual. See Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605,
606 n.9. Yet because the provision was offered as an amendment to the habeas corpus chapter of the
judicial code, it is hard to think, had it been adopted, that the Supreme Court would have refused to
give it the effect for which it was obviously intended. Clearly, the Senate Judiciary Committee
understood that the measure was designed to overrile Brown. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 63-65 (1968).
84. Letter from Richard R. Baxter, Professor of Law, et al. to Joseph D. Tydings, United
States Senator (Apr. 30, 1968), reprintedin 114 CONG. REC. 11,234 (1968).
85. 114 CONG. REC. 14,181-84 (1968); see 119 CONG. REc. 2220 (1973) (statement of Sen.
Hruska).
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That, however, was hardly the end of the matter. For even as the
1968 crime bill was debated in the Senate, the 1968 presidential campaign was under way outside the Beltway. And when the leaves turned
in autumn, Richard Nixon gained the White House by running as much
against the Court as against his rival. As Professor Seidman once
reminded us, Nixon's stump speech invariably included the charge that
the Court had "weaken[ed] the peace forces as against the criminal
forces" in America and the promise that he, if elected, would strike
blows for "law and order."'8 6 When the Nixon administration assumed
power, key officials in the new Department of Justice ("DOJ") set about
keeping the President's commitment to deal more sternly with crime and
criminals-both by limiting the Warren Court's substantive decisions
and by restricting the federal courts' authority to implement those decisions. Congress had already attempted to overrule Miranda in the ErvinMcClellan bill, so the DOJ focused on the idea that had been dropped
from the 1968 legislation: eliminating the federal courts' ability to
enforce the Miranda rules and other federal rights in habeas corpus.
Viewed in historical context, then, the campaign to curtail habeas was
not fueled primarily by an outcome-neutral concern that proper respect
be shown to the state courts, nor by concerns about docket congestion.
The resistance to federal habeas was a political statement about the Warren Court's alleged tendency to protect the rights of defendants at the
expense of public safety.
Similar views regarding habeas were everywhere apparent in the
Reagan and Bush administrations. To President Reagan's first Attorney
General, William French Smith, and to Smith's successors under Reagan
and President Bush, Edwin Meese, Richard Thornburgh, and William
Barr, habeas corpus was the paradigm example of the Warren Court's
failure to address the societal threat posed by crime. In their eyes,
habeas was an ideological irritant: an expensive and time-consuming
enterprise that frustrated law enforcement by forcing prosecutors who
had obtained convictions and sentences in state court to defend those
judgments in federal court.8 7 Moreover, the men in charge at the DOJ
86. Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in CriminalProcedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv.436, 438-39 & n.1 1(1980) (quoting
"Law and Order"-Into the Fuzzy Swirl, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1968, at 20).
87. See William French Smith, A Proposalfor Habeas Corpus Reform, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM: A BLUEPRINT 137 (Patrick B. McGuigan & Randall R. Rader eds., 1983). In one of its
last official publications, the Bush DOJ recommended that the states limit their own postconviction
procedures in many of the same ways that the Bush administration wanted to restrict federal habeas
corpus-again demonstrating, in my view, that the point was not federalism or docket control, but
what the Bush DOJ considered to be effective law enforcement. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN.,
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under Reagan and Bush were evidently convinced that prisoners on
death row (and their lawyers) manufactured frivolous claims and pressed

them on the federal courts in piecemeal fashion not in any serious effort
to obtain relief, but rather to delay their executions. The Reagan and
Bush administrations regarded the writ's defenders in Congress with suspicion, insisting that efforts to retain habeas in death penalty cases were
disguised attempts to frustrate capital punishment by the back door.8 8

Put bluntly, habeas corpus for state prisoners became a death penalty
issue. The habeas plan advanced by the Reagan and Bush administrations was tucked into omnibus anti-crime bills, where it apparently was
meant to underscore a federal commitment to capital punishment.

Critics would probably have condemned habeas with the same
ferocity even if the writ had not been so closely linked in their minds with
the death penalty. For even in noncapital cases, habeas would have
remained (to them) a vivid reflection of the Warren Court's perceived
excesses. Of course, it would have been impossible, in any case, to urge

that habeas be eliminated in capital cases, but retained for noncapital
cases. So whatever slim patience there might have been for federal
habeas apart from capital litigation would have come to nothing. In any
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMBATTING VIOLENT CRIME: 24 RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 37-39 (1992).

88.

See, eg., Smith, supra note 87, at 145:
Thirty-six states currently authorize capital punishment, and there are over one thousand prisoners under sentence of death. Remarkably, however, only five executions have
been carried out since 1967, and four of these involved criminals who wished to be executed and refused to pursue further appeals. Hence, the inefficiency of current court procedures has resulted in a de facto nullification of the decisions of most state legislatures to
impose capital punishment for some crimes. The "public interest" organizations that routinely involve themselves in the litigation carried on in capital cases have fully exploited the
system's potential for obstruction. Delay is maximized by deferring collateral attack until
the eve of execution. Once a stay of execution has been obtained, the possibility of carrying
out the sentence is foreclosed for additional years as the case works its way through the
multiple layers of appeal and review in the state and federal courts.
In 1986, the DOJ opposed a proposal by Sen. Metzenbaum to supply counsel to indigent deathrow prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. The reason given was that "the ability to generate
delay through habeas corpus litigation... [was] an important tool of the participants in this pervasive abuse of process." Metzenbaum's proposal, then, would have amounted to a "public subsidy for
an effort to frustrate the overwhelming public will supporting capital punishment for the most serious crimes." Letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, to Strom Thurmond, United
States Senator (Mar. 5, 1986) (on file with the author). The same organizations of state's attorneys
that typically support the full-and-fair plan also contend that habeas corpus frustrates implementation of the death penalty and, in this vein, resist proposals to overrule the decisions on "retroactivity" that I will take up below. See infra notes 204-32 and accompanying text; see also Criminal Law
Committee, National Association of Attorneys General, Substitute Resolution Opposing Federal
Habeas Corpus Reform Legislation That Undermines Finality and Promotes Delay and Relitigation
(June 23-26, 1991) (on file with the author); National District Attorneys Association, Resolution
Concerning Federal Habeas Corpus Reform Legislation (June 26, 1991) (on file with the author).
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event, for more than twenty years now, the writ's critics clearly have
sought the effective elimination of habeas for state convicts. Reforms
that seek a middle ground-preserving the federal courts' jurisdiction
but facilitating the processing of death penalty cases-have been unacceptable. As long as habeas is available at all, death row prisoners will
use it. And, when they do, only two things can happen. Either there will
be further litigation of some kind (however truncated by procedural

reforms), which, in the end, leaves death sentences undisturbed, or prisoners will obtain relief from the federal courts. Neither scenario is
attractive to conservatives.
A.

EARLY SKIRMISHES

Early on in the Nixon years, the DOJ under John Mitchell
approached the Judicial Conference Subcommittee on Habeas Corpus,
chaired at the time by Judge J. Edward Lumbard, one of Justice Harlan's
oldest and closest friends.8 9 The messenger was then-Assistant Attorney
General William Rehnquist.' The proposals Rehnquist offered for
restricting the federal courts' jurisdiction in habeas have enjoyed a tenacious staying power, notwithstanding that they have been rejected on
numerous occasions. At the time, Rehnquist acknowledged that each of
his three proposals would "require legislation." 9 ' More recently, he has
attempted to write them into law by judicial decision, without a justifying
amendment to the Habeas Corpus Act. 92
Essentially, Rehnquist proposed to revive the Ervin-McClellan plan
to displace Brown v. Allen. This time, however, he said that the federal
courts' habeas jurisdiction should not be repealed outright. Instead, he
argued that it should be retained in form, but robbed of content by the
reintroduction of preclusion via an admixture of Rehnquist's own views,
reflected in his bench memo to Justice Jackson twenty years earlier, and
Professor Bator's framework. 9 Rehnquist thus contended that while the
federal courts should have formal authority to entertain habeas petitions
from state convicts, they should give "conclusive weight" to prior state
89. TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 296 (1992).
90. For an earlier account of this episode, see Frank J. Remington, State PrisonerAccess to
Postconviction Relief-A Lessening Role for Federal Courts; An Increasingly Important Role for State
Courts, 44 OHIO ST.L.J. 287 (1983).
91. Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, to J.Edward Lumbard,
Circuit Judge (Aug. 20, 1971) (on file with the author).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 213-14.
93. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
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judgments on the merits-provided prisoners were accorded "an adequate opportunity to have full and fair consideration" of their claims in
state court. Alternatively, Rehnquist suggested that the 1867 Act be
amended to exclude from the federal courts' jurisdiction any claims
"unrelated to the reliability of the fact-finding process."'9 4 As yet a third
alternative, he proposed that the habeas statutes be amended to incorporate Judge Friendly's idea that federal relief should be denied even with

respect to meritorious claims, unless prisoners made a "colorable showing of innocence."9 5 Plainly, Rehnquist was urging the judges to endorse

a controversial program for restricting the federal courts' ability to vindicate federal claims. Not surprisingly, the subcommittee declined the
invitation. Rehnquist's plans were not procedural reforms that might be
accommodated in amendments to the federal rules; they were substantive
attacks on the federal courts' jurisdiction in habeas and thus clearly
would require legislative action. Accordingly, the subcommittee suggested that he take his ideas to Congress.9 6
Rehnquist did so forthwith by offering to support the Speedy Trial
Act then pending in the Senate in exchange for an amendment that
would restrict habeas corpus.9 7 To that end, he produced a draft bill and
sent it along to Senator Ervin. At about the same time, the National

Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") developed a similar proposal, and in due course the two drafts were merged in a new bill, jointly
endorsed by the Nixon DOJ and NAAG, and introduced by Senator
94. Letter from William H. Rehnquist to J. Edward Lumbard, supra note 9 1. Here, Rehnquist
drew on the Warren Court's decisions regarding the retroactive application of abrupt changes in
constitutional law. Briefly, the Court tended to give retrospective effect to "new rules" of law only if
they enhanced the truth-seeking function of criminal trials enough to offset the frustration of state
reliance interests. More recently, the Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist has developed a dramatically different approach to the retroactivity issue-with even more dramatic implications for habeas
corpus. See infra text accompanying notes 196-232.
95. Letter from William H. Rehnquist to J. Edward Lumbard, supra note 91; see Henry J.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments,38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142
(1970). This third proposal, Rehnquist explained, might be adopted alone or in addition to the
second, such that even prisoners raising claims touching the truth-seeking function of criminal trials
would still be turned away, unless they offered independent proof of their factual innocence. For an
insightful, reflective piece on Judge Friendly's influence, see Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L.
Rosenberg, Guilt"Henry Friendly Meets the Maharal of Prague,90 MICH. L. REV. 604 (1991).
96. Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, to Warren E. Burger,
Chief Justice of the United States (Sept. 23, 1971) (on file with the author) (reporting the subcommittee's position).
97. Hearingson S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,92d Cong., 1st Sess. 98-103 (1971).
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Hruska. 9' The Hruska bill reflected all three of the proposals that Rehn-

quist had asked the Judicial Conference to consider: a statutory rejection
of Brown in most instances, a prohibition on claims unrelated to guilt or

innocence in the cases remaining, and a "modification" of the harmless
error rule for any meritorious, guilt-related claims the federal courts
identified.9 9 The Judicial Conference opposed the Hruska bill, l°" which
failed to reach the floor in either the House or the Senate.101
B.

THE NIXON COURT

Simultaneously, President Nixon was working the other side of First
Street. Having promised not only tougher policies with respect to crime,
but also tougher judges in criminal cases, he chose Warren E. Burger to
succeed Chief Justice Warren. Three years later, when Nixon named
Rehnquist and Lewis Powell to succeed Justices Black and Harlan, the
stage was set for change. When the new Justices spoke of habeas corpus,
individually or as a body, they often linked the writ with threats to federalism and crowded dockets. In particular, Chief Justice Burger
expressed genuine concern about the efficient administration of justice,
and his annual reports on the state of the federal judiciary typically
included calls for some limit on habeas as a docket-control measure.102
98. S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The bill also was meant to displace the Warren Court's
great decision in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), regarding procedural default in state court.

Similar measures were offered in the House: H.R. 7084, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 6573, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 3329, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); H.R. 13,722, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972); H.R. 13,097, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
99. Letter from Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General, to Emanuel Celler, Chair, House
Committee on the Judiciary (June 21, 1973), reprintedin 119 CONG. REc. 2222 (1973). Specifically,
Kleindienst explained that the bill would require prisoners to make a special showing of "prejudice"
from a violation of their rights-notwithstanding that the federal courts already denied relief on the
basis of errors deemed to be harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. For a contemporaneous
critique of the Hruska bill, see Comment, ProposedModification of FederalHabeas Corpusfor State
Prisoners-Reformor Revocation?, 61 GEO. L.J. 1221 (1973).
100. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES (1973).

101. The judges' committee developed an alternative plan that would have retained the federal
courts' authority to adjudicate on the merits, but would have required prisoners to seek federal relief
within a specified period-provided they were given professional assistance to marshal their claims.
Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus, in REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 22 (March 7-8, 1974); see also Letter from Walter E. Hoffman, Circuit Judge, to Wade H. McCree, Jr. et al. (Mar. 12, 1974) (on file with the author). The

committee plan was introduced in the House by Rep. Rodino, H.R. 14,534, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), but it received no action.
102. See, eg., Warren E. Burger, Year-End Report on the Judiciary, Address Before the ABA
(Dec. 28, 1981), reprintedin Hearingson S. 653 Before the Subcomm. on Courtsof the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 653]; see also Lewis F.

Powell, Jr., Remarks at the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Conference (May 9, 1983) (on file with the
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Nevertheless, the Court's decisions restricting substantive rights in criminal cases, as well as its decisions limiting the availability of habeas corpus
for the enforcement of those rights, primarily made a symbolic statement
that public safety should be weighed more heavily against the competing
values celebrated in the Warren Court's decisions.
The symbolism was especially evident in the revival of capital punishment. 0 3 Plainly, the death penalty was no part of a pragmatic program for reducing street crime; it was only an expression of public
outrage. As an illustration of a changed outlook regarding public order,
however, the validation of the ultimate sanction served rather well.
Moreover, the linkage between the death penalty and habeas corpus
focused attention on the writ as itself an impediment to the new order of
things. Justice Rehnquist in particular lamented that judicial "tinkering" with Eighth Amendment standards in habeas made it "virtually
impossible for States to enforce with reasonable promptness their constitutionally valid capital punishment statutes."'" Both in death penalty
cases and in the wider field of habeas cases generally, Rehnquist, like
Justice Jackson, was convinced that a search for meritorious claims was
simply not worthwhile.'0° Accordingly, he consistently criticized the
current system for permitting "a single federal judge" to "overturn the
judgment of the highest court of a State."' 0 6 Other Nixon appointees
expressed similar views.' °7
Several strategies for restricting habeas commended themselves to
the Nixon Court. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell tended toward
some version of Judge Friendly's approach, namely a renewed focus on
factual innocence. 0 Certainly, concerns about guilt or innocence found
author) (urging Congress to curtail habeas along with diversity jurisdiction and civil rights actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-all as docket-control measures).
103. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
104. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 959 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
106. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543-44 (1981); see also Snead v. Stringer, 454 U.S. 988, 993994 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that "[it is scarcely surprising that fewer and fewer
capable lawyers can be found to serve on state benches when they may find their considered decisions overturned by the ruling of a single federal district judge on grounds as tenuous as these").
107. See, e.g., Spalding v. Aiken, 685 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1093,
1093-94 (1983) (statement of Burger, C.J., concerning the denial of certiorari) (complaining that
federal habeas permitted prisoners to press "stale claims that were fully ventilated in state courts");
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 501 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (complaining that the "common-law scholars of the past hardly would recognize" the modern writ).
108. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 102, at 82 (urging Congress to "consider" limiting habeas to
"claims of manifest miscarriages of justice"); Powell, supra note 102 (contending that Congress
should limit habeas to "cases of manifest injustice, where the issue is guilt or innocence").
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their way into cases in which the Court placed procedural barriers in the
way of prisoners seeking federal adjudication. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Wainwright v. Sykes 1 was among those new precedents. In that
case, Rehnquist rejected the Warren Court's "deliberate bypass" standard for default in state court and substituted a forfeiture framework.110
Inasmuch as that framework typically barred the federal courts from
considering claims that were not, but might have been, raised and considered in state court, it amounted to a form of "claim" preclusion.
Importantly, however, when the Nixon Court broached the substantive scope of the federal courts' authority to adjudicate on the merits, it
reached not only for Judge Friendly, but also for Paul Bator, in support.
In an opinion by Justice Powell in Stone v. Powell,III the Court held that
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims would no longer be entertained in habeas, provided prisoners received an "opportunity" for "full
and fair" adjudication in state court. 1 2 By covering both cases in which
prisoners had missed their chance to argue exclusionary rule claims in
state court and cases in which the state courts had considered and
rejected such claims on the merits, Stone introduced both "claim" and
"issue" preclusion into habeas cases involving the exclusionary rule. The
consequences were dramatic; the federal habeas courts simply ceased to
enforce the Fourth Amendment.13

C.

THE REAGAN AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS

1. The Full-and-FairProgram
Soon after President Reagan took office, Senator Thurmond introduced a bill containing a series of procedural restrictions on the writ,
109. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). There are many other examples of new procedural restrictions, of
course. Compare Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (taking a flexible approach to the exhaustion doctrine) with Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (becoming much more rigid). As these
decisions piled up, the Judicial Conference promulgated a special set of procedural rules to streamline the processing of habeas corpus cases. H.R. REP. No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). That
action offered some assurance that the objective was to eliminate the writ's inefficiencies rather than
the writ itself. Yet the promise of more efficient federal litigation did nothing to slow the flood of
restrictive decisions from the Court. The rules are now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
110. See supra text accompanying note 69.
111. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
112. Id. at 481-82.
113. A study prepared by associates at Covington & Burling reports that in recent years the
federal habeas courts have rarely managed to reach past Stone to the merits of Fourth Amendment
claims. Covington & Burling Memorandum (Oct. 7, 1991) (on file with the author).
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some of which were meant to fortify the Court's recent decisions, includ-

ing Sykes.114 At about the same time, a special Task Force on Violent
Crime, appointed by President Reagan, recommended similar legisla-

tion. "' 5 Hearings elicited support and opposition from the usual suspects.11 6 Importantly, the new administration expressed reservations;
according to the Reagan DOJ, the recommendations of the President's
own task force (and thus the pending bill) were inadequate, because they
offered only procedural reforms and failed to cabin the federal courts'

substantive authority." 7 The DOJ's preferred "solution" was "simple
abolition" of the federal courts' jurisdiction to issue the writ on behalf of
state convicts.1 8 Conscious of earlier failures to obtain the outright
repeal of the 1867 Act as it applies to state convicts, however, the Reagan
DOJ again turned to the preclusion approach suggested by Professor
Bator-who served the Reagan administration as Deputy Solicitor General.' 9 Early in 1982, then-Attorney General Smith submitted to Congress yet another plan reflecting Bator's framework.' 20 Senator
Thurmond promptly substituted the new program for his earlier bill, and
then-Representative Dan Lungren of California introduced it in the
House.'21 Ten years later, the Bush administration embraced essentially
the same plan.' 22 In the years since, conservative critics of habeas corpus
have offered a series of similar bills, containing a variety of restrictive
measures. Chiefly, however, they have pressed the key feature of the
original Reagan-Bush initiative, namely that the federal courts should be

barred from awarding habeas relief on any claim that was "fully and
114. S.653, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Rep. Sensenbrenner offered a bill containing the same
provisions in the House. H.R. 5679, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
115. Report of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess., Recommendation 42, at
321 (1981).
116. Hearingson S. 653, supra note 102, at 119 (Stephen Gillers on behalf of the ACLU); Hearings on H.R. 5679 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1683 (1982) (Phylis S.Bamberger on behalf of the ABA Subcomm. on Habeas
Corpus); Letter from Ralph J.Erickstad, Chief Justice, North Dakota, to John Conyers, Jr., United
States Representative (Dec. 2, 1982) (expressing the Chief Justices' endorsement of the "general
principles in S.653") (on file with the author).
117. Hearingson S. 653, supra note 102, at 32 (Jonathan C. Rose on behalf of the DOJ).
118. Smith, supra note 87, at 147.
119.

LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF

LAW 62 (1987).
120. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED REFORMS IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES (1982) [hereinafter PROPOSED REFORMS] (on file with the author); see Larry W. Yackle, The

Reagan Administration'sHabeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IOWA L. REv.609 (1983).
121. H.R. 6050, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Hearingson S 2216 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter Hearings on S.2216].
122. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.

1993]

HABEAS HAGIOSCOPE

2359

fairly" adjudicated in state court. 1 2 3 That idea, known on Capitol Hill as
the "full-and-fair" plan for the writ, continues to occupy paramount
ground in the congressional habeas corpus wars, notwithstanding the
election of President Clinton.
In an apparent attempt to blunt the opposition, the Reagan DOJ
insisted that the language in which the full-and-fair plan is written is the
"same" as that used by the Supreme Court in Frank v. Mangum 124 and
other cases prior to Brown v. Allen, 125 and adopted more recently (for
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims) in Stone v. Powell.12 6 By
this account, Justice Frankfurter's analysis in Brown was the aberration-"abruptly" changing the previous scope of habeas corpus. The
full-and-fair program, then, purports to eliminate the "anomalous" distinction Frankfurter drew between state findings of fact (to which the
federal courts may defer) and state determinations of law or mixed questions of law and fact (regarding which, according to Brown, the federal
courts must exercise fresh judgment). 27 Given the line of cases that preceded Brown, suffice it to say, the attempt to ascribe pivotal significance
to that decision is misleading. 128 The attempt to conflate the federal
courts' treatment of factual issues and their treatment of legal and mixed
questions is also flawed. There is a difference between questions of primary fact and questions of law and law application-as Justice Frankfurter explained forty years ago and as the 1966 amendments to the
Habeas Corpus Act plainly recognize.
Having located the "full and fair" language within one, albeit revisionist, understanding of existing law, Reagan's DOJ next distinguished
its use of that language from the very sources on which its plan was
allegedly built. First, unlike the formulation employed by the Court in
Stone, the full-and-fair program is explicitly limited to "issue" preclusion
and does not embrace "claim" preclusion. Under the plan, the federal
courts would be barred from awarding relief if a question was "fully and
fairly" considered in state court, not if it was not, but might have been,
raised and considered there. 129 Of course, the practical significance of
123. Recognizing the fact/law distinction and its role in current law, the Reagan-Bush program
proposed new full-and-fair standards in separate sections, one for state court fact finding and the
other for state determinations of legal claims in their entirety. See, eg., H.R. 1127, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985); H.R. 2238, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 217, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
124. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
125. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
126. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
127. PROPOSED REFORMS, supra note 120, at 32-36.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 25-42.
129. PROPOSED REFORMS, supra note 120, at 37-38.
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this aspect of the full-and-fair program is muted by the Rehnquist
Court's decisions on point. The forfeiture rules adopted in Sykes, after
in state court at
all, independently foreclose claims that were not raised
131
law.
state
by
prescribed
the time and in the manner
Second, unlike Bator's model and ordinary "issue" preclusion doc-

trine, the plan contemplates that "full and fair" adjudication would
include an element of substantive judgment. Rather than limiting the
federal courts to an appraisal of the procedures employed in state court,
the full-and-fair program has it that the federal courts should undertake,
in addition, an appraisal of the outcome the state courts reached on the
merits of claims. Specifically, the federal courts should find state adjudication to have been "full and fair" only if the decision the state courts
arrived at meets a "minimum standard of reasonableness." 1 3 ' Notwithstanding adequate state processes for reaching results, the full-and-fair

plan would allow the federal courts to award relief if the outcome in state
court was unreasonable-"in light of the facts found and the rule of law
the
applied."' 3 2 As I will demonstrate below, this attempt to temper
33
reassuring.
scarcely
is
model
process
purely
a
of
implications
130. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
131. PROPOSED REFORMS, supra note 120, at 38.
132. Id.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 176-77. As a third point for debate, at least when it was
initially put forward, the full-and-fair plan would have allowed the federal courts to "re-adjudicate"
a claim previously rejected in state court if a prisoner presented "new evidence" regarding the claim
that could not have been discovered and presented to the state courts, or if, after the state courts
completed their work, there was a "change" in the law "of substantial importance" to the prisoner's
claim. PROPOSED REFORMS, supranote 120, at 40. This last provision was clearly meant to address
cases in which, subsequent to state court action on the basis of existing precedents, the Supreme
Court altered the controlling federal legal standard and gave its new decision retrospective effect.
Such a provision made more practical sense in 1982 when the plan was drafted than it does today.
Then, of course, the retrospective effect of changes in legal doctrine was a matter of substantive law,
and when "new rules" were applied retroactively, they were available to appellants and habeas petitioners alike. Today, by contrast, the Court has reconceptualized the law of retroactivity as an
interpretation of the Habeas Corpus Act, and habeas applicants almost never have the benefit of
"new rules." See infra text accompanying notes 196-232. The language in the Reagan-Bush program did not change to reflect this shift by the Court. Nevertheless, even if the Reagan DOJ thought
that fairness necessitated opening the federal courts to state prisoners relying on "new rules" that did
not exist when they were in state court, the Bush DOJ insisted that it is precisely in cases in which
the law changes that fresh adjudication in federal court should be unavailable.
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The full-and-fair program has evoked intense legislative scrutiny.13 4
Liberal Democrats have opposed it at every turn.1 35 So far, Representa-

tives Robert Kastenmeier, Don Edwards, William Hughes, and Jack
Brooks, and Senators Joseph Biden, Edward Kennedy, Patrick Leahy,

and Howard Metzenbaum have prevailed 136 for three related reasons.
First, they have benefitted from legislative inertia. Keeping a dozen bills
from passing is almost always easier than nursing one through to enactment. Second, they have been supported by excellent staffs and a few
dogged lobbyists and consultants representing the ABA, legal aid and

criminal defense counsel organizations, and civil rights and civil liberties
groups-particularly the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
("LDF") and the Washington office of the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"). Many a long night has been spent dickering over
restrictive bills until, usually at the bitter end of a congressional session,
the full-and-fair plan has been set aside. Third, they have often been able
to insist that events outside Congress have made immediate legislation
unnecessary or, at least, premature. As the full-and-fair proposal has
been debated in the House and Senate, the Supreme Court has extended
ways, has responded
its list of restrictive judicial decisions and, in many
137
to habeas critics' complaints by judicial action.
134. During the Reagan years, conservative Republicans in Congress repeatedly pressed bills
incorporating the plan in more or less its original form.
135. It is nothing short of miraculous that the Habeas Corpus Act was not amended during the
Reagan years. After all, the great power of the presidency was brought to bear on the writ, and there
was widespread support in Congress for restrictive legislation. Moreover, some judges on occasion
offered their general, if obliquely stated, encouragement. In a widely noted lecture at William and
Mary, Sandra Day O'Connor, then a state appellate judge but soon to be nominated to the Supreme
Court, made it clear that she regarded the federal courts' jurisdiction in habeas as undesirable. Sandra D. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the FederalandState Courtsfrom the Perspective of a State CourtJudge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981). Chief Justice Burger condemned
the writ as inviting an "endless quest for technical errors unrelated to guilt or innocence," Burger,
supra note 102, and Justice Powell explicitly called on Congress to limit habeas to cases in which
"guilt or innocence" was in question. Powell, supra note 102.
136. When, for example, S. 238 was before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1985-86, Sen.
Metzenbaum offered a series of amendments designed to mitigate the bill's threat to the federal
courts' ability to decide federal questions on the merits--among them a proposal simply to drop the
full-and-fair idea. The DOJ vigorously opposed all amendments to S. 238, and no amendments were
adopted. Yet the Metzenbaum initiative prompted significant discussion and necessarily complicated Sen. Thurmond's hopes of an early and favorable committee report. See Letters from John R.
Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, to Strom Thurmond, United States Senator (Feb. 26, Mar. 5 &
18, 1986) (on file with the author). In addition, Sens. Leahy and Biden submitted extensive written
questions to committee witnesses, the replies to which occupied substantial space in the published
hearings on the bill. Hearingson S. 238 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985).
137. In the spring of 1987, Leslie Harris, Legislative Counsel to the ACLU in Washington,
circulated a memorandum to members of the Senate, detailing the many ways in which the Court's
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When Republicans enjoyed a slim majority in the Senate during the
98th Congress, the full-and-fair program was inserted in the Reagan
administration's Comprehensive Crime Control Act. 138 When that
omnibus bill became ensnarled in committee, Senator Thurmond split
the habeas title off and persuaded the Judiciary Committee to report it to
the full body as a separate bill. The Senate passed it in that form, by a
lopsided 67-9 vote. 139 The House, controlled by Democrats, failed to act
on it, however, and it died at the end of the session. When Senator Thurmond tried again in the 99th Congress, he could not regain the ground he
had lost. The relevant committee of the Judicial Conference endorsed
some provisions in Thurmond's bill, but was thunderously silent with
respect to the full-and-fair idea. ' 4 The Judiciary Committee failed to
report the new bill to the floor. 4 ' Independent attempts by southern
Democrats to undercut habeas in the same period were also unsuccessful.' 42 In the 102d Congress, the Senate agreed to a massive anti-crime
then-recent decisions arguably satisfied demands for limits on the writ. While the ACLU found
those decisions unfortunate, their existence offered a sound basis for opposing restrictive legislation.
Memorandum from Leslie Harris to interested members of the U.S. Senate (May 6, 1987) (on file
with the author). Readers should know that I collaborated in the memorandum and signed it along
with Harris. Late in 1988, one could also argue that congressional action would be premature in
advance of the reports then expected from the Powell Committee and the ABA task force-discussed next in the text.
138. Hearings on S. 829 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
139. S. 1763, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1984); see S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
140. Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law, Report of the Proceedings of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Sept. 17-18, 1985 (on file with the author).
141. Judge Phylis Skloot Bamberger, then attorney in charge of the appeals unit of the Legal
Aid Society of New York City Federal Defender Section, testified against the bill on behalf of the
ABA. Jack Boger, then assistant counsel at LDF, spoke for that organization. Readers should
know that I testified on behalf of the ACLU.
142. During the mid-1980s, it sometimes appeared that the greater threat to federal habeas
might well lie in conservative Democrats' initiatives rather than in the Reagan administration's program. At that time, southern Democrats held the balance of power in both houses of Congress-just
as they do today. Regarding habeas, the principal players were Floridians-Charles Bennett in the
House and Bob Graham in the Senate. See, eg., H.R. 3416, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 134,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Neither man was one to carry a spear for the Republican administration then in office, but both pursued restrictions on the writ in service of a similar agenda-tied
tightly to the popularity of capital punishment in their state.
Sen. Graham had come to national prominence as governor of Florida, where he had championed the death penalty. Elected to the Senate, Graham brought along his suspicion that death row
prisoners used federal habeas to delay or frustrate their executions-the same argument that the
Reagan DOJ consistently put forward. Graham did not, however, simply give the President his
support, but, instead, directed his staff to explore a range of options with ABA representatives. In a
series of exchanges and meetings in 1985-87, Graham's staff and ABA consultants pored over draft
bills, most of which aimed to expedite and streamline the federal courts' consideration of the merits
of prisoners' federal claims. Graham's staff expressed the Senator's desire to codify the Sykes forfeiture standard for procedural default in state court, and, in that way, to limit the federal courts'
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bill containing the full-and-fair plan for habeas. 143 Again, however, the

House refused to accept such a provision in its own, similarly extensive
crime bill. t " President Bush himself pressed for the plan, as did the
DOJ, the Conference of Chief Justices, NAAG, the National District

Attorneys Association ("NDAA"), and other organizations.145 On the
ability to reach the merits of some claims. Yet neither Sen. Graham nor his staff pressed for the fulland-fair program or any other proposal effectively to eliminate the federal courts' general habeas
jurisdiction by subjecting the writ to preclusion. When Graham filed his own bill considerably later,
he tracked the Reagan plan sans the full-and-fair provision. While Phylis Bamberger pulled the
laboring oar, readers should know that, during this period, I also served as an informal consultant to
the ABA and the ACLU-and in that capacity met with Sen. Graham's staff along with others. For
the Graham bill, see S. 271, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); see also H.R. 1090, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1989) (a bill by Rep. Bennett incorporating the provisions of S. 271).
143. See, eg., H.R. 2709, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989); Hearings on H.R. 4737 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, IntellectualProperty,and the AdministrationofJustice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 279-320 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4737]. A Republican
substitute for H.R. 4737, offered in the House Judiciary Committee in the summer of 1990, also
reproduced the full-and-fair plan. Sen. Thurmond introduced the same program independently, S.
88, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); see also H.R. 4079, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 3918, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 3119, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (all incorporating the same plan).
144. In the first session of the 102d Congress, Sen. Biden reintroduced his original plan for
death penalty cases, coupled with a section from the previous year's House bill, H.R. 5269. S. 618,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see infra note 167. Sen. Graham initially introduced a variant of the
bill he previously had introduced, S. 620, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), but later offered an amendment to Sen. Biden's program. Sen. Specter again offered the bill that had previously been passed in
the Senate, S. 19, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), but his bill saw no action. After debate on the floor,
the Senate rejected the Biden and Graham habeas proposals in favor of a Republican substitute
containing the full-and-fair program. 137 CONG. REc. S8660-61 (daily ed. June 26, 1991).
Proceedings in the House were complicated at the outset by the defeat of Rep. Kastenmeier in
the previous fall's elections. When the new Congress opened, jurisdiction for habeas corpus was
shifted from the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice,
previously chaired by Kastenmeier and now assigned to Rep. Hughes, to the Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights, chaired by Rep. Edwards (Cal.). Rep. Hughes reintroduced the HughesDerrick plan, H.R. 18, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), see infra note 167. However, that bill was set
aside in favor of a new plan devised by Rep. Edwards-which was reported to the floor by the House
Judiciary Committee as part of yet another omnibus crime bill. See H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Rep. Hyde abandoned his previous
support for the Powell Committee report standing alone, notwithstanding his success with that position in the 101st Congress. See infra note 167. Instead, he initially introduced a substitute containing the President's complete program, just as it had been adopted in the Senate. When it appeared
that the House might defeat the substitute because of the full-and-fair provision, Rep. Hyde offered
an amendment he said would define "full and fair adjudication" in a way that should satisfy critics'
concerns. The House rejected the amended Hyde substitute in favor of the program offered by Rep.
Edwards. 137 CONG. REc. H11,753-55 (daily ed. Nov. 11, 1991).
145. See 137 CONG. REc. S18,670-75 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (collected letters); Resolution
XVI of the Conference of Chief Justices (resolution adopted in Philadelphia, Aug. 8, 1991) (on file
with the author); cf Charley Roberts, Lungren Will Take Messagefor a Price,L.A. DAILY J., Sept.
30, 1991, at 7 (reporting that now-California Attorney General Dan Lungren was raising money
through direct-mail solicitations to finance a lobbying effort to enact the full-and-fair plan for habeas
corpus--which Lungren himself had proposed when he was a House member). The state attorneys
general were not unanimous. Robert Abrams of New York and Nicholas J. Spaeth of North Dakota
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other side, an array of groups and individuals, including the ABA,
mounted a campaign to defeat the full-and-fair program.1 46 In the end
(and in the face of a veto threat14 7), the House adopted a package of
habeas proposals developed by the House Judiciary Committee and
squarely rejected a substitute containing the full-and-fair plan offered by
Representative Henry Hyde. When the conference committee embraced
that House-passed habeas program, the House again approved it.1 48 In

the Senate, by contrast, Republicans filibustered the conference committee report, frustrating the enactment of any crime bill in 1992.149 The
battle continues in the current, 103d Congress.
dissented. Later, Lee Fisher of Ohio, joined by Spaeth, and Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota,
wrote to Sen. Biden to endorse the conference committee bill, albeit with reservations. Letter from
Lee Fisher, Ohio Attorney General, to Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chair, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (undated) (on file with the author). William J. Guste of Louisiana wrote a separate letter, condemning the NAAG resolution and supporting the conference bill, and circulated it to a number of
potentially sympathetic colleagues.
146. The effort included the formation of the Emergency Committee to Save Habeas Corpus,
cochaired by several former attorneys general of the United States including Benjamin R. Civiletti,
Nicholas Katzenbach, and Elliott L. Richardson, and constituted by dozens of prominent public
figures. See Press Release (Oct. 10, 1991) (on file with the author).
147. Ten state attorneys general urged Bush to carry out his threat if he received the bill then
pending in the House. Letter from Dan Lungren, Attorney General of California, to the President
(Nov. 21, 1991) (on file with author). At a meeting in Fort Lauderdale in December 1991, NAAG
adopted such a resolution (on file with author).
148. 137 CONG. REC. HI 1,756 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991). It was no secret at the time that the
Democratic leadership worked hard to obtain approval for the conference report, particularly its
habeas title-which was widely regarded as the principal stumbling block. The leadership kept the
House in session through the night before the Thanksgiving recess, and at that, may well have
obtained a favorable vote (205 to 203) only because some conservative Democrats became angry at
the President for an entirely different reason. Just as the conference crime bill came to the floor,
some Republicans in the House, led by Rep. Newt Gingrich, proposed an eleventh-hour tax reduction for the "middle class." President Bush, who previously had resisted tax reductions, at first held
firm, but then appeared to waffle in the face of a popular scheme put forward by members of his own
party. That apparent inconsistency irritated Democrats, who regarded talk of tax reductions as
political pandering for partisan advantage. They may have been more willing, accordingly, to
approve a crime bill that Bush had threatened to veto. Clifford Krause, After Senate Backs Bush and
Blocks Anti-Crime Bill, Congress Goes Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1991, at D22.
149. 137 CONG. REc. S18,615-16 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991); 138 CONG. REC. S3926-44 (daily
ed. Mar. 19, 1992) (recording unsuccessful cloture votes). For the general Senate debate, see 137
CONG. REC. S18,664-86 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991); see also Joan Biskupic, Death Row Issue Divides
Hill, Halts Crime Bill Progress, CONG. Q., Feb. 22, 1992, at 410.
Late in the second session, Sen. Biden orchestrated a series of meetings on the most controversial provisions in the crime bill, including habeas corpus. Some of the meetings were for the principals in the House and the Bush DOJ and thus were meant to address broad policy objectives; some
were for staff and were meant to seek specific compromises on some of the less divisive issues regarding death penalty cases: the statute of limitations, the rules for successive petitions, and the standards
for counsel in state court. None of those efforts to find a middle ground was successful. In the last
week, Biden involved representatives of national police organizations in the discussions. Those
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Proceduresfor Capital Cases

As much as I want to emphasize that the purpose and effect of the
full-and-fair program would be the practical elimination of habeas corpus
for state prisoners, I do not mean to neglect the genuine procedural difficulties occasioned by death penalty cases. As the debate over habeas has
unfolded, the press has been filled with lurid accounts of instances in
which notorious murderers have filed numerous applications for relief in
the state courts, followed by multiple federal habeas petitions and, in the
process, managed to keep themselves alive for years pendente lite.150
Equally significant, the press has reported the current Supreme Court's
impatience with such cases and the disturbing, sometimes unseemly, way
the Court has treated lower court judges struggling to meet their
responsibilities. I5
groups wanted the crime bill to succeed, because it promised federal funding for local law enforcement programs and modest handgun controls in the form of the celebrated "Brady Bill," named for
the Reagan press secretary who had been seriously wounded in the attack on President Reagan some
years earlier. Even with police groups on his side, however, and after spending the night of October
1, 1992, in his office attempting to forge a compromise, Sen. Biden was unable to develop a habeas
corpus package that the Bush administration and Republican senators would accept.
On the Senate floor the next day, Biden tried once more to invoke cloture with respect to the
conference committee report, and, when that effort failed, he offered to delete the entire habeas title
from the bill in order to remove the Edwards program for the writ as an obstacle to agreement on the
remaining provisions. When Sen. Thurmond continued to object, the Senate's consideration of the
crime bill came to an end. 138 CONG. REC. S16,226 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992). One last attempt by
Republicans to enact the Bush administration's crime program by attaching it to the Public Health
Service Act was unsuccessful. Id. at S16,360.
150. Eg., Katherine Bishop, CaliforniaKiller is at Center of Storm on Limiting Death Penalty
Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1991, at B7 (describing the Robert Alton Harris case in California);
Lawrence I. Shurlroff, Mass Killer PutsFocus on FederalAppeal Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1991,
at B16 (reporting that Alan Raphael at Loyola of Chicago had just filed a petition on behalf of John
Wayne Gacy-and that "more delays" were expected in that notorious case). While many popular
press stories express wonder at the deliberate pace of capital cases, some are openly sympathetic to
the plight of death row prisoners litigating for their very lives. The accounts of Kathleen Behan's
work on behalf of Roger Keith Coleman provide the best illustration. See Peter Applebome, Virginia Executes Inmate Despite Claim of Innocence, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at A20; Tamar
Lewin, Lawyer Relives Sorrow of Execution, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1992, at A7. Critics of habeas in
death penalty cases typically use the details of convicts' offenses as part of their case against the
availability of the federal courts. Eg., George Deukmejian, Justice Denied: Habeas Corpus Appeals
Have Been Misused to Thwart the People's Will, L.A. DAILY J., June 21, 1989, at 3.
151. For example, in Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992), the Court
vacated a stay of execution issued by the Ninth Circuit and thus permitted Robert Alton Harris to be
put to death in California without consideration of his claim that execution by lethal gas violated the
Eighth Amendment. Cf Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713 (1992) (ordering the lower courts to
deny any further stay applications on Harris' behalf without the permission of the Supreme Court
itself). And in Herrera v. Collins, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992), the Court granted Herrera's petition for
certiorari and thus agreed to consider his claim that the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of
an innocent man-but at the same time denied his request for the stay of execution needed to keep
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The pattern is now familiar. A prisoner is convicted of a heinous
crime and sentenced to death. Direct review in the state appellate courts

requires substantial time and effort-often because trial counsel failed to
raise and pursue all the federal claims open to the accused and new counsel must attempt to compensate on appeal. Next come state post-conviction proceedings, in which many states provide no counsel to indigentsthus leaving undereducated death row inmates to generate even more
confusion and complexity as they stagger through alien territory pro se.
At some point several years after sentencing, state remedies are
exhausted and the appropriate state officer fixes an execution date. At
that point, one of the country's thinly spread volunteer-counsel programs

(for example, the ABA Postconviction Project or LDF) manages to find
the prisoner an attorney by triage: the next prisoner scheduled to die gets
him alive until that question could be adjudicated. On the Herreraepisode, see Jordan Steiker, Can
They Execute the Innocent? Probably,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1992, at A23. Cf Herrera v. Collins,
113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (ultimately finding Herrera's evidence insufficient); 139 CONG. REC. S776
(daily ed. Jan. 27, 1993) (recording a bill by Sen. Metzenbaum meant to overturn the Herreradecision legislatively).
For strong responses to the Court's action in the Harris case from two of the circuit judges
below, see Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, the Death Penaltyand the Harris Case, 102 YALE
L.J. 205 (1992); John T. Noonan, Should State Executions Run on Schedule?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
1992, at A 17; see also Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton
Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992); Kathrine Bishop, When Appeals Court Becomes a Big Issue in
Death-Row Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at B18 (reporting Judge Pregerson's integrity in issuing a fourth stay in the Harris case in order that the open Eighth Amendment issue could be taken
up); Stephen Reinhardt, Conservative Rehnquist Court Unmasks Its Naked Activism, L.A. TIMES,
May 7, 1991, at B7. As might be expected, attorneys on opposing sides in celebrated cases typically
reach dramatically different conclusions from their experience. Compare Daniel E. Lungren & Mark
L. Krotoski, Public Policy Lessons From the Robert Alton Harris Case, 40 UCLA L. REv. 295 (1992)
(offering the prosecution's perspective) with Charles M. Sevilla & Michael Laurence, Thoughts on the
Cause of the PresentDiscontents: The Death Penalty Case of Robert Alton Harris,40 UCLA L. REV.
345 (1992) (responding from the defense perspective).
The popular press has not missed the implications of these and similar cases. Moreover, the
very titles of articles indicate that the Justices' actions have not been well received. E.g., Linda
Greenhouse, A Window on the Court: Limits on Inmates' Habeas Corpus Petitions Illuminate Mood
and Agenda of the Justices, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, Of Rehnquist's
Mission, and Patience to Match, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1991, at A18; More Death, Less Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 1990, at A29; No Need for Execution Express, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1989, at A22.
Not only the Justices' actions in death penalty cases that come before them, but their support for
legislative curbs on the writ, have drawn criticism. See, e.g., The High Court v. Habeas Corpus, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 1992, at 18. Of course, reporters are helped to their unsympathetic appraisals by
civil-liberties advocates, who increasingly have taken their message to newspapers and magazines.
See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Little Sympathy for Defendants in CapitalCases, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990,
at S12; David Bruck & Leslie Harris, Habeas Corpse, NEw REPUBLIC, July 15, 1991, at 10; Ronald
J. Tabak, Execution of Injustice: Under Any Test, Death Penalty Fails, LEGAL TIMES, May 28, 1990,
at 26; Scott Wallace, The Great Writ at the Crossroads,THE CHAMPION, Mar. 1990, at 45.
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the next available volunteer lawyer. 5 2 New counsel promptly seeks a
stay of execution from the appropriate federal district court, pending the
court's consideration of a petition for habeas corpus relief. State's attorneys oppose the stay request, and everyone is then put through stressful
emergency proceedings up and down the federal judicial hierarchy-proceedings that typically require hastily called evening sessions or deliberations by telephone. If a stay finally issues and is sustained, substantially
more time is required to consider the issues revealed in the petition on
the merits. In some instances, moreover, there may be successive applications on behalf of the same prisoner.'5 3 This "hurry up and wait" process has no champions, only critics.' 54
When the full-and-fair plan stalled in Congress late in President
Reagan's second term, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that procedural reforms for capital cases could not be postponed. Accordingly, he
appointed an ad hoc committee of the Judicial Conference, chaired by
former Justice Powell, to study the matter. 5 5 At the time, the Chief
Justice declared that he had no preconceived remedy in mind, but
152. See Esther F. Lardent & Douglas M. Cohen, The Last Best Hope: RepresentingDeath Row
Inmates, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 213 (1989). See generally Marcia Coyle et al., FatalDefense: Trial
and Errorin the Nation'sDeath Belt, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30; Michael Mello, Facing Death
Alone: The Post Conviction Attorney Crisison Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 513 (1988). On the
difficulties and perils of relying on volunteer lawyers, see Mark Silk, Can Legal Volunteerism Work
in Capital Cases?,ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 15, 1991, at A15. For an account of the excellent service
that some volunteers have rendered, see Stuart Taylor, Jr., We Will Kill You Anyway, AM. LAW.,
Dec. 1990, at 54. And for an account of one professional who works for so little that he is in
substance a volunteer, see Caroline V. Clarke, DoingBattle in the Death Belt, AM. LAW., Dec. 1990,
at 76 (reviewing Brian Stevenson's work in Alabama). For an unsympathetic account of the work of
LDF lawyers on behalf of death row prisoners, see Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903-08 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
153. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2520 (1992) (complaining that repetitive eleventhhour petitions are common in death penalty cases); accord Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377
(1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
154. Compare Lewis A. Powell, Capital Punishment, HARV. L. REv. 1035 (1989) with Reinhardt, supra note 151. Judge Higginbotham has himself published a helpful piece. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Stays of Execution: A Search for Predictabilityand Rationality, 20 TEx. TECH. L. REV.
at vii (1989).
155. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Press Release (Aug. 31, 1988) (on file with the
author). In addition to Justice Powell, the members were sitting federal judges from the "death"
circuits: Charles Clark, Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit; Paul Roney, Chief Judge of the Eleventh
Circuit; William Hodges, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida;
and Barefoot Sanders, Acting Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas. Professor Al Pearson, who had previously served as a judicial fellow at the Supreme Court,
was named as reporter. The group, which came to be called simply the Powell Committee, operated
entirely in executive session. It solicited submissions from various groups, including the ACLU, the
NLADA, and LDF, but it held no hearings. Most observers believed it would return soon with
proposals for drastic limits on the writ in capital cases. See, eg., Room for Relief, NAT'L L.J., Nov.
28, 1988, at 12. Justice Powell intimated as much in a speech delivered at an ABA meeting, and
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wanted the committee to explore ways to improve the handling of capital

cases-positing, if you will, that they would continue to reach federal
court. 156 Moreover, in a later speech seeking support for the committee's
proposals, the Chief Justice said that the full-and-fair program might be
premature at this time and suggested that the committee's procedural
changes be tried instead. 57 By then, however, he and his colleagues at
the Court had opened their own front in the battle over the writ, which

might render the full-and-fair scheme no longer necessary to subject
habeas to preclusion. I will explore those related developments below. I 8
In any case, it is clear that the Powell Committee took as its operating assumption that the federal courts would retain their jurisdiction in
habeas corpus and searched for some means by which that jurisdiction

might be exercised more efficiently in capital cases. A parallel task force,
commissioned by the ABA, did the same." 9 Others have sketched the
two groups' investigations and the recommendations they offered."6 Let
me make only a few points in passing. First, while one must assume the
Chief Justice intended nothing of the kind, the appointment of the Powell
Committee in the summer of 1988 in fact short-circuited any legislative
action on habeas in the 100th Congress. As the committee began its
work, Congress took up its last opportunity of the session to enact the
habeas defenders braced themselves for yet another fight. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Remarks to the ABA
Criminal Justice Section (Aug. 7, 1988) (on file with the author).
156. William H. Rehnquist, Remarks to the National Conference of Chief Justices, Williamsburg, Va. (Jan. 27, 1988) (on file with the author).
157. William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the American Law Institute Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C. 13-14 (May 15, 1990) (on file with the author). The Chief Justice referred specifically
to a version of the full-and-fair plan then-recently introduced by Sen. Thurmond, S. 88, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989); see supra note 143.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 179-297.
159.

AD Hoc COMM. ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, REPORT AND PRO-

POSAL (1989) (explaining that the Committee had no intent to alter the substantive scope of federal
habeas). The ABA obtained a grant from the State Justice Institute to support its task force, which
was cochaired by Malcolm Lucas, Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, and Judge Alvin B.
Rubin of the Fifth Circuit and was composed of a diverse group of knowledgeable members, including Jim Liebman from Columbia and one of the nation's best death penalty litigators, Steve Bright.
Ira Robbins was the reporter. The ABA task force did hold public hearings and developed its own
set of recommendations for reform. See Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of
Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1990) [hereinafter ABA Task Force].
The ABA task force proposals were offered too late to influence the earliest habeas bills in the 101st
Congress, filed in the Senate by Sens. Biden and Thurmond, but they figured significantly in a later
bill introduced by Rep. Kastenmeier in the House. See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
160. Steven M. Goldstein, Expediting the Federal Habeas Corpus Review Process in Capital
Cases: An Examination of Recent Proposals, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 599 (1990); Ronald J. Tabak & J.
Mark Lane, JudicialActivism and Legislative "Reform" of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent Developments and Current Proposals, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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full-and-fair plan. As usual, it was included in a massive crime bill, the

Anti-Drug Abuse Act. 16 1 As usual, opponents worked vigorously to
delete it from the larger bill. As usual, they were successful-this time
by persuading the Senate to drop the habeas provisions from the bill in

exchange for a promise that the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Biden, would introduce a new habeas bill in the 101st Con-

gress-within a specified time after the Chief Justice transmitted the
Powell Committee's report. 1 62 Paradoxically, then, by appointing his
own committee to study procedures in capital cases (a matter of genuine
concern but scarcely his highest priority), Chief Justice Rehnquist contributed to the defeat of the more far-reaching changes that he had been
urging since 1953.163
Second, Rehnquist's handling of the Powell Committee report 1 4 in

the fall of 1989 generated bad publicity for himself and the Court and, in
the process, undercut congressional action on habeas again in the 101st

Congress. Initially, the Chief Justice insisted that the full Judicial Conference act on the report almost immediately. When a majority of the
Conference refused, he sent the unapproved committee report to Senator
Biden, triggering the time period the Senate had given Biden to develop a
reform bill and forcing Senator Biden to act without the benefit of the
161. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
162. 134 CONG. REC. S7323 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
163. The heated politics of habeas corpus in Congress enjoyed some breathing space for most of
1989. Yet those who had resisted restrictive measures in the past used that time to marshal their
resources for the renewed challenge that lay ahead. Organizations committed to preserving habeas
for state prisoners established an informal coalition that met regularly to map strategy with key
congressional staff members. By late summer, the hard work of lining up votes had begun again in
earnest. The coalition faced two especially vexing difficulties. Given the Senate's action in deference
to the Powell Committee, it seemed clear that the next threat to the writ would come in the form of
that committee's recommendations. Yet until Justice Powell reported, the contours of the impending debate were unknown. In addition, the coalition was deeply suspicious of the Supreme Court's
decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which had been handed down in February. No one
was quite sure what to make of it, but LDF attorneys George Kendall and Richard Burr anticipated
that the case might one day reach well beyond the retroactivity problem it purported to address.
That, of course, is exactly what happened.
164. AD Hoc COMM. ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, supra note 159. If a
state supplied counsel to capital petitioners in state postconviction proceedings, the committee recommended: (I) that stays of execution should be automatic (in order to eliminate unseemly midnight
deliberations), (2) that prisoners should be required to file their federal petitions within a fixed time
period, (3) that the federal courts should not ordinarily entertain claims that were not properly
raised in state court, and (4) that second or successive petitions from the same prisoner usually
should be dismissed and should never be accepted in the absence of a claim going to the prisoner's
guilt of the offense for which the death penalty was imposed.
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parent body's views.16 5 If that was not enough, the impatience apparent

in Rehnquist's behavior contributed to a general rush to judgment in the
Senate itself, which promptly adopted a widely condemned habeas program-parts of which were concocted by Senator Arlen Specter in the
midst of debate on the floor in order to win a largely partisan political
victory. 166 Things began more propitiously in the House, where Representative Kastenmeier was able to postpone a bill until the full Judicial
165. When the committee filed its report with the Judicial Conference in September, the Conference tabled it for consideration at its next scheduled meeting in March 1990. The Chief Justice
nevertheless immediately sent the committee report to Sen. Biden, explaining that he interpreted the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act to contemplate submission of the report-with or without action by the full
Conference. Statement of the Chief Justice (Oct. 5, 1989) (on file with the author). Fourteen members of the Conference then joined in a letter to the Conference Secretary, asking him to approach
Sen. Biden and Rep. Brooks, chair of the House Judiciary Committee, to request that no action be
taken on the committee report until the judges could be heard in hearings. Letter from Donald A.
Lay, Circuit Judge, et al. to Ralph Mecham, Secretary of the Judicial Conference (Oct. 4, 1989) (on
file with the author); see Linda Greenhouse, Judges Challenge Rehnquist's Role on Death Penalty,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1989, at Al. Sen. Biden asked Chief Justice Rehnquist whether, in these circumstances, the Chief Justice meant by early submission of the report to invoke the time limit specified in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. The Chief Justice declined to change his position. Letter from
William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, to Joseph Biden, Chair,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 11, 1989) (on file with the author); see Linda Greenhouse,
Rehnquist Renews Request to Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1989, at A21. Sen. Biden then found
himself obliged to review the committee report promptly and to present a bill. Habeas Corpus
Reform: Hearingson S. 88, S. 1757, and S. 1760 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 119 (1989).
When the full Judicial Conference considered the committee report in March 1990, the judges
who had joined in the letter to Mr. Mecham the previous fall offered amendments to make habeas
corpus more accessible to capital petitioners. Most of the amendments were disapproved by a narrow margin. In two instances, the Chief Justice himself cast negative votes in order to produce ties
and defeat amendments he opposed personally. See Hearingson H.R. 4737, supra note 143, at 122
(testimony of Judge Oakes); id. at 127 (statement of Judge Lay); Linda Greenhouse, Vote is a Rebuff
for Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 15, 1990, at A16. The Conference adopted two amendments,
one encouraging the provision of qualified attorneys at all stages of capital litigation in state court,
the other permitting successive petitions raising claims touching the appropriateness of death
sentences. Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, News Release (Mar. 14, 1990) (on file with the
author); see also Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, to Jack Brooks, Chair, House Committee on the Judiciary (Apr. 6, 1990) (on file with the
author) (forwarding the Conference's approved amendments to the House Judiciary Committee).
166. Sen. Biden made the best of a bad situation and introduced a plausible plan, which tracked
the Powell Committee report in many respects, but tempered its rigidity in others. See S. 1757, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 4002, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 3584, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1989) (tracking S. 1757). Sen. Thurmond, for his part, immediately introduced his own bill, which
reproduced the Powell Committee report verbatim. See S. 1760, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Sen.
Biden's bill was incorporated in the Senate's omnibus crime bill in the 101st Congress. S. 1970,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). There followed some of the most perplexing maneuvering the battle
over habeas had yet seen. Because Biden considered Sen. Graham's support essential, his committee
staff consulted with Graham's personal staff at great length-ultimately producing a compromise,
which was imperfect by any fair standard, but which was accepted by unanimous consent as floor
debate opened on S. 1970. 136 CONG. REC. S6802-38 (daily ed. May 23, 1990). The Senate stayed in
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Conference and the ABA had acted and then to offer a more coherent

Democratic plan with the help of Representative Hughes. That program, too, surrendered to conservatives on the floor, however, when the
House accepted a substitute by Representative Hyde that incorporated

the original Powell Committee report verbatim.

67

When a conference

committee could not reconcile the Senate and House actions on habeas to

anyone's satisfaction, habeas corpus was dropped from further consideration. In the end, then, the 101st Congress, too, failed to enact habeas

legislation.

68

Third, the Powell Committee was given an impossible assignment
and, unsurprisingly, failed to develop recommendations for change that
session late on the night of May 23, 1990 to consider the Biden-Graham compromise and its Republican opposition. It soon became clear that Sen. Thurmond would not succeed if he persisted in
pressing the Powell Committee report without amendment. Sen. Specter persuaded him to accept a
series of changes, some of which borrowed from the Biden-Graham initiative, and some of which
reflected Specter's own innovations. Specter did not take time to shape and refine his thinking with
staff and other senators. Certainly he made no attempt to remand the habeas matter for committee
consideration. As he sat on the Senate floor, he wrote out his ideas in longhand in the margins of the
pending bill. Through the evening, Sen. Specter's staff, Sen. Biden's staff, the staffs of other senators,
lobbyists, and DOJ lawyers wrangled among themselves over the acceptability of Specter's proposals. At one point, it seemed that Biden had given enough ground to achieve a compromise on which
all sides could agree, albeit grudgingly. But at the last minute, that chance was lost and the Senate
was put, after all, to the very vote that Biden had hoped to avoid-a clear choice between the BidenGraham plan and the substitute that Sen. Specter had developed with Sen. Thurmond. The vote was
close, but Biden-Graham prevailed. Id. at S6833-34. The usual shifting of positions followed. Sen.
Specter changed his vote in order to move to reconsider the matter the following day. By then, he
had found additional votes for his cause and, in the end, his motion to reconsider was adopted by a
52-46 margin. Id. at S6882 (daily ed. May 24, 1990). The resulting Senate action could be explained
only as a manifestation of doubts in the minds of Republicans and southern Democrats that Sen.
Biden's initiative was sufficient to vent the Senate's displeasure with habeas litigation in capital cases.
167. Rep. Kastenmeier's bill, H.R. 4737, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reflected some ideas from
the Powell Committee, but also incorporated the amendments adopted by the full Judicial Conference, together with many of the ABA's recommendations. See Hearings on H.R. 4737, supra note
143. Before the full House Judiciary Committee, Kastenmeier offered a substitute fashioned in cooperation with Rep. Hughes, which responded to criticisms leveled against H.R. 4737. The substitute
was adopted by the committee and became part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990,
H.R. 5269, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See H.R. REP. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The
House Rules Committee initially proposed a rule that would have allowed only one amendment to
the habeas corpus title: a compromise proposal offered by Rep. Hughes himself and Rep. Derrick.
After a heated exchange between Democratic and Republican House leaders, the House defeated
that rule. 136 CONG. REc. H7997-8006 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990). When the Rules Committee
returned with a rule permitting both the Hughes-Derrick amendment and a substitute amendment
offered by Rep. Hyde (containing the original Powell Committee report verbatim), the House
adopted the Hyde substitute over both the committee program for habeas corpus and the HughesDerrick amendment. Id. at H8876-81 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1991).
168. Richard L. Berke, 101st Congress Wraps Up Work Belatedly and a Little Battered, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1990, at Al.
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promised actually to work. The institutional stress associated with capital litigation is a function of the death penalty itself. The moral anguish
and awful stakes generate both doctrinal complexity and extraordinary
efforts to develop and press every possible argument on behalf of prisoners facing the gas chamber. No amount of procedural massaging can
expedite capital litigation greatly or make it efficient in any serious sense.
The Powell Committee hoped to mitigate the pressures of eleventh-hour
litigation over stays of execution by guaranteeing every prisoner at least
one such stay in order that an initial federal petition may be heard. That
proposal is to the good and largely noncontroversial. Yet the committee
proposed nothing at all to address the perennial problem of poor defense
counsel at state court trials and only invited the states to appoint counsel
in state postconviction proceedings in exchange for various procedural
advantages in federal court-for example, a statute of limitations and
tighter restrictions on multiple federal petitions. The ABA task force
proposals were superior by a fair margin. Yet in a season marked by the
desire to demonstrate hostility to criminal offenders, those more balanced
views were not heeded.
Finally, and I will stop after this, the Powell Committee episode
focused debate on marginal issues: the time it takes to get petitions filed
and considered in federal court and successive petitions from a single
prisoner. As important as those matters are, and as critical as it would
be to address them in a genuine program for reforming habeas corpus,
they are secondary to the principal thrust of the full-and-fair plan and
recent, related Supreme Court decisions. The real fight is not over
delayed petitions, multiple petitions, or any of the other horrors thrown
up by habeas critics. Everyone endorses legislation to address genuine
abuse of the writ. The fight is over whether there will be any writ to
abuse. The professionals responsible for drafting legislation understand
this point very well. I am afraid, however, that even key participants in
the congressional debates often fail to appreciate it fully.
Recall that when Representative Hyde defeated the Democrats'
habeas bill on the House floor in the 101st Congress, he did so with an
amendment that simply incorporated the original Powell Committee
report. 169 Hyde presumably thought, reasonably enough, that he had
won a victory. It appears, however, that the DOJ thought otherwise.
For the Powell Committee plan, and thus Hyde's substitute, included no
full-and-fair provision and, indeed, presupposed that the federal courts
would continue to adjudicate the merits of properly presented claims.
169.

See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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When the DOJ returned to the Hill in the 102d Congress, its new bill
consisted of two parts. One part contained procedural reforms for capital cases; the other contained a refurbished edition of previous bills
offered by conservatives to restrict access to federal court in both capital
and noncapital cases. Importantly, both parts contained full-and-fair
provisions. 17 The idea, I dare say, was that if Representative Hyde
again found it politically necessary to jettison the program for "general"
change and press forward only with respect to capital cases, then a fulland-fair element would remain in the bill. Without such a preclusion
provision, there could be no genuine success.
It is scarcely surprising, accordingly, that when, in the 102d Congress, Representative Brooks and other House Democrats went to the
floor to do battle with Representative Hyde and the Bush administration's two-part bill, they pitched their arguments in these basic terms.
Clearly there were differences between the procedural changes that the
competing plans would make in current habeas law. But those differences were inconsequential in light of the more fundamental distinction
between the Brooks bill and the bill advanced by Hyde and other Republican challengers, which contained full-and-fair provisions. 171 The flyer
that Democrats handed out on the floor hit the basic issue squarely:
Vote No on Hyde Habeas Substitute
Hyde Substitute Ends Habeas Corpus
72
Brooks-Jenkins-Derrick Bill... Streamlines Habeas Corpus.1
170. S. 635, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); H.R. 1400, 102d Cong., 1stSess. (1991); see supra text
accompanying note 143. Not that it made sense to include such provisions in both subtitles of the
bill. Because the Powell Committee presupposed that the federal courts would continue to consider
properly presented claims on the merits, it made little sense, indeed, simply to attach a full-and-fair
deference rule to that committee's procedural recommendations for capital cases. The full-and-fair
provision in the death penalty subtitle ate up the practical significance of, and even the need for, the
procedural changes to which it was added. Moreover, if the full-and-fair provision in the "general"
subtitle were enacted, habeas would no longer pose a significant issue to death penalty states, which
then would have no great interest in doing what was necessary to trigger the subtitle for capital
litigation-namely, appointing counsel for state postconviction proceedings in capital cases.
171. 137 CONG. REC. H7896 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1991) (Rep. Hughes); id. at H7999-8005 (daily
ed. Oct. 17, 1991) (Reps. Brooks, Jenkins, Derrick, Kopetski, and Cox (Ill.)).
172. If you don't believe me, come by my office. I have a copy framed on the wall. After Rep.
Hyde's amendment containing the full-and-fair plan failed (by a vote of 218-208), id. at H8005 (daily
ed. Oct. 17, 1991), he offered a motion to recommit the entire crime bill, of which the Democrats'
habeas provisions were a part, with instructions to return with a new bill reflecting, more or less, the
amendments he and other Republicans had offered. Hyde used as an argument on behalf of his new
motion that he had deleted any reference to the full-and-fair idea from those instructions. Id. at
H8171 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1991). By that time, however, the House had made its decision to reject

2374

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2331

III. TERMS OF THE CURRENT DEBATE
In this part, I want to take a step back from the foregoing account of
recent history and appraise more analytically the implications of the various challenges to habeas corpus now converging on the scene. At the
end of the play, they all come to the same thing: preclusion in effect, if
not in form.

A.

THE FULL-AND-FAIR PROGRAM-REPRISE

By contrast to the Parker bill in the 1950s and the Ervin-McClellan
bill in 1968, the full-and-fair plan formally tolerates at least the existence
of habeas corpus for state prisoners. 173 The plan does not attempt simply
to do away with the federal courts' jurisdiction to receive petitions from
state convicts. It does, however, revive the chief proposal advanced by
then-Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist in the Nixon administration:
the introduction of preclusion into habeas corpus. 174 Accordingly, it is
yet another frontal assault on the federal courts' authority to enforce the
federal rights recognized by the Warren Court and, concomitantly, a
flank attack on the substance of those rights. 175 The full-and-fair program plainly does not conceive of the writ as a basis of original federal
jurisdiction to determine federal questions arising in state criminal prosecutions. Rather, it assumes the state courts have responsibility for
attending to any such questions and that those courts do an acceptable
job most of the time, so that we need no independent mechanism for
litigation in the federal courts. Habeas corpus is merely a safety net for
habeas amendments from the Republican side. The motion to recommit failed by a vote of 221-201.
Id. at H8172.
173. See supra notes 39-41, 82-83 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
175. Late in the 102d Congress, in connection with hearings on the meaning of the full-and-fair
plan, the ABA President offered Rep. Hyde some compromise language meant to strike a balance
between existing law (Brown) and the Bush administration's program. Rep. Hyde studied, but
rejected, the compromise and, in so doing, made it clear that the full-and-fair plan was meant to
overrule Brown legislatively:
With respect to section (h) [of the ABA proposal], it begins with the language from
Brown v. Allen .. ., which effectively provided that state court judgments are not entitled to
any deference on questions of law and "mixed questions" of law and fact. Therefore [if the
ABA proposal were adopted], capital defendants seeking to overturn their convictions and
sentences, and other habeas corpus petitioners, would have a strong argument that no significant change was intended from the existing standard of review established by Brown v.
Allen.
Letter from Henry J. Hyde, United States Representative, to John J. Curtin, Jr., ABA President
(Aug. 22, 1991) (on file with the author).
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catching the rare case in which egregious error occurs. 176 Liberals also

claim this role for the federal courts in habeas. The difference is that the
full-and-fair scheme recognizes no other role.
At the descriptive level, the plan appears to be the predictable product of the Legal Process tradition on which it rests and the preclusion

language in which it is expressed. It posits that there is rarely any objectively right answer to a question, but rather some number of "reasonably" right answers-right enough, good enough, to be accepted as right

if produced in a procedurally satisfying manner. Yet at the functional
level it recalls the extravagances of the most radical of the Legal Realists:
understandings of law and jurisprudence usually associated with the left

wing of American academia rather than the councils of American conservatism. 177 Under the full-and-fair plan, law is taken to be indetermi-

nate, subject to an elastic list of possibilities limited only by the
imaginations of lawyers contending for their conclusions. And since
176. More than one observer has insisted (reasonably) that the full-and-fair program would
revive the approach the Court took in Leo Frank's case. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying
text; see, eg., Anthony Lewis, Crime Against Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1991, at A15; James S.
Liebman, Unlearningthe Leo Frank Lesson, ATLANTA CONST., July 23, 1991, at A7. Yet the committee report accompanying the plan in 1984 explained that state adjudication would not be "full
and fair" in the "intended sense" if the decision reached in state court was not reasonable. Thus the
outcome in state court must "reflect a reasonable interpretation of Federal law, a reasonable view of
the facts in light of the evidence presented to the State court, and a reasonable disposition in light of
the facts found and the rule of law applied." S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1983); see
Hearingson S. 2216, supranote 121, at 16 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Rose on behalf
of the DOJ). As an illustration of the circumstances in which a state court outcome would be
reasonable (and thus entitled to preclusive effect), the original DOJ supporting memorandum
explained that if the federal circuits were divided over a question of federal law, and a state court
adopted one view and rejected the other, no federal habeas court could "override" the state court's
determination of the legal issue "simply" because it took the alternative view of the question
presented. PROPOSED REFORMS, supra note 120, at 38.
In an attempt to reassure doubtful members of the House in the 102d Congress, Rep. Hyde
offered an amendment specifying that state adjudication would not be "full and fair" if the proceedings were "conducted in a manner inconsistent with the procedural requirements of Federal law," if
the state judgment "involved an arbitrary or unreasonable determination of the facts," or if the
outcome in state court was "contrary to or involved an arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation or
application of clearly established Federal law." 137 CONG. REC. H7996 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991).
Hyde's references to "arbitrary" state judgments that conflict with "clearly established" federal law
suggested an extremely high tolerance threshold. It was no surprise, then, that when he offered these
refinements, he failed to bring the House around to his side. Rep. Hamilton Fish, the ranking
minority member of the Judiciary Committee, answered that Hyde's definition of "full and fair"
adjudication made it clearer than ever that the adoption of the full-and-fair standard very well would
mean the evisceration of the Great Writ. Id. at H8001.
177. The first time I heard Teague and Butler compared with Critical Legal Studies was at a
symposium at New York University, at which Graham Hughes mentioned it.
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there are almost always plausible arguments on both sides of cases, virtually any result a state court reaches is "reasonable" in this sense-and
thus immune from federal examination in habeas corpus.
The full-and-fair plan does concede that courts can arrive at answers
that are unacceptable. But an answer given by a state court is not sufficiently wrong to warrant habeas relief because it departs from the answer
that other courts, most courts, or, certainly, a federal court would reach,
but only because it is so off the mark that no reasonable court acting in
good faith could produce it. Within this framework, the federal courts
should not evaluate competing "reasonable" results and choose the one
that seems, if you will, the most reasonable and, therefore, the best interpretation of federal rights. By contrast, the state courts are free to pick
any marginally defensible result they like and to insulate that result from
oversight. The federal courts do not superintend the exercise of judgment under the constitutional rules by which the adjudication game is to
be played; they only police the most flagrant violations of those rules.
B.

THE REHNQUIST COURT

The Justices are divided over the advisability of the full-and-fair
program. Justice O'Connor has endorsed it as a basis for legislative
reform; the Chief Justice has said that it may be premature at this
time. 78 As I have noted, however, the Chief Justice, and, indeed, a thin
majority of the Justices, may have other plans for reviving preclusion in
habeas.1 7 9 A systematic effort in that direction is plainly evident in four
lines of recent decisions, which, like the full-and-fair plan, reflect all the
proposals for restricting the writ that Chief Justice Rehnquist advanced
when he was at the Nixon DOJ. At that time, Rehnquist recognized that
to accomplish what he had in mind, he would have to convince Congress
178. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
179. For Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement, see Rehnquist, supra note 156. For Justice
O'Connor's statement see Remarks at the Attorney General's Crime Summit, Washington, D.C.
(Mar. 4, 1991) (on file with the author). The other plans I have in mind are reflected in the cases to
be discussed next in the text. Kent S. Scheidegger of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation has
consistently pressed the Court to abandon Brown in favor of a strong deference rule regarding previous state judgments. Back to the Future: The JusticesRe-Examine the Habeas Corpus Writ, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 17, 1992, at 1. When a reporter asked Scheidegger why it was that, after indicating that
the full-and-fair idea was premature for legislative action, the Chief Justice seemed willing to consider it, or something very close, as a matter for the Court to pursue on its own. Scheidegger reportedly answered that Rehnquist might be "changing his mind." Id. at 53. For my part, Ira Robbins
had a better response: In the wake of the Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas appointments, perhaps the
Chief Justice now "has the votes" to get what he really wants from his colleagues. Id. Richard
Samp, chief counsel to the Washington Legal Foundation, is equally blunt: "You could wait forever
if you wait for Congress to pass a bill." Id. at 52.
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to rewrite the Habeas Corpus Act. Now, as Chief Justice, he has
returned to the thesis he urged on Justice Jackson in Brown v. Allen: the
Court itself should adopt a preclusion framework in habeas corpus without waiting for a justifying change in the controlling statute.
1. The "Mixed Question" Cases
Initially, the Rehnquist Court has undercut Brown v. Allen by capitalizing on the one instance in which even the Warren Court employed
the process model in habeas corpus: the standard governing the deference
the federal courts should accord to state court findings of fact.' 80 As a
general matter, the federal habeas courts have plenary power to hold
their own hearings, examine documentary evidence, listen to witnesses,
and make independent determinations of the facts bearing on petitioners'
federal claims. A federal hearing is required, however, only if there was
some "vital flaw" in the process used in state court, such that the state
court hearing was not "full and fair."' 1 Moreover, by the terms of the
legislation adopted in 1966, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the federal
courts must "presume" the accuracy of state findings of fact, so long as
those findings were reached in a procedurally sound manner. 182 Once
that presumption is engaged, it can be rebutted only by "convincing"
evidence that the state courts got the facts wrong, despite using adequate
procedures. The upshot is that section 2254(d) recognizes a kind of
"issue" preclusion with respect to state findings of fact, as distinct from
conclusions of law.
Usually, doctrines formulated by the Court, as well as statutes
enacted by Congress, distribute judicial authority to handle entire cases.
In this instance, we have a mechanism by which Congress allocates
authority for particular issues within a single case. Under section
2254(d), the characterization of a question as factual or legal typically
determines which court will decide it. Facts are left to the state courts;
legal issues are decided independently by the federal courts. The fact/
law distinction employed by section 2254(d) draws on the set of definitions articulated by Justice Frankfurter in Brown. Facts are the "primary" and "basic" elements of an historical episode "in the sense of a
recital of... events and the credibility of their narrators."' 83 Thus when
180. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
181. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). See generally
Charles D. Weisselberg, Evidentiary Hearingsin FederalHabeas Corpus Cases, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv.
131 (discussing the "vital flaw" rule).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
183. Brown, 344 U.S. at 506 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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a court sets about to determine facts, it engages in what Henry
Monaghan aptly describes as a "case-specific inquiry into what happened
here."' 84 If, for example, a petitioner claims that the police coerced an
"involuntary" confession, the factual questions include such matters as:
Where did the interrogation take place? How long did it last? Who said
what to whom? Litigants typically dispute historical facts such as these,
and when they do a court must take evidence, appraise witnesses'
demeanor, and decide who is telling the truth.
The fact-finding function is critical to the development of a complete
and accurate record on which to base judicial determinations of federal
rights. Because the federal courts usually offer superior fact-finding
capability, many of us insist that parties with federal claims should ordinarily be able to take their cases to federal court for initial consideration--either by filing original complaints in the district courts, or by
removing federal-question litigation begun in state court.' 8 5 In habeas
corpus, however, any scheme that would guarantee independent federal
fact finding in every instance faces serious obstacles.
In ordinary civil actions, federal-question business is channeled to
the federal courts as an original matter; the state courts are out of the
picture. In habeas corpus, by contrast, the state courts are very much in
the picture. Since state criminal defendants are prosecuted in state court
and cannot remove the actions against them to federal court for disposition, the state courts are initially positioned to find the essential facts,
both with respect to guilt or innocence and with respect to any federal
defenses an accused person may assert. Thus by the time prisoners churn
through the state system and seek habeas corpus relief from the federal
courts, the state courts have typically already heard what the witnesses
have to say about their federal claims and have chosen to believe one
version of the story over another. In this context, it is not just that one
set of courts has already found the facts, and it appears wasteful and
potentially antagonistic to propose that another set of courts should start
over from scratch. The passage of time since the critical events occurred
may frustrate another round of fact finding. Witnesses may be unavailable, memories may be faded, and physical evidence may be lost. The
federal courts might restrict themselves to an appraisal of the state court
record. Yet the judge who saw witnesses firsthand was probably in the
best position to sort truth from falsehood. Federal court factual determinations based only on the transcript of witnesses' testimony in state court
184.
185.

Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 235 (1985).
See supra note 6.
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may not be superior at all. For these reasons, it is difficult to insist that
the federal courts should begin anew in every case, repeating work the
state courts have already done in demonstrably less propitious circumstances. Accordingly, section 2254(d) establishes a presumption in 1favor
86
of facts found by the state courts in a procedurally adequate way.
Questions of law, by contrast, are answered not by building an accurate record of historical events, but by identifying and elaborating the
standards by which society judges human behavior. Legal standards in
their pure form can be articulated in the abstract, without reference to
the facts found to exist in any particular instance. In a confession case,
for example, the purely legal question is the constitutional standard for
the admissibility of a defendant's statement. The answer is that the Due
Process Clause allows the prosecution to use only "voluntary" confessions. The very point of exempting federal habeas corpus from preclusion is to allow the federal courts to make their own, independent
determinations of the law applicable to prisoners' claims. The presumption in section 2254(d) thus does not extend to state declarations of legal
standards. Similarly, section 2254(d) has always been understood to be
inapplicable to questions at the intersection of primary facts and legal
principles. At some point in every case, it becomes necessary to determine the legal significance of historical events-to bring legal principles
and rules to bear on the facts. These hybrid issues are what Justice
Frankfurter called "mixed" questions of law and fact, that is, the "application of a legal standard to ... historical-fact determinations." 187 To
state such a mixed question, a court must refer both to the primary facts
of a case and to the abstract legal standards deemed to be applicable.
And in joining the facts and the law bearing on a claim, the court actually decides whether the claim has merit. Mixed questions are the crux of
legal judgment. If a federal court's independent authority were limited
to announcing the abstract "voluntariness" standard in a confession case,
and state applications of that standard were presumed to be correct
under section 2254(d), federal habeas corpus would almost always forfeit
its exemption from preclusion respecting state decisions in confession
cases. Here again, the statute reflects Frankfurter's understanding of the
allocation of authority between the federal and state courts.
In apparent recognition that section 2254(d) draws Justice Frankfurter's distinctions, the Rehnquist Court has acknowledged that the presumption in favor of state findings of primary fact does not extend either
186.
187.

See REMEDIES, supra note 15, § 133.

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963).
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to state judgments on purely legal issues or to state applications of legal
standards to the facts of individual cases.I s Yet the Court's record with
respect to mixed questions is itself mixed. The Justices have held (correctly) that the "voluntariness" of a confession and the "effectiveness" of
defense counsel are mixed issues to which the section 2254(d) presumption is inapplicable. But they have also held (incorrectly) that the "partiality" or "bias" of jurors, and the "competency" of defendants to stand
trial, are questions of primary fact-to which the presumption applies. 8 9
To explain why it treats issues that seem plainly to be mixed as, instead,
factual, the Court candidly offers that when it decides to put an issue in
one pigeon hole or the other, it does so on the basis of its own judgment
regarding the best allocation of judicial authority. 190 Since this Court is
inclined to think that most issues should be decided in state court, it
strains to characterize state decisions as findings of fact, rather than
applications of law to fact, and thus invokes the statutory presumption in
favor of the result reached in state court.
Given this backdrop, it probably should not have been so surprising
as it was when, in an otherwise unremarkable case from Virginia, Wright
v. West, 9 the Court asked the parties to argue not only the issues they
had presented to the lower courts, but also a general question of federal
law the Justices had developed on their own:
In determining whether to grant a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court, should a federal court give deference to the state court's applicacase or should it
tion of law to the specific facts of the petitioner's
1 92
review the state court's determination de novo?
On its face, this question challenged the very fact/law distinction
drawn in section 2254(d). The Court thus appeared to be poised to discard that distinction, to overrule precedents depending on it, and to hold,
after all, that the federal habeas courts should defer to the state courts
even with respect to mixed questions. The prisoner, supported by amici
briefs from other interested individuals and groups, insisted that, by necessary implication, section 2254(d) bars federal court deference to the
188. See, e.g., Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982).
189. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (voluntariness); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985) (bias); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) (partiality); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 11
(1983) (competency); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (effectiveness).
190. Miller, 474 U.S. at 104.
191. 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
192. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 672 (1991) (granting certiorari). Without opinion, Justices
Blackmun and Stevens noted their dissent from the Court's special order.
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state courts regarding mixed issues. 193 Entering the case on behalf of the
Bush administration, the Solicitor General argued that it is indefensible
to maintain the allocation of authority apparently contemplated by the
statute. In the end, none of the Justices purported to resolve the matter,
one way or the other. 194 The question thus remains open. And the
Court may yet hold that the federal habeas courts should treat mixed
issues in the same way they treat issues of primary fact.
We would not expect the Rehnquist Court to overlook the forumallocation implications of the fact/law distinction built into section
2254(d). Nor would we expect that the Justices now sitting would set
those implications aside and decide whether a question is one of fact, law,
or a combination of the two, as a hollow matter of semantics. The Court
ought to appreciate the practical implications of the doctrines it employs
and should bear in mind the purposes and functions of legal ideas when it
puts them into effect. Yet the Court cannot legitimately skew conventional understandings of these categories in order to vindicate its own
ideas about where issues should be decided-in spite of Congress' contrary judgment. 95
2.

The "New Rule" Cases

The Rehnquist Court has also undermined Brown by reworking the
law of retroactivity. On the surface, the Court's stated concern is that
the federal courts apply not only existing law, but also changes in the law
controlling prisoners' claims-changes established after the proceedings
in state court are complete. When the federal courts announce and
enforce "new rules," the Court insists they mistreat the state courts by
upsetting state judgments on grounds the state courts could not anticipate.1 96 Here, too, the Court apparently believes that habeas is abused by
state prisoners to extend litigation in capital cases, as prisoners seek the
193. Brief for the Respondent at 35, West, 112 S. Ct. at 2482 (No. 91-542); Brief for the Amicus
Curiae on behalf of the ACLU, id.; Brief for the Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Benjamin R. Civiletti,
Nicholas Katzenbach, Edward H. Levi, Elliot L. Richardson, et al., id.; Brief for the Amicus Curiae
on Behalf of Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, Daniel J. Meltzer, Paul J. Mishkin, Martin H.
Redish, Frank J. Remington, David L. Shapiro & Herbert Wechsler, id.; Brief for the United States
at 7, id.
194. But see West, 112 S. Ct. at 2498, 2499 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging that
section 2254(d) establishes a statutory rule of deference only with respect to state court findings of
fact).
195. Recall that I have already admitted to preparing an amicus brief on the prisoner's side in
West. See supra note 1.
196. Engel v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 n.33 (1982); accord Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 534
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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benefits of any changes in the law that may occur between the time they
are sentenced and their scheduled executions. 19 7 Several decisions suggested movement regarding retroactivity.91 Then, in a plurality opinion
in Teague v. Lane,1 99 Justice O'Connor rejected the Warren Court's

approach to the problems associated with shifting legal standards and
substituted a variation on themes advocated by Justice Harlan's dissents

from the Warren Court's decisions. More recently, the Court has elaborated on its new approach and, in the process, has provided additional
support for the kind of argument the Solicitor General advanced in
Wright v. West. Realistically, the Court's decisions in this context have
little to do with the retrospective application of genuine changes in the
law. Instead these decisions, too, threaten to establish a general rule of
deference to ordinary state judgments on the merits of federal claims. To
understand how all this fits together, we must pause to sketch some intellectual history.
There was a time when the Supreme Court followed the common
law practice and assumed that current understandings of the law would
apply to any pending case, irrespective of the means by which the case
came before the bar. Yet in the 1960s, when the Court began interpreting the Constitution in innovative ways, there was pressure to apply its
new precedents only to future cases and thus to deny their retroactive
effect on judgments already in place. The Warren Court responded by
admitting a limited exception to the common law practice for new decisions marking a significant departure from past, typically denominated
"clear breaks" with precedent. 2" If such a decision did not protect
197. Barry Friedman has attributed this thinking to the Justices-and properly so. Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REv. 797, 822-23 (1992) (offering an appraisal of the Rehnquist Court's habeas cases that is similar to my own-similarly negative).
198. See, eg., Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216 (1989) (finding it unnecessary to depart from
the Warren Court's approach); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 59 n.4 (1985) (noting that the Court's
result was "fully congruent" with Justice Harlan's dissents from the Warren Court's analysis); see
also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 329 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Reed v. Ross, 468
U.S. 1, 26 n.3 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
199. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
200. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969). As one might have expected,
the Court found it easiest to conclude that it had created "new" law when it explicitly rejected a
familiar legal standard under which one result would be reached and substituted a different legal
standard that generated a different outcome. That typically occurred, for example, when the Court
overruled an otherwise dispositive precedent-by all accounts the paradigm illustration of the creation of a "new rule" raising the retroactivity issue. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2443 (199 1) (opinion of Souter, J.); see also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371,
381 n.2 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In addition, the Court said that changes in the law occurred
when clearly settled prior law was disregarded sub silentio and when the Court overturned "a longstanding and widespread practice to which [the Supreme Court had] not spoken, but which a near-
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against convicting the innocent, and if its application would upset reliance interests, the Court denied its benefits to prisoners whose claims

rested on prior events or judgments. There was no serious argument
about the retroactive effect of a decision unless it constituted a genuine
change in the law, and when that was true the Court determined retroac-

tivity on a case-by-case basis. 201

Justice Harlan objected to the Warren Court's work and proposed,

instead, a different model that drew a distinction between cases heard in
the Supreme Court on direct review and cases reaching the Court by way

of federal habeas corpus. In all direct review cases, according to Justice
Harlan, the Court's role as a court of error demanded that it should

announce and apply the rule of law on which the Justices were agreed at
the time of decision. Any "new rule" established in such a case should
be applicable to the case at bar, to all future cases, and to all cases then
pending at trial or on direct review-including cases in which the state

courts had already rejected such a claim in light of prior precedents, but
in which the state court judgment was still subject to direct review in the
Supreme Court. On direct review, this is to say, the Court should return
to the common law2 practice of giving "new rules" retroactive effect,
20
without exception.

unanimous body of lower court authority [had] expressly approved." United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 551 (1982); see Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 645 (1984) (holding that the law had been
changed for retroactivity purposes even though there had been no "clear break" in the sense of an
explicit overruling).
In this vein, however, Justice Harlan argued that there also might be instances in which legal
standards, with precedential support intact, had been so obviously undercut by more recent case law
that lawyers and judges could no longer have professional confidence in their viability. In his view at
least, the Court did not necessarily create a "new rule" simply by recognizing that such a legal
standard was no longer an accurate statement of current law. Desist, 394 U.S. at 265 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
201. Because Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), clearly broke with the past, and because it did
not advance the accuracy of criminal judgments but potentially disrupted settled arrangements, the
Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule would be enforceable only in the
particular case at bar and in future cases. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965). The
Miranda decision, too, was given only prospective effect. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721
(1966). By contrast, the Warren Court decided that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
was so vital to fairness that prisoners who had already been tried should have the benefit of that
decision. Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963). There were hitches in the Warren Court's
framework. Litigants whose circumstances were difficult to distinguish were sometimes treated differently, depending on whether they were fortunate enough to get to the Supreme Court ahead of
others. In addition, the past event that counted for retroactivity purposes varied with the claim: the
date of an unlawful search in exclusionary rule cases, the date of trial in right-to-counsel cases, etc.
These subtleties have been superseded in the Court's more recent decisions and need not distract us.
202. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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However, with respect to cases that arose by way of "collateral"
litigation in habeas corpus, Justice Harlan regarded the federal courts'
role as entirely different. Since Congress had never given the lower federal courts authority to take appeals from state judgments, Harlan
argued that the power of the district and circuit courts to issue the Great
Writ on behalf of state prisoners should not be made to serve an appellate
function. To Harlan, the function of habeas corpus was not to correct
erroneous state judgments by enforcing federal law as it was when a case
reached federal court, but to deter the state courts from neglecting the
federal legal standards that were applicable to the criminal cases before
them. Those courts, he insisted, could only be expected to know and
respect federal principles already in place at the time of decision. Therefore, according to Harlan, a habeas corpus petitioner whose conviction
and sentence had previously been approved on direct review in the state
appellate courts should not be heard to claim relief on the basis of a "new
rule" established since the prisoner's sentence became final. Rather, such
a petitioner should ordinarily be entitled to relief only if a claim was
shown to be meritorious in light of the law prevailing at the time the
original proceedings took place in the state system. Justice Harlan recommended two exceptions to this general prohibition on the retrospective application of "new rules" in habeas corpus: A "new rule" should be
enforced if it either placed "certain kinds of primary... individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," or required "the observance of procedures . . . 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.' "203
The approach the current Court takes regarding these problems borrows from Justice Harlan, but departs from him in critical respects. Initially, this Court embraces Harlan's crucial distinction between direct
review and collateral attack cases. The Warren Court assumed that the
Constitution did not speak to the question whether a change in the law
203. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-93 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). In this sense, Harlan insisted that the question
whether a legal standard is "new" for retroactivity purposes in habeas corpus presents a "choice of
law problem." A federal court must first get the applicable law straight (the law as it was when the
petitioner's sentence became final) and then is constrained to examine the petitioner's claim in
habeas on that standard and no other. Justice Harlan explicitly recognized that this would require
the federal habeas courts to "chart out the proper implications of the governing precedents at the
time of a petitioner's conviction." Desist, 394 U.S. at 268 (Harlan, J.,dissenting). At least in the
civil context, the Rehnquist Court, too, thinks of retroactivity generally as a "matter of choice of
law." James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, III S.Ct. 2439, 2443 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J.).
Whether this Court will adhere to that conceptualization in habeas remains to be seen, however. See
infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's fact-centered formulations of the
test for "new rules" in habeas corpus).
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should be applied to cases already final. Irrespective of whether a case
arose on direct review or in habeas corpus, the Court decided whether a
"new rule" could be applied to it by weighing the values that would be
served by retrospective application against the disruption of state reliance
interests. Now, following Justice Harlan, the Rehnquist Court has
reconceptualized the retroactivity question. The Constitution does govern cases arising on direct review and, in that context, requires that "new
rules" be applied both to the case at bar and to all other cases still subject
to direct review. In collateral attack cases, by contrast, the federal
habeas corpus statutes govern-and are construed to incorporate both
Harlan's view that "new rules" ordinarily should be neither announced
nor applied and his recommendation that certain exceptions should be
recognized. 2 4
At the same time, however, this Court defines both "new rules" and
the exceptional circumstances in which they should be invoked quite differently from Harlan. The circumstances in which the Rehnquist Court
will allow the federal habeas courts to apply "new rules" are extremely
narrow. The Justices accept Justice Harlan's view that "new rules"
should be enforced if they render petitioners immune from prosecution
altogether. But they reject Harlan's argument that the federal courts
should also invoke "new rules" that establish safeguards essential to the
204. The Court held in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 US. 314 (1987), that a "failure to apply a
newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of
constitutional adjudication." Id. at 322; see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 317 (1989) (White, J.,
concurring) (noting that the direct review cases "appear to have constitutional underpinnings"). In
Teague v. Lane, four members of the Court adopted "Justice Harlan's description of the function of
habeas corpus." Id. at 308. I suspect there are those who will quarrel with my insistence that
Teague is, or purports to be, an interpretation of the Habeas Corpus Act. Yet when Justice Brennan
complained in Teague that the Warren Court's approach to retroactivity represented by Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), should be respected as an authoritative construction of federal statutory law, Justice O'Connor responded in a footnote that Linkletter was not due that kind of special
precedential weight because the Court in that case had failed to "mention, discuss, or analyze
§ 2254." 57 U.S.L.W. 4233, 4239 n.2 (Feb. 21, 1989). That footnote, it seems to me, was an
acknowledgement that the Court's analysis in Teague is, and has to be, a construction of the governing statute-however weakly the terms of the Act appear to support it.
The footnote was included in the version of the Court's opinion that later appeared in the
Supreme Court Reporter, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075 n.2 (1989), but it cannot be found in the official
version published thereafter in the United States Reports. I am informed by the Office of the
Reporter of Decisions that, while there is no specific order in the file with respect to the footnote, its
deletion was not an oversight. The footnote was deliberately dropped in the course of final editing
before the official text of the opinion was approved for publication. Telephone Interview with a
spokesperson for the Office of the Reporter of Decisions (Jan. 29, 1993) (spokeperson's name withheld per Court policy). I know of no formal way to learn (any time soon) why, in fact, the footnote
did not survive. Of course, it might have been discarded in order to deprive observers like me from
using it to argue that Teague is, and must be, a statutory construction case.
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"fairness" of criminal trials. Instead, this Court insists that only "new
rules" that bear on the "accuracy" of the outcome in state court are sufficient to warrant federal attention. Thus the federal courts may announce
and apply only "new rules," without which "the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. 2 0 5
The Court's conception of "new rules" is, by contrast, extremely
broad-ignoring a reality of which Justice Harlan was keenly aware.
Under the Warren Court's approach, state reliance interests were
respected both indirectly and directly-indirectly when "new rules" of
federal constitutional law were identified (typically on the ground that
they made a "clear break" from the past), and directly when the retrospective impact of "new rules" was assessed (largely by measuring the
extent to which retroactive application would upset existing arrangements). Under Harlan's competing view, only the first, indirect, means
of protecting reliance interests would be retained. Within his regime,
accordingly, state's attorneys bent on protecting state court decisions
would no longer be in a position to argue simply and forthrightly that it
would be disruptive to apply current legal standards to cases already
final, but would be forced to channel all their efforts into convincing the
federal habeas courts that current law was different from what it had
been previously. There would be, then, powerful incentives to characterize rules as "new" in order to defeat prisoners' claims. The threat of
distorting ordinary jurisprudential understandings of the very meaning of
law was palpable.
Recognizing the incentive structure his approach would create,
Harlan warned that the decision on the novelty of a rule would often be
close. In his view, the "content" of constitutional principles rarely
changed "dramatically from year to year," but rather was "altered
slowly and subtly." Thus a rule was not "really" to be judged "new"
unless it could be said "with assurance" that the Supreme Court would
have rejected a prisoner's claim at the time a case was in state court, but,
by the time the case reached federal habeas, the Court had changed its
mind and was prepared to sustain it. Moreover, what might appear on
first glance to be the announcement of a "new rule" could, instead, be
"simply" the application of a "well-established constitutional principle"
to a "closely analogous" case. According to Justice Harlan, the Court
205.

Teague, 489 U.S. at 313.

1993]

HABEAS HAGIOSCOPE

2387

did not change constitutional law every time it decided a mixed question-applying an established legal standard to a different pattern of primary facts.20 6
In her initial opinion in Teague, Justice O'Connor conceded that it
is often difficult to recognize a "new rule" when you see one and thus
declined to offer a definition for all seasons. As a general matter, however, she said that a case establishes a "new rule" when it "breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation" on the government.20 7 In Teague
itself, for example, O'Connor explained that since the Court had previously said that racial groups need not be proportionately represented on
juries, a rule requiring juries to reflect the racial makeup of the community would be "new." That conception of "new rules" appeared to be
consistent with Justice Harlan's thinking: A judicial decision creates new
law when it adopts an innovative legal standard that makes demands of
state authorities that previously did not exist-roughly the kind of thing
the Court appears to have in mind when it recognizes that a rule is
"new" if it makes a "clear break" from the past.
Within a few months, however, in Sawyer v. Smith, Justice Kennedy
said that not only do "clear breaks" from precedent constitute "new
rules," but so do "gradual developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree. ' 20 8 This, of course, is precisely what Justice
Harlan denied. Where Harlan insisted that a rule was not "new" for
retroactivity purposes unless, at the time a case was in state court, the
206. Desist, 394 U.S. at 263-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting); accord United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 549 (1982):
[W]hen a decision .. .merely has applied settled precedents to new and different
factual situations, no real question has arisen as to whether the later decision should apply
retrospectively. In such cases, it has been a foregone conclusion that the rule of the later
case applies in earlier cases, because the later decision has not in fact alteredthat rule in any
materialway.
Id. (emphasis added).
It can fairly be argued that when Justice Harlan dissented from the Warren Court's decisions, it
was not because he thought the Court was making "new" law when the majority denied it, but
rather because the Court persisted in its own retroactivity analysis and declined to adopt his alternative approach. The leading cases in that period presented fairly easy "new rule" questions, such that
the Justices readily agreed on whether a rule was sufficiently innovative to require the Court to pass
on the retroactivity issue. Nobody suggested, for example, that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), had not established new legal standards for retroactivity purposes. See, e.g., Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966). Justice Harlan contributed illuminating discussions of the considerations that might go into deciding whether a rule was genuinely "new," not different conclusions
regarding the novelty of the rules then under examination.
207. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
208. 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990).
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Supreme Court would have rejected the legal standard on which a prisoner relied, Justice Kennedy has it that a rule is "new" unless it can be
said that, when the case was in state court, the Supreme Court would
have accepted the prisoner's argument-and the state courts unaccountably failed to comprehend as much. 2' Thus the subtle evolution of a legal
standard that Harlan did not consider to be the announcement of an
entirely "new rule" would be such a "new rule" within Kennedy's formulation. Even if a rule of constitutional law was clearly foreshadowed
in prior cases, such that many, or even most, lawyers and judges saw it
coming, still the decision in which the development is explicitly
embraced would establish a "new rule" if some "reasonable" state judge
might have thought the law was maturing differently.
Other statements in the Rehnquist Court's cases indicate that "new
rules" are created not only when the content of a legal standard develops
in a gradual way, but also when settled rules do not change at all, but are
merely applied to the facts of different cases. In this, the Court suggests
that the everyday resolution of an ordinary mixed issue creates "new"
federal law. For example, immediately following her statement in
Teague that decisions establish "new rules" if they impose "new obligations" on the states, Justice O'Connor said that "[t]o put it differently, a
case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent"
when the prisoner's conviction was affirmed in state court.2 10 Taken literally, that was a non sequitur. Having said that a federal decision establishes a "new rule" when it alters the content of a legal standard,
O'Connor hardly said the same thing in another way by declaring that a
federal court announces a "new rule" of law whenever the "result" it
reaches in an individual case would not have been logically compelled
when the prisoner was still in state court.2 11
209. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 426 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
211. A few months later, Justice O'Connor concluded that a prisoner's claim did not depend on
a "new rule" under the Teague "dictated by precedent" formulation. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 303 (1989). Justice Scalia had to file a sharp dissent to insist that the rule on which the prisoner
rested had not previously been "compelled." Id. at 353. On the other hand, the full Court said in
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), that the question was, indeed, "whether a state court... would
have felt compelled by existing precedent" to find a prisoner's claim meritorious. Id. at 488 (emphasis added). I do not think it is necessary yet to read cases like Parks for the worst. Justice Kennedy
went to some lengths in that case to explain that the prisoner was, indeed, relying on a legal standard
for which earlier cases could not fairly be cited. Id. at 486, 488-92. However, I am hardly sanguine,
as the discussion in the text makes plain.
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Other Justices have expanded on Justice O'Connor's start with addi-

tional accounts of "new rules," which, taken literally, collapse the general matter of announcing new legal standards into the case-specific

business of deciding mixed issues. Justice Kennedy said in Sawyer that
the "application" of a settled rule of law to the facts of an analogous case

may well "involve a new rule of law."2 12 And in Butler v. McKellar, the
Chief Justice suggested that a "new rule" is any judgment regarding the
proper resolution of a particular case that could reasonably have been

debated previously. 213 Even if the Court itself declares that a decision is
"controlled" by precedents, the decision establishes a "new rule" if the

"outcome" was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds" before
the petitioner's sentence became final.2 14

212. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 233 (1990).
213. 494 U.S. at 415.
214. Id. at 417. This formulation in Butler was not necessarily put forward as the very kind of
shorthand test for "new rules" that Justice O'Connor had eschewed in Teague. The prisoner in
Butler argued that his claim under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), relied on principles
traceable to Edwards itself and, accordingly, that the federal habeas courts could grant him relief
without creating a "new" rule of federal law. The Butler Court held, however, that it was critical in
Edwards that the prisoner in that case had requested counsel during questioning about an offense
and that the police had nevertheless continued their interrogation about that same offense. Butler,
494 U.S. at 414-16. In Butler, by contrast, the prisoner had been questioned in similar circumstances-but about a different potential charge. Accordingly, the Court held that the petitioner in
Butler could be entitled to relief in habeas corpus only if he were allowed to rely as well on Arizona
v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), decided more recently. It can fairly be argued that Chief Justice
Rehnquist merely used the "reasonable minds might have differed" line to make the point that the
outcome in Roberson had changed the law. A companion case, Parks, 494 U.S. at 484, also appears
to say that one determines whether a rule of law is "new" by asking whether a previous state court
judgment was within the bounds of reason. Yet in Parks, too, the Court arguably stopped short of
casting Butler's formulation so far. Again, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court devoted considerable time to parsing the content of the legal principles reflected in the relevant precedents and
concluding that they would not support the petitioner's current claim. See also Stringer v. Black,
112 S.Ct. 1130 (1992) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
On the other hand, the Court persists in using Butler as though it is an all-purpose test for "new
rules." In Graham v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 892 (1993), Justice White said that the prisoner's claim
depended on such a "new rule," because "[s]urveying the legal landscape as it then existed, we
conclude that it would have been anything but clear to reasonable jurists ...that petitioner's sentencing proceeding did not comport with the Constitution." Id. at 898; see also id. at 903 (stating
that "reasonable jurists reading the case law" at the time the prisoner's sentence became final "could
have concluded" that his sentencing proceeding was "not constitutionally infirm"); accord Gilmore
v. Taylor, 113 S.Ct. 2112 (1993).
If, however, the Butler formulation is taken as a general test for "new rules," it goes well
beyond anything said in Teague. At the point in Teague where Justice O'Connor offered the "dictated by precedent" formulation, she cited Justice Powell's dissent in Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S.
527, 528-29 (1987), in which Powell repeated his oft-stated, and now-accepted, view that the Court
should adopt Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Turning to the
issue at hand, Justice Powell read the Court in Truesdale to assume that Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1 (1986), had simply "applied... settled principles" in a "new fact situation." Truesdale,
480 U.S. at 528 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell apparently had no objection if, in truth,
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If these accounts are read for all they are worth, prisoners would
seem to be barred from federal habeas, even if they merely ask the federal
courts to decide that the facts in their cases warrant relief in light of
established law-that is, the same legal standards that controlled when
they were in state court and that continue to control when the federal
courts take up their claims. No two cases are identical. By hypothesis,
then, even if there are many cases in which others have obtained relief in
similar circumstances, no one has ever succeeded on the basis of precisely
the same facts that a particular petitioner presents. Thus under Chief
Justice Rehnquist's test, all prisoners are seeking a "new rule" for the
particular circumstances of their own cases. By contrast to Justice
Harlan, the Rehnquist Court's notion of "new rules" has it that the federal courts do change the law every time they apply settled legal standards to analogous cases.
This, it must be said, is jurisprudential nonsense. We all remember
the first year of law school, when some patient academic led us painfully
through endless common law cases, asking after each successive decision
whether the analysis and result could be reconciled with what had gone
before and, if not, whether the law had not somehow changed. In that
setting, we learned something about stare decisis and the rudimentary
elements of American judicial methodology. Certainly, we came to
understand that the question whether the law changes in application is,
in the final analysis, uninteresting. The ostensibly qualitative distinction
between rules and the application of rules has frayed edges. A court may
invoke a settled rule (particularly one articulated at an abstract level of
generality) in circumstances wholly different from those in which (and
for which) the rule was originally established. When that happens, it is
fair to say that the law has been altered, albeit without a change in the
language in which the guiding rule is expressed. Moreover, in the postNew Deal world in which we live, everyone acknowledges that, at the
margin, the content of substantive law approaches its operation in actual
cases. Yet we scarcely allow that realist insight to decimate all our
notions of preexisting legal standards that guide judicial judgment. We
Skipper had merely applied principles established in previous cases to "new" facts. Yet in Powell's
view, Skipper had itself "broke[n] new ground." Id. at 529. It appears, then, that the Powell opinion
that Justice O'Connor cited in Teague to support the "dictated by precedent" line is consistent with
the view that the invocation of an unchanged legal standard to "new" facts does not establish "new"
law and, indeed, actually stands for the proposition that a rule of law is really "new" only if it breaks
with the principles established in past precedents.
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are not so realistic that we deny the very existence of law apart from
facts.215
Abstract legal standards are real; they give structure and content to
the corpus of law and make it more than a ceaseless flow of judicial decisions resolving isolated disputes. Does the law change as it is applied to
different fact patterns? In a way it does, and in a way it doesn't. It
doesn't, and this surely is the point here, in any way that provides a
sensible basis for allocating business between the federal and state courts.
This entire Teague affair would be utterly bizarre if it were not so obviously contrived-radical realism (from some of the most formalistic
thinkers to sit on the federal bench in a very long time) 216 transparently
in service of political objectives. If the Court persists in this course, and
as I write this there is reason to think it means to, it will not only find
"new rules" when settled rules are applied, but it will also do violence to
some basic elements of conventional jurisprudence.
Taken together, the Court's various descriptions of "new rules"
would seem to capture all claims raised in habeas corpus-claims seeking
incremental developments in the content of legal standards and claims
seeking the application of settled standards to different factual circumstances. Both questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact
215. See Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasionand the Distinction Between Fact and
Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 916, 917-18 (1992). Even in the cases on section 2254(d), in which the
Court has played fast and loose with issues of primary fact and mixed questions of law and fact, the
Justices still have paid lip service to the conventional distinction between the two. That is not naive
formalism. It is the rule of law in a sensible, workable legal system.
216. Obviously, I have in mind Justice Scalia. In separation-of-powers cases, he could scarcely
be more formalist. See, eg., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In these retroactivity cases, he wants to have things both ways. In the civil context, he concedes that
judges "make" law, but insists they do it "as though" they don't and, instead, as though they only
search for it and "find" it as it "is" and, evidently, always was. It follows that in the civil context, he
thinks the Court never announces and applies new rules of law (over which questions of retroactive
effect can arise) and, accordingly, that whatever the Court decides in a given case necessarily applies
with equal force to all others-past, present, and future. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2451 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Compare id. at 2449 (White, J., concurring) (charging that Justice Scalia must think that the public is "naive enough to believe" that the
Court does not change the law).
In habeas corpus, by contrast, virtually everything a federal court may decide in a given case is,
by Justice Scalia's account, sufficiently "new" to be denied retrospective effect. See, e.g., Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 350 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). All this reflects no jurisprudential coherence, but starkly reveals a clear, sometimes even explicit, result-oriented agenda. In the civil context,
Justice Scalia hopes that by insisting that nothing is ever "new" (and thus that everything applies
retroactively) he can discourage the Court from overruling precedents. James B. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at
2451. But in the habeas context, he hopes that by insisting that everything is "new" (and thus that
nothing applies retroactively) he can eviscerate the federal courts' habeas jurisdiction by the back
door. Nothing more uplifting than this is afoot.
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appear to be surrendered to the state courts, subject to federal review

only for minimal rationality. A petitioner who relies on a decision
handed down after the sentence under attack became final must demonstrate that the new case had to be decided as it was in light of precedents
in place before the state courts acted. If the case could have gone the
other way, if any reasonable judge could have decided it differently, then
it announced a "new" rule that cannot be applied in habeas corpus,

except in narrow circumstances. Similarly, a prisoner who simply
advances an argument, not grounded in any particular recent precedent,
is required to show that that argument must be accepted by any reasonable judge considering it in light of the precedents on the books when the
sentence under challenge became final. If a reasonable judge could reject
the argument, the prisoner is seeking the establishment of a "new rule"
of law, which, again, cannot be applied in habeas save in special circumstances.2 17 Finally, a petitioner who merely asks the federal courts to
apply an established and unchanged legal standard to the particular facts
of another case is also foreclosed, unless the state courts acted unreasonably when they applied that standard and found the prisoner's claim without merit. If the state courts were merely wrong, but not unreasonably
wrong, in their judgment regarding the mixed question in the case, the
federal court cannot reach a different decision without creating a "new
rule"-which, once again, usually cannot be applied in habeas corpus.
As though to underscore this point, the Court has said that the very
purpose of its "new rule" formulations is to "validate reasonable, good217. Previously, the typical retroactivity case was one in which, after a prisoner's conviction
had become final in state court, the Supreme Court handed down a new decision that changed the
legal standard the state courts had applied. Then, when the prisoner sought the benefit of the new
Supreme Court decision in an action for federal habeas relief, the question whether it could be
applied retroactively was squarely posed. The Rehnquist Court's analysis captures not only episodes
of that kind, but also situations in which there is no new Supreme Court decision and a prisoner
nevertheless asks a federal district court itself to announce and apply a "new rule," as defined in
Teague, Butler, Sawyer, and like decisions. See, eg., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990). Positing
Justice Harlan's sharp distinction between direct review and habeas, and accepting that that distinction demands that courts focus on something they ordinarily consider uninteresting (whether, in
reaching a particular result in a case, they are advancing the development of abstract law), the
applicability of Teague in such cases is unremarkable. For if the Court's framework forbids a federal
habeas court to apply a "new rule" already announced, it only makes sense that it should equally
forbid such a court itself to announce such a "new rule" and apply it to the case at bar. Indeed, this
insight would prove helpful if the Court were to take seriously what Justice Harlan seems to have
had in mind, namely that a federal habeas court should fix its gaze on the legal standard fairly
reflected in the precedents that prevailed when a prisoner was in state court and, having grasped that
standard, should apply it to a prisoner's claim in habeas-without being distracted by more recent
decisions or its own maturing judgment, which only clutter the landscape. Cf supra note 203 and
accompanying text (discussing Harlan's approach to retroactivity as a choice-of-law matter).
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faith" decisions by the state courts regarding the merits of federal
claims.2 18
Small wonder these decisions came quickly to mind in Wright v.
West, when the Court invited briefs on the abstract question whether the
federal courts should routinely defer to the state courts on the resolution
of mixed questions.21 9 The prisoner contended that the habeas jurisdiction conferred by Congress, and construed in Brown, cannot be ignored
and that, accordingly, the Court's decisions on "new rules" must be limited to situations in which legal standards are genuinely changed. 22 ° By
contrast, the warden insisted that these same decisions have already
established a general deference rule in habeas corpus, albeit indirectly.
According to the warden, Justice O'Connor's initial decision in Teague
stands for the proposition that any "reasonable" disagreement between
the federal habeas courts and the state courts regarding the legal standard applicable to a case must now be resolved in the state courts' favor.
A "reasonable" state judgment fixes the baseline of then-prevailing federal law, from which the departure contemplated by a "new rule" can be
measured; such a state judgment serves, in effect, as a correct judgment,
so that a federal habeas court must change the law in order to reach a
different result. It follows, then, that "reasonable, good-faith," state
decisions regarding "pure law" issues are now free from independent
examination by the federal courts. Next, according to the warden, more
recent decisions like Butler v. McKellar have "extend[ed]" O'Connor's
reasoning beyond the retroactivity context to ordinary cases in which
"settled law" must be applied to a "given set of facts." Finally, by virtue
of section 2254(d), Congress itself demands deference to state court findings of primary fact. In the end, then, according to the warden in West,
the federal courts must presume the accuracy of "all" state court conclusions-"legal, factual, and mixed."2 2 1 Speaking for the Bush administration, the Solicitor General added only that if the "new rule" cases have
not already eliminated the federal courts' authority independently to
218. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1135 (1992) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,
414 (1990)). 1 do not read this reference to "good faith" to intimate a subjective inquiry. For all its
warts, Teague does not appear to contemplate that whether a rule of law is new or old depends on a
federal court's assessment of state judges' personal blameworthiness. But see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 351 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting a subjective approach in apparent aid of
finding most rules to be "new"); Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527, 529 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(referring expressly to the "subjectivity" of this analysis). Cf infra note 323 (distinguishing the cases
on executive officers' "good faith" defense to suits for damages).
219. See supra text accompanying note 192.
220. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2488 (1992).
221. Brief for the Petitioner at 14-22, West, 112 S. Ct. at 2482 (No. 91-542).
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apply settled legal standards to the facts of concrete cases, the Court

ought to finish the job.22
The Justices balked. As we have seen, they failed to decide the ques-

tion they themselves had put to the parties. Parsing the opinions in West,
one concludes that the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Scalia
would now adopt a deference rule for all the issues in habeas corpus cases

and would rely on the "new rule" decisions for support.2 23 Others are
more cautious and, in the cause of caution, offer more limited interpreta-

tions of the precedents. Justice O'Connor rejects the argument that the
"new rule" decisions have already established a deferential "standard of
review" for examining the work of the state courts, such that habeas
relief is now available only if the state courts reached an unreasonable
result when they applied the law then available to them. She is crystalclear that the federal habeas courts are to ensure that the state courts
reached results that the federal courts themselves deem to have been correct, based on the legal standard applicable at the time. Indeed, she is

adamant that "a state court's incorrect legal determination has [n]ever

"been allowed to stand because it was reasonable."2'24 Justice O'Connor's

position, then, is formally straightforward: State judicial decisions are
222. Brief for the United States, supra note 193, at 7-8.
223. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2482 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.).
Justice Thomas hints, for example, that it is enough if the federal courts retain authority to decide
"independently" whether the state courts reached a "reasonable" judgment. Id. at 2489 n.7. For a
trenchant criticism of Justice Thomas' opinion, see Liebman, supra note 24, at 2012-33.
224. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.) (emphasis
added); see also id. at 2495 (insisting that the federal courts continue to adjudicate prisoners' claims
in light of the legal standards in place when the state courts acted "without any hint of deference to
the state courts"). To determine whether a state decision was correct at the time, Justice O'Connor
has explained that the federal court must undertake an "independent evaluation" of the precedents
in place at that time. Id. at 2497. Much "time and effort" may be spent "scrutinizing" the relevant
body of "federal law." Id. The standard for this evaluation is "objective." The existence of conflicting authorities is not conclusive. Nor is it decisive that previous opinions have characterized a case
as either establishing a "new rule" or simply applying a settled legal standard to different facts. Id.
I take all this only to acknowledge that courts and judges, members of the Supreme Court
included, sometimes make mistakes about an existing rule of law. Thus a federal habeas court does
not ineluctably create new law when it later identifies and applies the correct, settled standard.
Moreover, courts and judges typically insist that the results they reach are supported by precedent,
the better to parry dissenters who typically argue that new law is being forged. It would be unrealistic to attach decisive import to such characterizations when they probably reflect disagreement about
whether a legal standard is substantively sound rather than about whether, whatever its strengths or
weaknesses, it is "new." Surely what other judges have said about a legal standard is only evidence
to be considered by the court charged with making an independent judgment on a "new rule" question. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (concluding that a rule was "new" despite
previous statements suggesting it was not); cf. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct.
2395, 2406 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (pointing out that "a mistaken allusion in a later case
to the facts of an earlier case does not by itself undermine the holding of the earlier case").
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not correct because they are reasonable; they are reasonable because they

are correct.
Justice Kennedy also denies that the "new rule" cases are on a "collision course" with the federal courts' authority to decide ordinary mixed
issues independently. He, too, has it that the "new rule" decisions are
tethered to their driving purpose: the desire to respect state judgments
rendered in accordance with the precedents that prevailed when the state
courts acted. Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy understands
Teague as an attempt to spare the states from a regime in which their
judgments are upset by "changing a rule [of law] once thought correct
but now understood to be deficient on its own terms. ' 225 That purpose
225. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2499 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Judge Higginbotham
cites similar passages in recent cases to signal that Teague and its progeny have not yet buried habeas
for good and all. I certainly hope he is right and, while we are thinking wishfully, we should take
note of some other hopeful signs of late. For example, Justice Kennedy has said that the procedural
obstacles the Court has placed in the way of habeas petitioners stop short of abridging the federal
courts' authority to determine the merits. Kg., Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991) (elaborating the Sykes forfeiture standards for procedural default in state court); McCleskey v. Zant, 111
S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (applying Sykes' forfeiture standards to cases in which prisoners file multiple
federal petitions). If a petitioner successfully surmounts the barriers that cases like Coleman and
McCleskey establish and thus presents a federal district court with a claim "in a proper procedural
manner," Justice Kennedy is content that the federal court can adjudicate "all dispositive constitutional claims." Id. at 1474 (citation omitted). In a like manner, Justice Kennedy suggests that
Teague constitutes a threshold condition for merits adjudication in federal habeas and does not limit
the ability of the federal courts to enforce the proper legal standard in any case. A claim that can
succeed only if the federal habeas courts bring to bear a "new rule" of law is simply not properly
presented for decision on the merits. Claims that depend only on previously established legal standards are properly presented, however, and may be adjudicated in the ordinary course.
Justice O'Connor joined this chorus in her dissenting opinion in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112
S. Ct. 1715 (1992), in which, importantly, she managed to line up three others behind her-Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy. Initially, Justice O'Connor characterized McCleskey, Coleman,
and Teague, as "hurdles" that a habeas petitioners must negotiate in order to present a claim for
consideration on the merits. Id. at 1722 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She then explained: "[O]nce
[McCleskey, Coleman, Teague, and other threshold obstacles] have been surmounted--once the
claim is properly before the district court-a habeas petitioner, like any civil litigant, has.., a right
to a hearing where one is necessary to prove the facts supporting his claim." Id.
In a separate dissenting opinion in Tamayo-Reyes, Justice Kennedy seemed to go along.
Our recent decisions in (Coleman,McCleskey, and Teague] ...protect the integrity of
the writ, curbing its abuse and insuring that the legal questions presented are ones which, if
resolved against the State, can invalidate a final judgment. So we consider today only those
habeas actions which present questions federal courts are bound to decide in order to protect constitutional rights.
Id. at 1727-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
It may be pressing the point, but even Justice White's majority opinion in Tamayo-Reyes is at
least arguably open to the notion that Teague, like the procedural bar cases, is merely a gate-keeping
device that identifies federal claims for consideration on the merits. In critical part, Justice
O'Connor's dissent drew a distinction between rules for determining when a claim is properly before
a federal court for decision on the merits (regarding which forfeitures are legitimate) and rules for
determining the manner in which a federal court actually determines the merits (regarding which, in
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would be thwarted if the federal courts were to defer to state judgments
said to be minimally rational. Justice Souter also seems to think that the
very idea that some rules are "new" (and thus largely excluded from

federal habeas corpus) necessarily concedes that others are not "new"
(and thus applicable in federal court).226 There are, moreover, recent
O'Connor's view, forfeitures are impermissible). Justice O'Connor put the rule at stake in TamayoReyes (touching the establishment of primary facts in state court) in the second category. Justice
White did not reject Justice O'Connor's distinction between the two kinds of rules. Indeed, he
expressly said that Coleman, McCleskey, and Teague are "precondition[s] to reaching the merits
.
" Id. at....1719 n.3 (majority opinion). Arguably at least, White disagreed with O'Connor only in
that, in his opinion, rules governing procedural default with respect to the development of primary
facts fall in the same category as procedural-bar rules-and not (where Justice O'Connor would put
them) in the (forbidden) category of rules that undermine the federal courts' jurisdiction to determine properly-presented claims independently.
Finally, it is worth recalling that, under Teague, a federal district court must determine the
novelty of the legal standard on which a claim rests as the first order of business and can actually
decide whether the claim has merit only if the legal standard is deemed to be sufficiently settled or
the claim fits within one of Teague's narrow exceptions to the general ban on retroactive application.
That also arguably indicates that Teague is a "threshold question" and does not undermine a federal
habeas court's subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate properly presented claims on the merits. See
West, 112 S. Ct. at 2500 (Souter, J., concurring). Cf Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-41
(1990) (holding that Teague is not jurisdictional and therefore must be argued affirmatively).
226. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2500 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter explicitly disavows the
notion that, in order to defeat a "new rule" argument in habeas, a petitioner "must be able to point
to an old case decided on facts identical to the facts of his own." Id. at 2502; accord Graham v.
Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 917 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). Moreover, speaking generally of retroactivity law in the civil context, Justice Souter has confirmed that "[i]t is only when law changes in
some respect that an assertion of nonretroactivity may be entertained .... " James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2443 (1991). Thus in "ordinary" cases, in which courts are "in
the business of applying settled principles and precedents of law to the disputes that come to bar," it
follows that "no question of retroactivity arises." Id. at 2442. As in civil cases, in which he characterizes retroactivity as a choice-of-law issue, similarly in habeas cases, he explains that "[t]he crux of
the analysis ...is identification of the rule on which the claim for habeas relief depends." West, 112
S. Ct. at 2501 (Souter, J., concurring). Nevertheless, Justice Souter finds "new rules" where even
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy would not think to look. Eg., West, 112 S. Ct. at 2500 (Souter, J.,
concurring); Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1140 (Souter, J., dissenting). It is hardly insightful to point out, as
Souter does, that everything turns on the level of generality in which a rule is stated. That, of course,
is self-evident. If a prisoner were permitted to articulate the rule of law on which federal relief is
sought in the most open-ended manner, for example, a denial of fair process, then no case would call
for the announcement of a "new rule." The problem we face in the cases is that the Court insists on
articulating legal rules in extremely narrow, fact-specific terms. That, in turn, cynically transmutes
factual distinctions between cases seemingly governed by the same settled legal standard into variations of the standard itself. Each such variation begets an entirely different rule, and the sum total of
such "new rules" fills up the universe of the possible cases that can reach the federal courts in habeas
corpus. I am reminded of Justice Scalia's contention that when, in substantive due process cases, the
Court derives the content of protected liberty from American cultural history, it should confine its
search for sources to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition can be said to exist. See,
eg., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). That argument has the purpose and
effect of preventing the Court from taking account of the overarching societal values expressed in
legal understandings articulated at a higher level of generality and, instead, focusing the Court's
attention on fact-centered applications of abstract ideas. The practical result, of course, is to defeat
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instances in which the Justices have considered the merits of federal
habeas corpus claims and, by so doing, have indicated, explicitly or
implicitly, that not every decision is a "new rule" decision after all.2 27
Nevertheless, there remains a building tension between the Court's
literal descriptions of "new rules" and the federal courts' authority independently to judge the merits of prisoners' claims. The Justices who now
seem ready to adopt a general deference rule clearly think that the "new
rule" cases mean, at least in effect, that the federal courts must accept
"reasonable" state judgments across the board. 228 And even the Justices
who refuse to shape the "new rule" cases into a general rule of deference
may reach the same result on a case-by-case basis. 22 9 What the Court
individual claims of right. The lower the level of generality at which a societal tradition (or a legal
standard) must be identified, the less likely it is that any such tradition (or legal standard) will be
found. Fortunately, Justice Scalia's approach to substantive due process cases has been rejected.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter, JJ.) (stating that Justice Scalia's position is "inconsistent with our law"). I would like to
think that, in time, the Court's tendency to define legal standards for habeas purposes in a similarly
specific manner will also be discarded.
227. See, eg., Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130
(1992); Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990); see also
James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro'" The Rehnquist Court'sRout of Habeas CorpusJurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537, 588-93 (1990-91).
228. Speaking for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas insists that "if a
state court has reasonably rejected the legal claim asserted by a habeas petitioner under existing law,
then the claim seeks the benefit of a new rule." West, 112 S. Ct. at 2490. In his mind, this does,
indeed, mean that the federal court "must defer to the state court's decision rejecting the claim
unless that decision is patently unreasonable." Id. (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 422
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). Responding to Justice O'Connor's argument that the federal courts must
still determine whether the state courts decided prisoners' claims "properly" under the precedents
then in existence, Thomas contends that, by definition, any "reasonable" state judgment based on
old precedents must be accepted-because a federal court would have to establish a "new rule" in
order to come out differently. Id. at 2690 n.8.
I am afraid that for all practical purposes Justice White must also be counted in this camp.
Albeit he originally expressed doubts about the Court's new analysis in Teague, 489 U.S. at 317
(White, J., concurring), and was thunderously silent in West, Justice White consistently joined
majority opinions finding "new rules" in subsequent cases. His own opinion for the Court in Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993), was couched as though he continued to understand Teague
and its progeny to be addressed to changes in the law. Still, his bloodless reliance on Butler for the
definition of what counts as a "new rule" revealed that Justice White was content with the practical
implications. He read the opinions filed by the other Justices (and the amicus briefs sounding the
alarm); he knew perfectly well what he was doing.
229. The dispositions in Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993), and Gilmore v. Taylor, 113
S. Ct. 2112 (1993), illustrate this point. The prisoner in Graham attacked the Texas death penalty
statute on grounds almost identical to those asserted previously by the petitioner in Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Because in Penry, the Court squarely held that the claim did not
depend on a "new rule" of Eighth Amendment law and thus was not foreclosed by Teague, the
parties in Graham set any retroactivity argument to one side and briefed only the merits. Nonetheless, in the Supreme Court, a five-member majority opinion by Justice White distinguished Penry on
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hesitates to do wholesale, it may be perfectly willing to do retail. Worse,
the "new rule" cases may turn out to offer a loose (and extremely convenient) means by which the Justices can dispatch claims they deem to be
questionable without committing themselves (as a body) on the merits.
Even if five votes cannot be found to hold forthrightly that a claim is
invalid, it may be possible to get a majority to hold that, valid or invalid
by current standards, the claim depends on a "new rule" that cannot be
considered in habeas.2 30
None of the Justices appears willing to restrict the definition of a
"new rule" to a genuine change in the content of the legal standard applicable to a case-a new rule, rather than a new application of an old rule.
Justice O'Connor begins in a promising way, arguing that a rule is "new"
only if it can be "meaningfully distinguished from that established by
binding precedent" when a case was in state court. Yet in the next
breath she shifts back to a case-specific formulation, now saying that a
federal court announces a "new rule" if it awards relief in a case in which
there is some "factual distinction" that alters the "force with which...
[an] underlying principle applies."'2 3' Similarly, Justice Kennedy thinks
that the federal courts are barred from invoking both "new rules" and
"old rule[s] in a novel setting., 232 Judge Higginbotham insists that all
its facts and found the prisoner's claim Teague-barred. Similarly in Gilmore, the Court concluded
that in the circumstances of the case at bar, the petitioner could succeed only by establishing a "new
rule"-and thus refused to consider his claim in habeas corpus. The implications of this incremental
evisceration of habeas could scarcely be more sobering. Moreover, since the Court is quite prepared
to rely on retroactivity analysis to deny habeas relief even when that angle has not figured below,
state's attorneys have an incentive to press "new rule" arguments when they themselves are unpersuaded that the legal standards under which prisoners claim relief are really novel.
230. Graham and Gilmore also illustrate this point. In Graham, Justice Thomas wrote separately to argue that the rule on which the prisoner relied was not only "new" law, but bad law as
well. 113 S. Ct. at 913 (concurring opinion). And in Gilmore, Justice O'Connor concurred only in
the judgment-insisting that the Court should not commit itself on the merits of the prisoner's
claim, but agreeing that the merits should not be reached because the claim, whether valid or not,
turned on a "new rule." 113 S. Ct. at 2121.
231. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring). I do not yet despair for Justice
O'Connor. She now explains that the "dictated by precedent" standard she herself offered in Teague
was meant to be consistent with Justice Harlan's approach to "new rule" arguments in mixed question cases. Id. Indeed, relating the "dictated by precedent" formulation in Teague to the "reasonable minds might differ" formulation in Butler, Justice O'Connor concludes that if the state courts
depart from an established legal principle on the basis of a factual distinction that "does not change
the force with which the precedent's underlying principle applies," the resulting state judgment is
"not reasonable" within the meaning of Butler. Id. (emphasis added). Still, I do wish Justice
O'Connor would squarely take the position that a "new rule" for retroactivity purposes is necessarily
a significant break from preexisting law that seriously upsets state reliance interests.
232. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2499 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct.
1130, 1135 (1992) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)). Justice Kennedy, too, occasionally drops lines from
which hope can spring. He acknowledges, for example, that some rules are general by their nature,
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the evidence is not in on the meaning of Teague, and I, for one, hope
there is still room for optimism. For now, though, the threat to the fed-

eral courts' longstanding jurisdiction looms over each habeas corpus case
the Court agrees to review. For every such case offers another opportu-

nity to saddle the writ with preclusion.
3.

The Exclusionary Rule Cases

The federal courts' authority and responsibility to determine federal
claims de novo is open to a third avenue of attack. In one instance, and
potentially in others, the Court is willing to hold that a federal claim is
by nature inapplicable (at least routinely) in habeas corpus. The single
illustration so far is, of course, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
established for state cases in Mapp v. Ohio.2 33 Depending on where you

dip into Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Stone v. Powell,2 34 you
may come away with any of several understandings of the basis for his
decision that the federal courts should not consider habeas petitions that
meant to guide judgment in the examination of primary facts in a variety of patterns. Rules of that
kind, he explains, infrequently yield results so novel as to forge a "new rule" of law, that is, "one not
dictated by precedent." Id. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's formulations, too, are sufficiently factsensitive that they draw into question the conventional scope of the federal courts' authority to
determine the merits of federal claims in habeas. In Graham, for example, he provided the fifth vote
necessary to hold that a petitioner's claim rested on a "new rule," notwithstanding that the Court
had previously held in Penry that virtually the same claim could rest on preexisting decisions.
Of course, both Justice Kennedy and Justice White had joined Justice Scalia's dissent on the
"new rule" issue in Penry. Accordingly, we might have expected that, if Graham were recast as a
"new rule" case, Justice Kennedy would vote to bar the prisoner's claim from habeas corpus. In the
end, though, Justice White's majority opinion was loaded with the boilerplate regarding "new rules"
taken from Butler, and language from Justice Kennedy's own opinions for the Court in Saffie v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), and Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990). Kennedy's more recent (and
more moderate) formulations in West showed up only in Justice Souter's dissent in Graham.
In this vein, Justice Kennedy's generalizations for the Court in Stringer are unnerving. In
Stringer, he says that "new rule" cases present not one question, but two. In a case in which a
prisoner "seeks federal habeas relief based upon a principle announced after a final judgment," the
district court must decide, first, whether "the decision relied upon announced a new rule .. " If so,
the claim is barred, unless the case falls within one of Teague's exceptions. If not, the court must
turn to a second question: "whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the
prior decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent." Stringer, 112 S.Ct. at
1135. If Justice Kennedy (and, indeed, the Court's majority) genuinely conceives of this second
"application" question as qualitatively separate, rather than merely a more fact-sensitive version of
his first question, the practical implications may be significant. Prisoners now contend that their
claims rest on settled rules and that, to invoke Teague, state's attorneys must demonstrate that they
are trying to apply such an established rule so far out of its bailiwick as to alter its substantive
content. Justice Kennedy's discussion in Stringer threatens to change the terms of the debate by
permitting state's attorneys to concede that a prisoner is relying on an unchanged substantive legal
standard and still argue that the fact-focused application of that rule is Teague-barred.
233. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
234. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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seek relief solely on the ground that illegally seized evidence was used at
trial: because the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally grounded (and
is thus easier to adjust as the Justices see fit); because (unlike most other
safeguards) the rule does not enable the trial court to distinguish the
innocent from the guilty; or because the deterrent effect of the rule is
diminished by the time a case reaches the federal courts in habeas corpus
(in some instances years after the unlawful search was conducted).2 35
Importantly for present purposes, Justice Powell expressed the
Court's holding in Stone in the process-model terms conventionally associated with preclusion. He instructed the federal courts to consider an
exclusionary rule claim only if the state courts fail to provide an "opportunity" for "full and fair adjudication. ' 236 By making critical the mere
"opportunity" for state adjudication, rather than actual litigation on the
merits, Justice Powell declared that the federal courts should rebuff not
only claims previously treated and rejected in state court, but also claims
that were not, but might have been, determined there. The new formulation thus introduced both "issue" and "claim" preclusion into habeas
cases involving exclusionary rule claims. Now, if the state courts consider a prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim and find it wanting, the prisoner is typically barred from attempting to relitigate that claim in federal
court. If the state courts offer a prisoner a procedure for raising an
exclusionary rule claim and the prisoner does not seize that "opportunity," the federal courts are equally closed. The consequences have been
dramatic. The enforcement of the exclusionary rule in habeas corpus has
ground to a halt.
The ambiguous opinion in Stone sparked widespread speculation
about the Court's intentions.2 37 On the one hand, Justice Powell's use of
preclusion language suggested that for all his emphasis on the peculiarities of the exclusionary rule, he meant Stone as a step away from Brown
v. Allen. Many of us worried at the time that other claims, too, would
soon receive the same treatment-at least claims that, like the exclusionary rule, were subject to being recast as nonconstitutional prophylactics,
serving interests other than protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction.2 3 Justice Powell himself, as well as Chief Justice Burger, would
235. Id. at 482-86, 490, 492-95.
236. Id. at 481-82.
237. See Philip M. Halpern, FederalHabeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After
Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1982); Seidman, supra note 86.
238. E.g., REMEDIES, supra note 15, §§ 95-104.
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have pursued that course.2 39 More recently, Justices Scalia and Thomas

have taken up the same cause.
On the other hand, Powell dropped a footnote in Stone disclaiming
any intention to touch the federal courts' jurisdiction in habeas corpus.2 41
That, in turn, suggested that Stone was not a decision about the scope of
habeas corpus, but rather was a decision about the scope of the exclu-

sionary rule. The argument in that vein is now familiar: The exclusionary rule is of such a character that it is routinely applicable only when its
purposes are adequately served. Prior to Stone, the Court had held that

the exclusionary rule is not itself a personal right of the accused in the
case in which it is invoked, but a judge-made rule of evidence meant to
enforce the Fourth Amendment by deterring illegal police behavior in
other, future cases. 242 Tels
The loss of reliable evidence is a high price to pay
for getting the police to follow the Constitution: The criminal goes free
because "the constable blundered. ' 243 Accordingly, applying a crude
cost-benefit analysis, the Court held in Stone that such a price is justified
only when use of the rule promises sufficient deterrent impact. And that,

so the argument goes, is at trial or on direct review-but not in federal
habeas corpus. Recent decisions make it clear that, for the moment, the
full Court accepts this second understanding. 2 " The federal courts thus
retain power to consider federal claims independently, notwithstanding

previous litigation in state court, and, indeed, may even entertain a
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claim in a case in which the state
239. Eg., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (suggesting
the applicability of Stone in a race discrimination case); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 422
(1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Stone should control in a Sixth Amendment case).
240. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 1768 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting)
(joined by Thomas, J.) (arguing that a federal court should invoke "equitable discretion" to deny
habeas relief on the basis of a claim a prisoner had a "prior opportunity to litigate" in state courtunless the claim "goes to the fairness of the trial process or to the accuracy of the ultimate result").
241. 428 U.S. at 494 n.37.
242. E.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974).
243. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
244. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 (1980);
see YACKLE, supra note 120, at 623-28; cf Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (squarely rejecting
an analogy to Stone in a race discrimination case). In an unfortunate lapse, Justice Souter's opinion
for the Court in Withrow v. Williams, 113 S.Ct. 1745 (1993), begins by referring to "Stone's restriction on the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction." Id. at 1748. Perhaps we are to distinguish the
exercise of jurisdiction from jurisdiction itself. Cf id. at 1767 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting)
(contending that Stone did not disclaim habeas jurisdiction of exclusionary rule claims but only
exercised "equitable discretion" in declining to entertain them). Further on, in any case, Justice
Souter recognizes that Stone "was not jurisdictional in nature," but, instead, "rested on prudential
concerns counseling against the application of the ...exclusionary rule on collateral review." Id. at
1750.
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courts fail to offer an adequate opportunity for adjudicating such a claim.
In ordinary circumstances (in which prisoners do get a fair chance to
press Fourth Amendment claims in state court), however, the likelihood
that the enforcement of the exclusionary rule in habeas corpus will deter
future police misconduct is insufficient to justify the costs. 245
The process-model language Justice Powell used in Stone is not to be
read as the principal focus of that case. Powell attached significance to
whether the prisoner had received an opportunity for "full and fair"
adjudication in state court only insofar as he held that the absence of
such an opportunity would establish an exception to his primary holding
that, ordinarily, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable
in habeas. Such an exception was necessary in order to give state authorities themselves an incentive to enforce the exclusionary rule at trial and
on appeal. The foundation of the Stone decision, however, was the
nature of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Again, there is
nothing about habeas corpus that excludes a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claim from a federal court's purview simply because the
state courts previously did or might have determined such a claim
against the prisoner; rather, there is something about the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that makes its enforcement in federal habeas
corpus unnecessary.
It seems unlikely that other claims can similarly be understood to
include as one of their elements a specification of the judicial proceedings
in which they should routinely be invoked, that is to say, claims that by
their very nature are applicable at trial and on appeal, but (usually) not
in habeas corpus. Until last Term, most of us thought that claims under
Miranda v. Arizona24 6 offered an inviting target-reviving, in a different
time and place, the assault on the Miranda decision with which thenAssistant Attorney General Rehnquist was associated twenty years
ago.24 In Withrow v. Williams, 248 however, Justice Souter's opinion for
a five-to-four majority distinguished Miranda from Mapp and confirmed
that the federal courts will continue to enforce the Miranda framework
in habeas. This is as it should be. Mirandaclaims are nothing like exclusionary rule claims in any respect that matters to habeas corpus.
245. Williams, 113 S. Ct. at 1755.
246. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 205 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (joined by Scalia, J.) (contending that Mirandaclaims should be treated in the way that
Stone treats Mapp claims).
247. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
248. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
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Whatever may be the conceptual basis of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule, much of the Miranda framework is constitutional law.
Prior to Miranda, it had been thought in many quarters that the privilege
against self-incrimination only protected citizens against being compelled
to give evidence against themselves in a judicial proceeding: Both the
compulsion and the use of the compelled testimony had to occur
together. In Miranda, however, the Court held that compulsion and use
may be separated in time and place: The Fifth Amendment bars the use
of a compelled statement even if it was obtained previously in the course
of custodial interrogation outside the court room. That holding was
plainly "constitutional." 2'49 In addition, Miranda squarely held as a matter of constitutional law that the state may not use statements obtained
by custodial interrogation unless it demonstrates that the interrogators
employed "procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination." 2 50 Since that core constitutional decision in
Miranda,the Court has only once held that the Fifth Amendment allows
the use of a defendant's own statement as part of the prosecution's case
in chief without a showing that some measures were taken to protect the
privilege.2"' In the absence of a "fully effective equivalent" framework,
the familiar Miranda safeguards are constitutionally "required."2'5 2
Indeed, relief was granted in the cases before the Court in Miranda on
the ground that in each instance statements had been obtained by means
'253
that "did not meet constitutionalstandards.
To be sure, the Court said in Miranda that the Constitution does not
mandate any "specific code of procedures" for securing the privilege and
that the statements obtained from the suspects at bar were not necessarily "involuntary in traditional terms."2 4 Yet the concession that a confession is not always compelled in the constitutional sense if the
prosecution fails to demonstrate each of the elements of the Miranda
framework hardly implies that compliance with the Miranda safeguards
249. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460-61. The lion's share of Justice Harlan's dissent in Miranda was
devoted to a criticism of the majority for "extending the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination to the police station." Id. at 510; accord Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 (1974)
(reading Miranda to have decided for the first time that the constitutional privilege is "applicable to
state interrogations at a police station").
250. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
251. In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Court recognized a "public safety"
exception in a case in which the police needed to ask questions in order to secure a loaded gun.
252. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 479; accord Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 370-71 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491 (emphasis added).
254. Id. at 490, 457.
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is entirely divorced from the constitutionality of a conviction obtained by

violating them. The Court's careful opinion in Miranda was more than
an ambitious essay about what state prosecutors ought to show before
introducing an incriminating statement at trial. On the contrary, that

case was a firm constitutional decision regarding what prosecutors are
"required" to show to assure that the Fifth Amendment is "scrupulously
honored."2 '

Nor is Miranda the kind of court-fashioned evidentiary rule the
Court now considers the exclusionary rule to be. The constitutional violation asserted in a Fourth Amendment case is committed when governmental agents violate the suspect's privacy. There is no necessary
connection between such a violation and the criminal process. The
officers alleged to have conducted an unreasonable search need not have
been looking for evidence of crime, and the victim of their unconstitu-

tional action need not be subject to criminal prosecution. The link to the
criminal process arises only because the purpose for which the police
invade privacy is typically a search for criminal evidence and because,
when evidence is found, the victim of the search is typically prosecuted.
This being true, the Court thinks it fit to deter future police misconduct
255. Id. at 479. The principal precedent cited in support of the view that Miranda was something other than constitutional law is then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). That case involved an interrogation conducted before the Miranda
decision had come down. The police had given the suspect most of the warnings Miranda would
later require and had specifically asked him whether he wanted an attorney. They failed only to tell
the suspect that if he could not afford to hire a lawyer, one would be provided for him free of charge.
On that record, the Court was unwilling to hold that the statement the police obtained was compelled. Tucker, accordingly, is perfectly consistent with the understanding that effective safeguards
are demanded constitutionally, but that a single departure from the Mirandaframework may not, in
some circumstances, render a confession constitutionally deficient. Tucker has nothing to say about
cases like Williams, in which the police observed no safeguards at all during a custodial interrogation
that produced incriminating statements. Moreover, Tucker did not rely on the nonconstitutional
character of the error in that case to justify admitting the defendant's own statement, but rather used
its holding that the defendant's statement was not compelled in the constitutional sense only to
distinguish Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), and thus to escape the fruit-of-thepoisonous-tree doctrine. The statement that Tucker permitted the prosecution to introduce was
given by a witness to whom the defendant's statement led the police. In that case, accordingly, the
Court easily held that the defendant had not been compelled to be a witness against himselfbecause the evidence in issue was given by a third party. In so holding, the Court expressly pointed
out that the admission of the witness' statement in no way compromised the reliability of the factfinding process at trial. For while flaws in the safeguards used in the interrogation of the defendant
plainly would undercut the reliability of his own statement, those violations could not draw into
question the reliability of a statement freely given by another, not subject to the same interrogation.
This was the basis on which Justice White was willing to concur in Tucker. The Court has repeated
the caveat that Miranda violations do not always implicate the Constitution, but never in any manner critical to the result. E.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (holding that a noncoercive
interrogation without Miranda warning did not forever bar further questioning).
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by creating incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment-by refusing to allow the prosecution 25to6 use the fruits of illegal searches in some
instances, though not in all.
The decision in Stone was only another in this line. The Court reasoned that when a habeas petitioner attacks current detention on the
ground that the underlying conviction rests on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the prisoner asks the federal courts not
to upset a judgment obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights, but rather
to use habeas corpus as an enforcement mechanism for a right the Court
deems to have nothing necessarily to do with the regularity of, or the
reliability attached to, the conviction. This surely is what Justice Powell
meant in Stone, when he said that habeas petitioners ask for a redetermination of an issue that has "no bearing on the basic justice of [the prisoner's] incarceration. ' 257 It is, indeed, the only plausible ground I know
for the notion that a prisoner whose conviction was achieved on the basis
of illegally seized evidence is not "in custody" in violation of federal law
within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act.258
Miranda,by contrast, does enforce an express provision of the Bill of
Rights, which is itself a principle of exclusion having everything to do
with the validity of criminal trials. The rule in Miranda, which prevents
the prosecution from using a statement obtained in violation of procedures specified by the Court, flows from the underlying right those procedures vindicate: the right against being convicted on the basis of
compelled testimony. The violation in a Miranda case begins in the field
when the police fail to give the proper warnings and obtain the necessary
waiver from the suspect before taking a statement, but it is complete only
at trial when such a statement is used as part of the prosecution's case in
chief. Evidence of that kind is excluded not as a penalty for a violation
that is already finished (imposed in hopes of deterring similar misbehavior in the future), but to prevent a current violation of the Fifth
Amendment.2 59
256. Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding evidence) with United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) and Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (declining to
exclude).
257. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976).
258. REMEDIES, supra note 15, § 98.
259. The purpose of Miranda cannot have been merely to prevent compulsion for its own sake;
compulsion alone is not unconstitutional. This is plain from the cases permitting the government to
compel witnesses to give testimony and limiting the Fifth Amendment privilege to situations in
which such statements are to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution. E.g., Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (holding that "use" immunity captures the dimensions of the privilege).
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court recognized that while the rules
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Thus when a petitioner attacks incarceration on the ground that a
conviction rests on a confession obtained in violation of the Miranda
framework, the prisoner raises a claim that does go to the procedural
regularity, reliability, and integrity of the proceedings in state court that
resulted in conviction. 2" Compelled statements are often untrustworthy-the product of physical or psychological pressures, threats,
promises of leniency, or other coercive tactics. The Miranda rules eliminate or reduce the use of statements obtained in that way by instructing
trial courts to receive confessions only if the prosecution carries its burden of proof regarding what went on at the police station.261 Moreover,
the Miranda framework safeguards the fairness of the criminal process.
announced in Miranda would affect the behavior of police in the field, the "basis [of the] decision
was the need to protect the fairness of the trial itself." Id. at 240. There is, said the Court in
Schneckloth, a "vast difference" between the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and
rights, like Miranda, that "protect a fair criminal trial." Id. at 241.
260. The Court in Miranda explicitly stated that the framework it was putting in place was
meant to ensure that criminal trials were reliable and fair. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465. Previously,
trial courts had excluded statements made to the police only on finding them involuntary under the
Due Process Clause. That required vexing and time-consuming ad hoc inquiries into the peculiar
facts of each case. Because the participants in interrogation sessions were typically limited to the
suspect and the police, fact-finding hearings often degenerated into swearing contests in which suspects alleged coercive tactics and the officers involved denied them. Faced with conflicting testimony, trial courts typically could not find the facts reliably and thus could not decide the further
legal question whether, on the facts, a statement was voluntary. By instituting the relatively clean
and crisp Miranda rules, and by placing the burden on the prosecution to demonstrate that those
rules were followed, the Court meant to improve the ability of trial courts to make constitutionally
significant judgments regarding the admissibility of testimonial evidence at trial.
261. Id. at 479. The Bush administration's Solicitor General argued in an amicus brief in Williams that the "prophylactic" rules established in Miranda"lead to the exclusion of highly probative
evidence not obtained in violation of the Constitution." Brief of the United States at 9, Withrow v.
Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993) (No. 90-6297). That was a non sequitur. It left the misleading
impression that because some departures from Miranda may not undermine the reliability of statements, compliance with Miranda in general retards the pursuit of truth. In fact, Mirandaenhances
the truth-seeking function of criminal trials.
The decision in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), to apply Miranda only prospectively does not undercut this point. Johnson did not deny that Miranda serves the interest of achieving reliable outcomes. Instead, the Court recognized that most procedural safeguards have
something to do with reliability, and that the matter is typically one "of degree." Id. at 728-29.
Miranda was denied retrospective effect not because it did not enhance the accuracy of results, but
because prisoners to whom Miranda claims would be denied could still raise due process voluntariness claims, id. at 735, and because the retroactive application of Miranda would have upset reliance
interests and seriously disrupted the administration of justice. Id. at 731. Nor does the decision in
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), that statements obtained in violation of Mirandacan be used to
impeach a defendant's trial testimony, detract from Miranda's purpose to ensure reliable results.
Hass only ensures that Miranda will not be misused to frustrate, rather than to achieve, its own
purposes. The idea in Miranda is to exclude statements that may be unreliable, not to allow a
prisoner to contradict prior statements without the check that the introduction of previous utterances can provide in the search for truth.
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The Fifth Amendment privilege, which Miranda secures, rests on a constellation of values derived from Anglo-American history and is impli-

cated even when, on the basis of other evidence, it appears that a
compelled statement expresses the truth. Among those values is the
adversarial nature of our criminal process-the body and soul of the con-

stitutional scheme. The maintenance of the very structure of criminal
trials is, of course, entirely different from the privacy interest in Fourth
Amendment cases-which, again, has nothing necessarily to do with the
prosecution of criminal defendants and the validity of their detention.

There are other distinctions between Mapp and Miranda, most of
them recognized by the Court in Williams, but let me not belabor them
here.2 62 The question on the table now is what we are to make of the

pleasant surprise Williams has turned out to be. It would be a mistake, I
think, to find in this single decision much reassurance regarding the
future of Brown v. Allen. True, the Court squarely held in Williams that
the federal courts properly reconsidered a Miranda claim the state courts

of Michigan had previously rejected. At least implicitly, then, Williams
262. For example, the costs of enforcing Miranda in federal habeas corpus are by no means so
high as the costs of enforcing the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Mapp concededly frustrates
the pursuit of truth by depriving the trial court of tangible, reliable evidence of the defendant's
factual guilt. By contrast, Miranda enhances the system's ability to arrive at the truth through
trustworthy and fair means. Statements are excluded because they have not been shown to be voluntary and reliable. The exclusion of Miranda claims from habeas would produce none of the assumed
benefits of Stone but would, instead, generate more and greater problems for both the state and the
federal courts.
Prisoners who claim that evidence used against them was illegally seized have no other federal
ground to which they can repair; only egregious police practices can support a due process claim
touching the production of hard evidence. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Habeas
petitions attempting to raise that kind of claim can be easily screened. In practice, then, Stone carves
out of the federal picture claims of police misconduct during searches and seizures. Prisoners with
confession claims would have a fallback position: claims that the confessions used against them constituted compelled self-incrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment of its own force, or
coerced statements obtained in violation of due process. Charged to consider Fifth Amendment or
due process claims, the federal courts would be obliged to inquire into the circumstances of interrogations and criminal trials, and the precautions taken to avoid compulsion, but without the relatively
clear guidance provided by Miranda. To adjudicate in such cases, the federal courts still would have
to determine whether suspects were warned of their rights and whether, having been warned, they
voluntarily agreed to cooperate. Those matters have always been held to be relevant to the voluntariness question on the open-ended "totality of the circumstances" standard. E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1963); see Miranda,384 U.S. at 534 (White, J., dissenting); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. Rav. 435, 455-57 (1987).
So the federal courts would go on-entertaining the same petitions from the same state prisoners, inquiring into the same facts in search of the same answers to the same questions. Denied the
clarity of Miranda,however, they would take longer to decide cases and might well differ more often
with the state courts over the proper conclusion to be reached in a case. All this would only take
more time and effort, rub judicial feelings raw, and frustrate efficient justice in the bargain.
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reaffirms that the federal habeas courts are to exercise independent judgment on the merits of claims. Yet the Court did not forthrightly face and
dispose of the lingering questions touching the federal courts' authority
in habeas. For that reason alone, Williams may be little more than neutral precedent regarding the scope of the writ. z6 3 Indeed, because the
very point of this new decision is that Stone, and now Williams itself, are
cases about the content of substantive claims raised by habeas petitioners,
as opposed to the federal courts' authority to adjudicate in habeas
corpus, Williams may yet be distinguished away, if and when the Court
returns to the question left hanging in Wright v. West. Moreover, let us
not forget that four members of the Court, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented in Williams-reiterating familiar complaints about
habeas corpus that are scarcely limited to Miranda claims. 2"
Finally, the hydraulic pressures for restricting federal habeas by
other means will continue to influence the Justices' thinking about Stone
and its reach, if any, beyond its current base. We may live to see other
cases in which the content of a federal legal proposition is said not to
include its enforcement in habeas corpus. The set of claims subject to
being Stoned may be limited to Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
claims, but I wouldn't count on it.
4.

The Harmless Error Cases

In search of still another strategy for forcing the federal courts to
defer to prior state judgments, the Court has turned to the last maneuver
that then-Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist advocated in 1971.
Recall his argument: Even if his other ideas were rejected and the federal
habeas courts continued to exercise independent judgment on the merits
of federal claims, Rehnquist contended that they should give prisoners
relief when they found such claims to be meritorious only if successful
petitioners supplemented their applications with a "colorable showing of
263. In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), decided with Williams, the Court
insisted that precedents that "never squarely addressed" an issue have no stare decisis effect when
the Justices decide to take the question up "on the merits." Id. at 1718. But see Williams, 113 S.Ct.
at 1755 (stating that if "one should question the need for federal collateral review of requirements
that merit... respect [from state authorities], the answer simply is that the respect is sustained in no
small part by the existence of such review").
264.

Williams, 113 S. Ct. at 1756 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 1765 (Scalia,

J., concurring and dissenting).

1993]

HABEAS HAGIOSCOPE

2409

innocence."2'65 As we have seen, that idea emerged in the Nixon administration's legislative package as a proposal to relax the standard for judging "harmless error" in habeas corpus.26 6
In the context of direct review, the Court had said in Chapman v.
California26 7 that some violations of constitutional rights in state trials
could be overlooked if the state proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
they were harmless. The Hruska bill in 1973 would have barred habeas
relief unless the prisoner showed that, but for the constitutional violation
that occurred, the state courts would probably have reached a "different
result. ' 268 Attorney General Kleindienst counseled against introducing
such an explicit concern for the accuracy of state criminal judgments into
habeas and proposed, instead, that habeas relief should be available if the
petitioner suffered a "substantial deprivation" of his constitutional rights,
a test which, in turn, roughly tracked the language of what is now 28
U.S.C. § 2111, governing the effect of nonconstitutional error on appeal
270
in federal criminal cases.2 69 Previously, in Kotteakos v. United States,
the Court had construed a precursor to section 2111 to contemplate a
harmless error standard much less generous to the accused than Chapman. In 1973, Mr. Kleindienst explained that he intended, accordingly,
that habeas applicants should be required to make "some showing of
prejudice"-a result he conceded could only be reached through a "modification" of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in Chapman.2 7 1
Of course, neither the Hruska bill nor an amendment along the lines
suggested by Mr. Kleindienst was enacted.27 2
In a number of cases, the Court applied the Chapman test in habeas
corpus just as on direct review.2 73 Last Term in Brecht v. Abrahamson,274 however, Chief Justice Rehnquist found five votes for adopting
the "less onerous" Kotteakos standard, after all. Specifically, state prisoners who establish trial error of constitutional magnitude can now
265. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
267. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional
Error, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 79 (1988) (providing good background and analysis).
268. See supra note 98.
269. Letter from Richard G. Kleindienst to Emanuel Celler, supra note 99; see 28 U.S.C § 2111
(1988).
270. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
271. Letter from Richard G. Kleindienst to Emanuel Celler, supra note 99; see also supra note
99.
272. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
273. Eg., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
274. 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993).
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obtain federal habeas relief only if the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the verdict.27 5 This, the Chief Justice is quick
to point out, means precisely what Mr. Kleindienst advocated twenty
years ago: "actual prejudice. ' 276 Such a diluted standard for constitutional violations identified in habeas has all the devastating potential of
the general "deference" rule we narrowly escaped in Wright v. West.277
Put simply, Brecht, too, threatens to circumnavigate the Habeas Corpus
Act-but from a different direction. There is, of course, a conceptual
distinction between the general deference rule the full Court deflected in
West, under which a federal court would defer to an erroneous state
judgment on a federal legal claim, and the relaxed standard for harmless
error announced in Brecht, under which a federal court still may exercise
independent judgment on the merits of a claim but must withhold federal
relief unless the violation had a "substantial" effect on the determination
of guilt in state court. Yet both roads lead to the same Rome: the denial
of federal habeas relief to citizens who are conceded to be in custody in
violation of the Constitution.
The diluted standard for constitutional trial errors is hostile to the
very nature of the federal courts' jurisdiction in habeas corpus. The federal habeas courts have authority and responsibility to vouchsafe citizens
against detention in violation of the Bill of Rights. In most circumstances, if a constitutional error played no part in the conviction on
which the state relies for a prisoner's custody, then the conviction is not
unjust and habeas relief can be denied consistent with the Act. The same
cannot be said, however, if an error may have had some effect, albeit not
a demonstrably prejudicial effect, on the verdict. The adoption of a
relaxed harmless error standard thus evades the federal habeas courts'
core obligation within their congressionally prescribed jurisdiction. That
obligation is to determine properly-preserved claims on the merits and to
set free anyone whose incarceration is grounded in a state judgment
obtained, in large or small part, by unconstitutional means. It takes little
imagination to anticipate that the district courts may now make it their
practice to consider the relative harmfulness of an error at the threshold-and fail to reach the merits unless they first conclude that a claim, if
found to be meritorious, could bring relief. Something of this sort is
275.
276.
277.

Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.
Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1722 (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).
See supra notes 192-94, 219-27 and accompanying text.
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already done with respect to the "prejudice" prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel, 278 and it should surprise no one if Brecht produces essentially the same effect across the board with respect to all
claimed errors at trial.2 79
Chief Justice Rehnquist candidly acknowledges that his result is
wholly a creature of his own policy predilections. There is no support for
a diluted harmless error standard in the precedents. The Chief Justice
sweeps aside cases employing the Chapman standard in habeas on the
theory that they did not "squarely address" the matter and, instead, only
"assumed" that harmless error must be judged in the same way on
habeas as on direct review.28 0 Nor can the Chief Justice find much fortification in the lower court's decision. The Seventh Circuit also purported
only to act on its own appraisal of the relevant policies and, even then,
proposed a relaxed standard for harmless error only with respect to nonconstitutional prophylactic rules rather than to constitutional violations.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, by contrast, makes it plain that Brecht holds for
all claims of trial error, including constitutional error.28 1
The Chief Justice also concedes that the habeas statutes supply no
support for Brecht. He insists that Congress has been "silent" on this
point and dismisses both the argument that legislative silence should be
taken as an implicit approval of the Chapman standard and, more tellingly, the argument that, by failing to enact Attorney General Kleindienst's proposal, Congress explicitly concluded that the harmless error
standard should not be relaxed in habeas.282 As usual, when the Chief
Justice is able to find any daylight in the habeas corpus statute, he fills
what he takes to be a void with his own cost-benefit analysis-which
inevitably sacrifices the availability of a federal forum. If it is for the
Court to decide this question, and Chief Justice Rehnquist declares that
278. Eg., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
279. On the other hand, a distinction might be drawn between backing into a case in this way
when some showing of an effect on outcome is an element of the substantive claim (as is the case
with the "prejudice" requirement in ineffective assistance cases) and doing so when the effect is to
avoid the merits altogether. It seems to me that either approach abdicates the subject matter jurisdiction that Congress has conferred, but the latter does so more vividly than the former.
280. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718.
281. Compare id. at 1722 with Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991).
282. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719. Chief Justice Rehnquist concedes that the Nixon administration's position, while different from the position that the Hruska bill would have enacted, still "parallel[ed]" the standard for harmless error that now has been adopted in Brecht. 113 S.Ct. at 1719.
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it is, then federal habeas corpus for state prisoners must suffer yet
another setback.2 s3
It remains to ask whether, in turn, there is any daylight in what
Chief Justice Rehnquist has wrought in Brecht. I find none. True, the

Court has long said that some constitutional violations do not lend themselves to analysis for harmless error.2 s4 In Brecht, the Chief Justice
seems content that "structural defects" of that kind can never be harm25
less on any standard, either on direct review or in habeas corpus. 1

Moreover, he does not "foreclose" the possibility that in an "unusual"
case, even a trial error might yet justify habeas relief without a finding of

a substantial effect on the verdict. He has in mind, however, a "deliberate and especially egregious" trial error, or "one that is combined with a
pattern of prosecutorial misconduct," that so infects the "integrity" of
the trial that a departure from Brecht is warranted. 28 6 That kind of case
would be unusual, and one tends to think that the Chief Justice mentions

it not because he genuinely anticipates that it might arise, but to justify
some choice quotations from Justice Stevens' previous opinion in Greer v.
Miller.28 7 Aficionadoes will recall that the question in Brecht was also
presented in Greer, and, when the majority failed to address it, Stevens
283. In this, the Chief Justice did follow Judge Easterbrook below, who appraised a range of
considerations he thought relevant to the policy question whether federal habeas corpus should be
available to state convicts. Concluding that, on balance, federal habeas corpus is too costly and
should be curbed in some manner, Judge Easterbrook proceeded to "select[]" his own solution-a
"deferential standard by which to assess" harmless error. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1372. In truth, Judge
Easterbrook proceeded as though he was writing on a clean slate. He simply listed the costs he
associated with habeas, any precedent that had recognized such costs, and any precedent that had
restricted access to the federal forum in any way. Then, without connecting any of those precedents
with the harmless error rule, he declared that he had decided to deploy a "deferential" standard for
harmless error in this and future cases. Easterbrook thus made no pretense of grounding his decision on an interpretation of the Habeas Corpus Act, or, certainly, a reasoned elaboration of precedent. He simply declared (correctly) that the Supreme Court had not yet relaxed the harmless error
rule as a means of undercutting habeas corpus and (erroneously) that the Court had not yet rejected
such an approach, either. Therefore, he concluded he was free to make his own policy choice in the
matter. Judge Easterbrook wrote the circuit opinion in Brecht before West was decided, and, indeed,
before the Court asked the parties in West to brief the general "deference" question. Yet Easterbrook was hardly blind to the wider implications of the approach to harmless error he advanced. He
explicitly stated that he meant the "deferential" harmless error standard to occupy a "middle"
ground between "no review" of state judgments, on the one hand, and fresh, independent federal
adjudication, on the other. Id.
284. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717 (relying on Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-65
(1991) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.)).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1722 n.9 (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 769 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
287. 483 U.S. 756 (1987).
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attached a separate opinion to say that, in his view, the Chapman stan-

dard for harmless error should not always be applied in habeas.288 I have
to think that because Stevens' vote is essential in Brecht, the Chief Justice
is merely trying in this instance to keep him satisfied.2 89

If there is any counterweight to the anti-habeas signal in Brecht, it
must be found in what Justice Stevens has to say separately. Having
carried forward to Brecht the view he had expressed in Greer, and,

indeed, having joined not only in Chief Justice Rehnquist's judgment, but
also in his opinion, Justice Stevens nonetheless works hard to reassure us
that Brecht is not the dragon it appears to be. Importantly, he reads the
Court to embrace not just the "substantial effect" test for harmless error

that appears in Kotteakos, but everything in Justice Rutledge's "thoughtful opinion" in that case. If the district courts proceed as they should,
according to Justice Stevens, they will heed the many "warnings" in Kot-

teakos against a "single-minded focus on how [an] error may... have
affected the... verdict." 2" Expressly incorporating the position that he
and Justice O'Connor took in West, Stevens insists that the district courts
will continue to exercise independent judgment on mixed questions and
288. For this reason, the prisoner in Brecht thus faced formidable odds. He not only had to
persuade the usual suspects (Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter), but he also had to get Justice Stevens
to change his mind. I hasten to say, however, that Stevens' position in Brecht, while disheartening,
does not yet suggest that he means to revive the doubts about habeas that he expressed a decade ago.
Eg., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 538 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The politics of habeas have
changed considerably since then and, despite what I take to be a lapse in this instance, Justice Stevens seems to appreciate that his vote is critical to the preservation of an entire body of congressionally conferred subject matter jurisdiction.
289. The prisoner in Greer, like the prisoner in Brecht,grounded his claim in Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976), in which the Court held that prosecutors could not impeach the defendant's trial
testimony by referring to his failure to explain himself at the time of arrest when, after being given
Miranda warnings, the defendant had just been told that he had a right to remain silent. It is not
coincidental that Doyle should figure in both cases. In Greer, Justice Stevens directed his full attention to Doyle claims and did not expressly propose a diluted standard for harmless error regarding
other issues. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 467-68. In Brecht, much of what Chief Justice Rehnquist says
about harmless error is offered specifically with respect to Doyle. Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1716-17. And
in the circuit opinion below in Brecht, Judge Easterbrook focused entirely on Doyle and, indeed,
explicitly proposed a relaxed standard for harmless error only for Doyle claims, which he thought
(erroneously) depended on nonconstitutional "prophylactic" rules spinning off from Miranda.
Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1368-70. In Brecht, the Chief Justice recognizes that Doyle states a fundamental
due process principle. But that does not suggest to him that he should reverse Judge Easterbrook,
but, paradoxically, that he should expand the diluted standard for harmless error to all claims of
trial error. In any case, since the Chief Justice clearly states in Brecht that he means to adopt the
Kotteakos standard for all trial errors, the practical significance of the role Doyle has played in these
cases is minimal. The Court has not announced a relaxed standard for harmless error for Doyle
claims, and perhaps intimated discomfort with that case or its relation to Miranda. The Justices
have landed a much heavier blow against the availability of federal habeas corpus relief generally.
290. Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1724 (concurring opinion).
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then review the "entire record" to discern "all the ways that error can
infect the course of a trial."2'9 1 In the main, then, Justice Stevens insists
that the Court's articulation of a different standard for harmless error in
habeas corpus may come to little more than a shift in labels-so long as
the federal courts perform their function to judge actual cases in a way
that transcends the "formula or precise rule" that guides them.29 2
Be that as it may, Justice Stevens does pick one substantive bone
with the majority. He reads Kotteakos to place the burden of persuasion
on the prosecution, while Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to assign it to
the petitioner. 93 This difference is as critical as it is puzzling. Why, one
may fairly ask, would Justice Stevens concur in an opinion for the Court,
and then file a separate opinion that takes an apparently aberrant position on such a key issue?2 94 Whatever the explanation may be, I think it
is self-evident that what he says so pointedly in his own words must take
precedence over any inconsistent inference that might otherwise be
drawn from his participation in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court. Realistically, there are five votes in Brecht for relaxing the standard for harmless error in habeas corpus, but there are only four for
assigning the burden of proof to the prisoner.
Even if Justice Stevens is successful in allocating the burden of persuasion to the prosecution, I am afraid that by joining in Brecht, he may
have handed the Chief Justice yet another way to skin the habeas cat.
The diluted harmless error rule will, I think, function as a general rule of
deference to state judgments. Under either label, the federal courts will
stay their hand in all but egregious cases. To make the point graphically,
it should surprise no one if the very petitioners who will continue to get a
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1725 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 240 (1940)).
293. Compare Justice Stevens in id. at 1723 (concurring opinion) with Chief Justice Rehnquist
in id. at 1722. Justice Stevens reads Kotteakos to allow the burden to shift according to the nature of
the claim: The prosecution has the burden with respect to a claim whose "natural effect is to prejudice a litigant's substantial rights," but the accused has the burden regarding a claim deemed to be
"technical." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946) (referring to congressional committee reports on this point). To Stevens, however, it is perfectly clear that "a constitutional violation... would never fall in the 'technical' category." Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723-24.
294. All I can think to offer is that in joining the Rehnquist majority opinion, Justice Stevens
conceives that he is agreeing to everything that was said in Kotteakos and that he is somehow not
also accepting whatever else the Chief Justice says about the standard for harmless error. I do not
read the Chief Justice to incorporate the entire Kotteakos opinion by reference. Indeed, it seems to
me that he takes the worst of Kotteakos (the "substantial effect" test) and leaves the rest. Nevertheless, I have to read Justice Stevens' personal opinion in Brecht as definitive with respect to his own
views.
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federal hearing for their Miranda claims in light of Withrow v. Williams29 5 are nonetheless denied federal relief on the basis of Brecht,
decided on the same day. For even as the Court in Williams kept
Miranda claims in federal habeas corpus by characterizing the Fifth
Amendment privilege as a "trial right, ' 296 on that same basis the Court
laid the predicate for denying federal habeas relief for meritorious
Miranda claims under the relaxed standard for harmless error fashioned
for trial error in Brecht.
Finally, we should not miss the reversal of fortune the idea of "reasonable doubt" has undergone in the general run of habeas corpus cases
from this Court. Look at it this way. The traditional "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for harmless error was demanding-and deliberately so. For if there is a reasonable doubt about whether constitutional
error influenced a criminal conviction, we have long thought that the
individual should have the benefit of that doubt. That sentiment has now
been abandoned in habeas corpus in favor of a standard for harmless
error whose plain and unvarnished purpose is to shift comparatively
more of the risk of constitutional mistakes to the individual in the dock.
At the same time, via the "new rule" cases, this Court gives state courts
the benefit of any reasonable doubt regarding the accuracy of their determinations of constitutional claims.
5. Summary
Let's sum up. Recognizing the conventional distinction between
questions of primary fact on the one hand, and legal or mixed questions
on the other, the Rehnquist Court places an outsized number in the former category and thereby, at the outset, diverts a large portion of judicial
business to the state courts. Next, with respect to questions that are
undeniably legal or mixed, and thus ostensibly subject to independent
federal adjudication, the Court distinguishes between claims that rest on
clearly established principles and those that call for the announcement of
"new rules"-and sends most to the latter category. In the typical case,
then, a prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus must negotiate a treacherous course. The issue the prisoner wants to litigate in federal court
must demand enough legal judgment that it cannot be considered "factual," else the unfavorable conclusion reached by the state courts will be
presumed correct under section 2254(d). At the same time, the issue
cannot demand so much judgment that it falls within the definition of a
295. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
296. Williams, 113 S. Ct. at 1753.
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"new rule." To persuade a federal court to look at a legal or mixed question, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable minds, passing on
the claim in light of the precedents existing when the state courts acted,
could not have disagreed over the correct answer and had to arrive at the
result for which the petitioner now contends. Even then, the petitioner
will probably lose if the claim rests on a legal standard that, like the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, is by nature typically inapplicable
in habeas corpus. Finally, even if the petitioner escapes all these pitfalls,
relief can be obtained from the federal courts on the basis of a constitutional error at trial only if that error had a substantial, prejudicial effect
on the verdict. Thus the Court's interpretations of section 2254(d), brigaded with its definitions of "new rules" and the relaxed standard for
harmless error, now threaten to do by judicial decision what the full-andfair program would do by statute.29 7 Different legislation will be
required to wrestle with this seething morass of counterintuitive rhetoric-legislation, I might add, that will seem delightfully simple and
straightforward by comparison.
IV.

PRESCRIPTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
A. DEMOCRATIC BILLS TO DATE

In light of the developments at the Court, some members of Congress have concluded that in order to preserve habeas corpus at all, it is
insufficient merely to defeat the full-and-fair program when it is offered
in legislative bills. In addition, affirmative congressional action is needed
to disclaim that plan explicitly, to overrule Stone v. Powell, to clear up
the problems that have developed with section 2254(d), to redefine "new
rules" for retroactivity purposes, and at least to mitigate the effect of the
relaxed test for harmless error.
Senators Nelson and Mathias once introduced a bill that took primary aim at Stone, yet, in anticipation that the preclusion talk in the
Court's opinion in that case might spread to cases involving other claims,
spoke more broadly to the full-and-fair formulation generally. Their bill,
297. See, eg., GRAHAM HUGHES, THE DECLINE OF HABEAS CORPUS 10-14 (1990); Vivian
Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665, 1701-02 (1990); Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Supreme
Court'sNew Vision of FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,1989 Sup. CT. REV. 165; Liebman,
supra note 227; Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 939 (1991). For a review of
the cases, see Steven M. Goldstein, ChippingAway at the Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced Federal
Habeas Corpus PetitionersBe Able to Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 357 (1990-91).
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then, explicitly renounced the notion that the federal courts should dismiss any claim on the ground that a prisoner previously received a "full
and fair" opportunity to litigate in state court.2 98 More recent bills
address the retroactivity problem. 299 A provision in House Bill 5269, the
omnibus crime bill reported from the House Judiciary Committee in the
101st Congress, would have added this provision to the habeas corpus
chapter of the United States Code:"°
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, each
claim under this chapter shall be governed by the law existing on the
date the court determines the claim.
(b) In determining whether to apply a new rule, the court shall
consider-() the purpose to be served by the new rule; (2) the extent
of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on a different rule; and
(3) the effect on the administration of justice of the application of the
new rule.
(c) For purposes of this section, the term "new rule" means a
sharp break from precedent announced by the Supreme Court of the
United States that explicitly and substantially changes the law from
that governing at the time the claimant's sentence became final. A rule
is not new merely because, based on precedent existing before the
rule's announcement, it was susceptible to debate among reasonable
minds .... 3
298. FederalHabeas Corpus: Hearings on S. 1314 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in the
JudicialMachinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
299. Recall that Justice White said in Teague that the decision to limit the applicability of "new
rules" in habeas corpus was an interpretation of the habeas corpus statutes and therefore could be
changed by Congress. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 317 (1989) (White, J., concurring); see supra
note 204. Sen. Biden's original bill in the 101st Congress, S. 1757, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989)

accepted White's invitation to restore the Court's prior retroactivity analysis legislatively, albeit only
in death penalty cases. See supra note 166. That bill was written, however, before Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990), which underscored the importance
of the definition of "new rules" to the Court's analysis and, concomitantly, the need to change that
definition in any legislation meant to counter the effects of the Court's decisions.
The pertinent ABA recommendation was also drafted prior to Butler and thus shares the failings of Sen. Biden's initial provision. Specifically, the ABA recommends that "[t]he standard for
determining [retroactivity] should be whether failure to apply the new law would undermine the
accuracy of either the guilt or the sentencing determination." In a statement before Rep. Kastenmeier's subcommittee, Professor Liebman indicated his view that the ABA's position is consistent
with the language in H.R. 5269. ABA Task Force, supra note 159, at 4; Hearingson H.R. 4737,

supra note 143, at 13 (statement of Professor Liebman).
300. Readers should know that I consulted with the congressional staff members responsible for

drafting this provision.
301. H.R. 5269, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1305 (1990).
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This language merges Justice Harlan's intellectual framework with
the Warren Court's standards for judging the retroactive effect of
changes in the law. The baseline established by subsection (a) puts cases
reaching the federal courts in habeas corpus on the same footing as cases

reaching the Supreme Court on direct review: In both instances, the rule
to be applied is the current rule-even if that rule is "new" in the sense
that it departs, incrementally or radically, from what went before. In

this, subsection (a) embraces Harlan's position that currently prevailing
law should always be enforced on direct review.3" 2 The similar treatment
of habeas corpus cases departs from Harlan, of course, but the exception

recognized in subsection (b) immediately retrieves his view that "new
rules" should not always be invoked in habeas. Together, subsections (a)
and (b) make it plain that the question whether a change in the law
should be recognized and applied arises only in habeas corpus.
Next, subsection (b) incorporates the standards the Warren Court
employed for determining when "new rules" should be available to
habeas petitioners. Applying these standards, that Court sometimes,
though rarely, gave retrospective effect to genuine changes in the law.
Functionally, the standards do the work now performed by the two narrow exceptions to the current Court's blanket prohibition on the
announcement or application of "new rules" in habeas corpus.3" 3 The
vital matter, of course, lies in subsection (c), which tracks the understanding of "new rules" appearing in cases handed down prior to Teague
v. Lane.3" The last line of subsection (c) explicitly negates the definition

offered by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Butler. Since the "sharp break"
definition is plainly inconsistent with the Rehnquist formulation, a fur-

ther explicit rejection of his definition would be unnecessary in ordinary
302. Recall that when, in cases arising on direct review, the Warren Court handed down new
decisions changing the law, that Court did not always extend the benefits of its "new rules" to other
cases also pending on direct review at the time of the relevant decision. See supra notes 200-01 and
accompanying text.
303. The substitute offered on the House floor by Reps. Hughes and Derrick attempted to mollify the opposition by incorporating the current Court's two exceptions in place of the Warren Court
standards reflected in H.R. 5269. See supra note 167. Inasmuch as that substitute retained H.R.
5269's definition of a "new rule," however, it compromised something of only marginal significance.
304. See, e.g., Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 (1986) (per curiam) (referring to an "explicit
and substantial break with prior precedent"); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969)
(defining a "new rule" as a "clear break" from the past). In an opinion by Justice White in Solem v.
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984), the Court intimated that only a decision that overrules prior precedents
is a "clear break," but did not make the definition of a "new rule" for retroactivity purposes contingent on explicit overruling.
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circumstances. In this instance, however, the drafters thought it essential
to commit Congress to a different course in the most exacting manner.30 5
An alternative proposal can be found in House Bill 3371, the crime
bill passed by the House in the 102d Congress.3 °6
In an action filed under this chapter, the court shall not apply a
new rule. For purposes of this section, the term "new rule" means a
clear break from precedent, announced by the Supreme Court of the
United States, that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the
time the claimant's sentence became final in State court.30 7
This proposal constitutes a surgical strike at the heart of the Court's
retroactivity analysis. It is the product of the politically charged atmosphere in which it was drafted and defended in debate. The first line
draws Justice Harlan's distinction between direct review and habeas
cases, and then in Draconian fashion, absolutely forbids the federal
courts to invoke "new rules" in habeas corpus. In this, House Bill 3371
refuses to admit even the two exceptions recognized by Justice Harlan
and, after a fashion, by the Rehnquist Court itself. Although the result is
harsh, it enabled proponents to insist that they had answered the charge
that the federal courts now upset state judgments on the basis of changes
in the law. This bill, according to Representative Don Edwards, "prohibits new rules of law from applying retroactively in any case."' 30 8 Inasmuch as the Court's current exceptions are so narrow anyway, the
drafters concluded that the strategic value of a blanket, unforgiving prohibition was worth the sacrifice. Even written in this stark way, House
Bill 3371 passed the House by only a slim margin. 3°
The reason lies, of course, in the second line, which defines "new
rules" much in the manner of House Bill 5269. Here again, there is evidence of strategic maneuvering. The shift from a "sharp" to a "clear"
break ties the proposal ever more tightly to the terms of art employed by
the Supreme Court, a move thought to enhance the chances of attracting
305. The committee report accompanying H.R. 5269 was clear on this point:
[This subsection explicitly disclaims the statement in Butler v. McKellar,... that a
rule is new if it-was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds" at the time the
petitioner's sentence became final. That definition is far too broad to capture only the
unanticipated breaks with the past that constitute genuine "new rules."
H.R.REP. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 126 (1990).
306. I also consulted with the drafters responsible for this provision.
307. H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1104 (1991).
308. Memorandum handed out on the floor of the House of Representatives (undated) (on file
with the author).
309. See supra note 148.
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conservative support.3 1 ° In a similar vein, this provision drops the
explicit reference to Chief Justice Rehnquist's definition of "new rules"
contained in House Bill 5629-the better to avoid an open, arguably gratuitous, and strategically ill-advised conflict with a jurist who is demonstrably popular among conservatives. The essential task, the elimination
of the Court's expansive descriptions of "new rules," is accomplished by
the "clear break" definition.
On its face, the reference to rules the state courts could not reasonably anticipate tightens the meaning of "new rules" even more than does
the "clear break" formulation. The Supreme Court never does anything
without some warning. Even when the Court flatly overrules prior cases,
its decisions are always adumbrated in comments or warnings in majority opinions, separate opinions by individual Justices, other state and federal court decisions, or, at the very least, speculation in the legal
literature. So observers can always "reasonably" anticipate what the
Court means to do, and it is never unreasonableto predict that the Court
is about to chart the course the Court ultimately takes. In effect, House
Bill 3371 embraces the Rehnquist Court's duplicitous use of the "reasonableness" label, but reverses the direction in which it operates. Under
the Court's cases, a rule is "new" unless the state courts acted unreasonably in failing to recognize it; under House Bill 3371, a rule would be
"new" only if the Supreme Court acts unreasonably in announcing it.
Despite its logical implications, however, House Bill 3371's reference to rules that "could not reasonably" have been anticipated was
offered by the drafters, and by its proponents in the floor debates, not as a
means of narrowing the definition of "new rules," but, paradoxically, as a
redundant flourish that added nothing to the threshold, "clear break"
definition. If, this is to say, conservatives were genuinely worried that
the "clear break" definition of "new rules" in House Bill 3371 would
allow the federal courts to upset state judgments resting in good faith on
precedents existing at the time, then this clause should lay those concerns
310. See supra notes 200, 304. The accompanying committee report was again explicit, however, regarding the purpose to repudiate Butler:
This section clarifies the meaning of a "new rule" of law for purposes of Teague v.
Lane and subsequent decisions, particularly Butler v. McKellar ....
Certainly, the State
courts are expected fairly to apply the general principles established by precedent to analogous cases .... Accordingly, this section rejects the definition of a "new rule" suggested in
Butler, namely that a rule is "new" if at the time the State courts considered a petitioner's
claim, the claim was susceptible to debate among reasonableminds.
H.R. REP. No. 242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 129-30 (1991) (emphasis added).
This report in the 102d Congress expressly referred readers to the Judiciary Committee's report
in the 101st Congress for a fuller explanation of why the Butler formulation was unarceptable. Id. at
130; see also id. at 395 (dissenting views) (criticizing the committee bill for rejecting Butler).
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to rest. A change in the law that "could not reasonably" be anticipated
by the state courts would never again be used to upset a state judgment in
habeas corpus.3 11
All this confusion flows, of course, from the misleading arguments
employed to explain and defend the Rehnquist Court's recent cases. The
Court insists that it is only keeping the federal courts from trumping
state decisions on the basis of changes in the law the state courts could
not foresee. House Democrats simply accepted that political rhetoric on
its face-and put it in their bill. Sophisticated observers understand,
however, that the Court's literal descriptions of "new rules" not only bar
the federal courts from vindicating rights the state courts could not have
recognized, but also (and much more importantly) rights those courts
could have recognized, and ought to have recognized, when prisoners'
cases were before them.31 2 Indeed, as we have seen, the "new rule"
cases, taken literally, promise to foreclose petitions seeking only the
application of unchanged legal standards to the facts of particular cases.
A third bill, introduced by Senator Biden as Senate Bill 1441 in the

103d Congress, attempts to refocus attention on a genuine shift in the
content of an abstract legal rule-and away from the notion that "new"
law is created when a settled rule is applied to a case whose facts differ

from the facts of the case in which the rule was initially established:
(c) As used in this section, a "new rule" is a rule that changes the
constitutional or statutory standards that prevailed at the time the
petitioner's conviction and sentence became final.... 313
311. The limitation of "new rules" to breaks from precedent "announced by the Supreme
Court" is chimerical in this same way. On its face, this limitation restricts the scope of "new rules"
(and thus preserves the scope of federal habeas corpus) in that it eliminates from a federal district
court's concerns the possibility that a prisoner is asking the district court itself to announce (as well
as to apply) a "new rule." Because this provision defines a rule as "new" only if it is announced by
the Supreme Court, a district court need be concerned only with Supreme Court decisions handed
down since a prisoner's case left the state system. See supranote 217. Nevertheless, the reference to
Supreme Court action seems (at least to the uninitiated) to cut the other way-by dealing expressly
with the problem the Court's definition of "new rules" is said to address, namely prisoners' use of
habeas corpus to gain the benefits of "new" Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution in
general and the Eighth Amendment in particular.
312. Chief Judge Merritt of the Sixth Circuit has made the point in no uncertain terms. See,
e.g., Letter from Gilbert S. Merritt to Joseph Biden, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee (June 25,
1991) (stating that the chief judges of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
joined his recommendation that Teague be overruled for precisely this reason) (on file with the
author).
313. S. 1441, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1993).
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This simple "change in the legal standard" definition of "new rules"
is intellectually sensible, even refreshing, in that it goes forthrightly to

the real issue in retroactivity cases, namely whether abstract legal rules
actually shift between state and federal court. Nevertheless, this formulation lacks the rhetorical punch that the "break" metaphor in House
Bills 5269 and 3371 brings to bear. Accordingly, in an apparent effort to

clarify its purpose to overrule the Court's decisions, Senate Bill 1441
includes another section, which specifies that the federal courts are to

exercise fresh judgment when they review state rulings on questions of
federal law, "including the application of Federal law to facts," and that
it makes no difference whether the state courts previously gave prisoners'

claims a "full and fair hearing." That explicit disclaimer of deference to
prior state judgments and, indeed, the full-and-fair program for habeas
corpus, plainly reinforces the bill's chances of getting the Court's attention. The aim is rather clear, namely to tell the Justices that they are not
to use a capacious understanding of "new rules" to defeat the federal
habeas courts' general authority to determine the merits of ordinary federal claims.314
Senate Bill 1441 is mute with respect to the standard for harmless

constitutional error and thus fails (expressly) to revive the traditional,
"beyond a reasonable doubt" test. This bill does, however, assign the
burden of proving harmless error to the state. House Bills 5269 and 3371
were written before Wright v. West and Brecht were decided and thus did
314. Id. § 4(b). The immediate reaction to S. 1441 for the most part confirms this understanding. Senator Biden explained on the floor that he and his staff had developed S. 1441 in negotiations
with the NDAA, which formally endorsed the bill on introduction. 139 CONG. REC. S10,926 (daily
ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (quoting Letter from William C. O'Malley, President of the NDAA, to Joseph R.
Biden, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee (Aug. 5, 1993)). In a distribution to the NDAA membership, one of the negotiators explained that the bill would "codifly] the core of Teague" and thus
frustrate attempts by "criminal defense lobbyists" to "gut current law." Ronald Eisenberg, Federal
Habeas Corpus Reform Talking Points (Sept. 10, 1993) (on file with the author). If the "core" of
current law is the different treatment that "new rule" claims receive in habeas corpus as against
direct review, then, of course, S. 1441 does embrace that central premise-as have all other bills in
recent years. The "change in the legal standard" definition of "new rules," however, plainly is more
confining than the Court's sweeping formulations. Other observers acknowledge as much. Eg.,
Letter from Larry Echo Hawk, Attorney General of Idaho, and Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney
General of Nevada, to all Attorneys General (Sept. 9, 1993) (on file with the author) (insisting that
the definition of "new rules" in S. 1441 is "vague" at best and that it would overrule the differently
phrased formulations in Teague and Butler); Letter from Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of
California, to Dianne Feinstein, United States Senator (Aug. 13, 1993) (copy on file with the author)
(explaining that the S. 1441 definition is more "narrow" than the Court's formulations and thus
insisting that the bill would abrogate the current understanding that the federal courts must "follow
reasonable state court rulings").
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not address those developments and their implications for the writ's
future.
B.

AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION

1. The Proper Conceptual Framework
It is obvious by now that even the most basic question that can be
asked about federal habeas corpus, namely what claims the federal courts
can consider, is problematic. In habeas, perhaps more vividly than in
any other aspect of the law of federal jurisdiction, complexity, confusion,
and subtlety mask an underlying debate over the value of federal remedies for federal rights. I said at the outset that I assume in this Article
that the federal forum ought to be available for the adjudication of prisoners' federal claims. It will surprise no one that I regard the possibility
that prisoners' constitutional rights will be vindicated in habeas corpus
with unabashed enthusiasm. The conservative backlash at the root of the
opposition to habeas over the past quarter century constitutes, to my
mind, an unfortunate lapse of judgment from which the country may yet
hope to recover. Laying aside the pros and cons of the political choice to
be made, however, and assuming that liberals are doing the choosing, let
me offer a specific legislative solution that would implement a policy
judgment to preserve federal habeas corpus for state prisoners in a muscular form.
The beginning of wisdom is to recognize that the proper scope of the
issues cognizable in habeas depends on the function the federal courts
perform. On this point, the full-and-fair plan's introduction of "issue"
preclusion into habeas is due some credit. That program incorporates
the view that the state courts should enforce the Constitution in state
criminal cases and the federal courts should have only a marginal, backstop role. While we can complain that proponents understate the restrictions the full-and-fair program would bring about, we cannot complain
that the plan lacks a clear conception of what federal habeas corpus
should be. The same cannot be said for the Supreme Court's definitions
of "facts" and "new rules," which, as we have seen, may lead to the same
result. Yet to the extent the Court decides whether a question is factual,
legal, or mixed by open reference to its own judgment regarding forum
allocation, it does concede what is actually afoot. And to the extent the
Court embraces Justice Harlan's views regarding retroactivity, it again
acknowledges the underpinnings of what it is doing. Harlan was in no
way disingenuous. He criticized the availability of habeas corpus after
prisoners had had a "fair opportunity" to air their claims in state court
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and candidly admitted that his framework for retroactivity was a secondbest means of restoring habeas to the limited role it had prior to Moore v.
Dempsey.3 15 According to Harlan's framework, the federal courts should
merely monitor the state courts' handling of federal claims and step in
when it is necessary to deter the state courts from neglecting federal
rights. The approach to retroactivity now employed by the Rehnquist
Court is thus in service of roughly the same vision of habeas corpus that
is embodied in the full-and-fair plan.
This being so, we should extricate ourselves from the jurisprudential
morass of trying to decide, as a matter of logic, whether a "new rule" has
been established and should instead determine, as a matter of policy,
whether the novelty of a legal claim should affect the choice of a particular remedy for it-for example, relief in habeas corpus. As Dan Meltzer
and Richard Fallon have recently pointed out, abstract debates over
when and whether the law changes only confuse matters.3 1 6 My little
discussion of the competing definitions of "new rules" surely demonstrates they are right. I despair of locating any sensible test for "new
rules" that does not either engage the federal courts in shadowboxing
better reserved for first-year law classes or, worse, leap to the clarity that
comes from characterizing everything as "new." Let's understand each
other. Just as an argument over whether a question is one of fact or law
is a proxy for an underlying argument over whether the state courts or
the federal courts should have primary authority to decide it, the "new
rule" controversy is a proxy for an underlying debate about the general
availability of the federal courts to entertain federal claims as a sequel to
state court litigation. The exclusion of Fourth Amendment claims from
habeas and the relaxation of the harmless error rule in habeas corpus
constitute additional ways to deprive the federal courts of authority to
enforce federal rights.
The flaw in the Rehnquist Court's analysis is not so much that the
Court conceals its forum-allocation choices behind what appear to be
neutral decisions about what constitutes a "fact," or whether a claim
turns on a "new rule," or whether, indeed, the purposes of Mapp are
served in habeas-though that charge can be laid. Nor is it that the
Court fails to offer a coherent vision of the federal courts' role-though,
it must be said, there is a surface inconsistency that ought to arouse suspicion. Recall that when Justice Pitney articulated a restricted purview
315. See supra text accompanying note 34.
316. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1736 (1991).
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for habeas in Leo Frank's case, he gave as part of his explanation that the
lower federal courts had no authority to review state judgments directly.
Then, it seems, the scope of habeas had to be narrow to prevent the federal courts from using the writ as an appellate jurisdiction where Congress had conferred none.31 7 Now, it appears, the Rehnquist Court
conceives that habeas is, after all, a mechanism for reviewing state judgments and, for that very reason, again the scope of the writ must be
circumscribed.3 18
The real difficulty with what the Court has been up to of late is that
it has in mind the wrong role for the federal courts in habeas corpus.
The purpose of habeas is not to deter the state courts from ignoring fundamental federal rights, such that, if we assume that the state courts usually can be relied upon to enforce the Constitution, we should equally
assume that the federal courts should usually leave well enough alone.
Harlan was wrong. The federal habeas courts are not in the business of
looking back at state judgments and reviewing them at all; their role is
neither to serve as ordinary appellate courts of error nor as figurative
safety nets to catch the occasional egregious case. Federal habeas corpus
is an independent basis of original jurisdiction in the federal district
courts to entertain federal claims arising in state criminal cases. Criminal defendants cannot remove their prosecutions to federal court in the
first instance. Accordingly, if the system is to provide citizens with at
least one chance to litigate federal claims in a federal forum, there must
be some vehicle for federal adjudication after the state courts have completed their work. Habeas corpus is that vehicle.
The implications of this different understanding of the role federal
habeas plays in the federal judicial system are plain. Since the very point
is that the federal courts should be open after state adjudication to
address federal claims they could not treat earlier, the application of preclusion rules in habeas corpus is unacceptable. The full-and-fair program
would do that and therefore should be rejected. Similarly, the Court's
manipulations of the meaning of primary facts and "new rules" have no
place in habeas corpus, properly conceived. Habeas is not a backstop
against outrageous injustice, but a routine means by which federal
claims, both conventional and creative, can be considered in the ordinary
317. See supra text accompanying note 29.
318. And this even as the Court continues to mouth boilerplate descriptions of habeas that
recognize the true conceptual nature of the federal courts' authority. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, I11 S. Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991) (relying on Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 (1963)) (recognizing
that a federal habeas court "does not review" a previous state judgment but rather examines the
"lawfulness of the petitioner's custody simpliciter").

2426

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2331

course. Certainly, there is no warrant for reconceptualizing the very
nature of constitutional law in a transparent effort to drain the blood
from the writ. There is a sensible difference between factual questions on
the one hand and mixed or legal issues on the other. Similarly, there is a
difference between the incremental growth and development of legal
principles over time and abrupt disruptions in the normal continuity of
things. Justice Harlan was right about one thing: Constitutional law is a
gradually evolving body of thinking about an ever-changing social landscape, not, as the current Court implies, a series of lurching leaps from
unquestionable propositions to "new rules." Finally, there is no warrant
for excluding entire cohorts of claims from habeas, or relaxing the harmless error rule in federal court, in a tendentious campaign to achieve by
those means what cannot be accomplished more forthrightly. The legislation needed, then, is not of the kind illustrated by House Bill 5269,
House Bill 3371, or Senate Bill 1441. Those bills engage the notion that
habeas corpus is a mechanism for reviewing state judgments and attempt
to make the ambit of that review considerably wider than the full-andfair program or the Court's decisions would allow. 319 Given the current
state of affairs, it does seem necessary to prescribe the effect, short of
preclusive effect, the federal courts should give to prior state judgments.
But we require much more to make sense of this business. The ABA
recommendations 32° offer a good start at addressing the special problems
arising in capital cases. I will concentrate here on the more basic question of judicial authority that has been my focus throughout.
With respect to the fact/law distinction, we should not patch up
section 2254(d) in an attempt to get the Court back on track. In a perverse way, the Bush administration was right in West. Dividing authority to decide different issues within a single case is troublesome. This
does not mean, however, that we should simply route all issues to the
state courts, thus eliminating federal authority entirely. To ensure that
habeas litigants get the rough equivalent of the removal jurisdiction they
were denied prior to trial, Congress should repeal section 2254(d), and
with it the current requirement that state factual findings must ordinarily
be accepted as correct. Starting again, Congress should enact a new statute giving the federal courts power to determine all the issues necessary
to resolve a federal claim-questions of law, mixed questions, and, as
well, questions of primary fact. Regarding facts, however, the statute
319. Cf Joseph L. Hoffmann, Retroactivity and the Great Writ: How Congress Should Respond
to Teague v. Lane, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183; Liebman, supra note 227, at 613.
320. See supra note 159.
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should permit the federal courts to make use of prior state proceedings
and, indeed, to rely on state findings when independent federal investigation would be impractical or wasteful. Congress should also specify that
the federal courts have authority to announce and apply whatever legal
standards are needed to determine a claim correctly. In ordinary civil
actions, the federal district courts independently determine the facts and
all legal or mixed issues that bear on the merits of federal claims, and
they do so in light of current law. They should do the same in habeas
corpus. Furthermore, they should entertain all the same claims, including Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims, that would have been
cognizable in federal court if removal had been available. Finally, of
course, the same standards for harmless error that guide judgment on
direct review should also govern in federal habeas corpus.
It will be said that legislation of this kind will not do. For the reasons I mentioned previously, the federal courts do not always offer superior fact-finding capacity. Accordingly, it will be said that the federal
courts should continue to defer at least to the primary facts found in state
court. Moreover, the content of legal standards does change at least
occasionally. Accordingly, it will be said that the federal courts should
decline to enforce genuine breaks with the past; otherwise every prisoner
whose case admits of a claim under new constitutional interpretations
would be free to file another habeas petition. The states have a legitimate
interest in the finality of state judgments, and, it will be said, criminal
cases should not be subject to redundant factual investigations and
repeated litigation over the effects of shifting legal rules.
Yet a framework in which habeas corpus provides state prisoners
with the rough equivalent of what they might have had by removal
presents none of these difficulties-necessarily. An authority to develop
the facts would not always squander resources. Nor would an authority
to enforce current law necessarily generate repetitious litigation. Other
aspects of habeas law produce those problems-namely the absence of a
statute of limitations for federal petitions and the potential for multiple
petitions on behalf of a single prisoner. Those elements of current law
can be altered in order to construct a system in which citizens with federal claims touching state criminal prosecutions are entitled to one, but
3
usually only one, opportunity to be in federal court.

21

321. See infra note 324. But see Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionalityof the ProposedSix-Month Time Limit on the Filingof Habeas Corpus Petitionsby State
Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 451 (1990-91).
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A Specific Bill

In this spirit, the following provision should be enacted as a substitute for section 2254(a):
(a) A petitioner may apply for a writ of habeas corpus under this
chapter if the custody of which the petitioner complains is based
on a criminal sentence imposed by a State court. In such an
action(1) the court in which the action is filed shall have jurisdiction to
determine any Federal claim that would have been cognizable
in Federal court if the original proceedings in State court had
been removable and removed under section 1441 of this title
and shall:
(A) exercise independent judgment on the merits of the claim,
including finding the facts and determining the legal significance of the facts in light of the Federal legal standards
prevailing at the time the court considers the claim; and
(B) grant appropriate relief if-(i) the claim is meritorious;
and (ii) in the case of a violation of Federal law that can be
harmless, the respondent fails to show that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) a previous State court conclusion of Federal law, finding of
fact, or determination of the legal significance of facts under
Federal law shall not be entitled to deference, but shall be considered for whatever persuasive power it may have.
This provision, like the current version of section 2254(a), proceeds
on the premise that the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain petitions from state convicts pursuant to the basic statute, section 2241. It dispenses, however, with the current statute's recitation of
the federal grounds that must be asserted to invoke that jurisdiction,
which also appear in section 2241 and need not be repeated. Subsection
(a) locates a district court's authority to entertain habeas corpus petitions
within the general, overarching structure of federal jurisdiction. Specifically, habeas corpus after state criminal proceedings is a substitute for
the removal opportunity that defendants are denied under current law.
Paragraph (1) fixes the scope of the federal court's jurisdiction by reference to the claims that would have been available to the petitioner if the
case had been removable and, in fact, removed to federal court for trial.
Rejecting the Supreme Court's current position, paragraph (1) would
treat Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims equally with all other
contentions typically raised at criminal trials. Subparagraph (A) specifies that the federal court is to make its own independent findings of
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fact-subject to the proviso in paragraph (2) that previous findings by the
state courts can be taken into account.
Subparagraph (A) also specifies that the federal court is to exercise
independent judgment on mixed issues and, importantly, to invoke the
current legal standard-not the standard prevailing at the time the state
courts acted. This brings habeas cases into line with cases arising on
direct review in the Supreme Court. 322 Under this provision, a district
court in habeas corpus would have the authority and responsibility,
equally with the Supreme Court itself in a direct review case, to
announce and apply any rules of federal law needed to decide a case
correctly. A federal habeas court would not be concerned that the state
courts reached a different result regarding a prisoner's claim at a time
when arguably different legal rules were in place.32 3 Concerns about
322. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
323. It may be that some judicial remedies can properly be withheld on account of shifts in the
applicable legal standards. To take a common example, the Court has held that state executive
officers sued personally for damages in a § 1983 action should be heard to respond that they acted in
good-faith reliance on existing precedents and did not violate any "clearly established" legal standard. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Yet there is no basis for drawing an analogy
between the official immunity cases and habeas corpus. While the words the Court uses to describe
the scope and content of official immunity are similar to the words it uses in Butler v. McKellar and
other cases in habeas, the reason for using the same or similar words in that context is fundamentally
different. In official immunity cases, the Court assumes (for purposes of discussion) that the action
taken by the defendant violated the plaintiff's rights. For if the defendant's behavior was lawful,
there is no substantive basis for liability and thus no need to determine whether the defendant should
be spared liability that would otherwise attach. When, then, the Court has recognized immunity
because an officer acted "reasonably," it has scarcely suggested that a finding of such "reasonableness" somehow erases the unlawful behavior that triggered the immunity question in the first place.
The two issues (a threshold violation of the plaintiff's rights and the defendant's immunity from a
damages claim) are entirely distinguishable. They are related only in that the one (the immunity
question) presupposes the other (a violation that would otherwise give rise to liability). In the context of retroactivity analysis in habeas, by contrast, the alleged violation of a petitioner's federal
rights is not assumed at all, but rather constitutes the central matter in issue. To allow the "reasonableness" of a state court's judgment on a federal legal claim to stand would be to allow concerns
about the availability of a remedy to skew the content of substantive federal constitutional law.
Even if this crucial difference between official immunity and habeas is put aside, the two contexts are also dramatically different on another level. The policy that drives "good faith" official
immunity is the concern that exacting damages from executive officers according to a more demanding standard might discourage them from doing their jobs properly, or, indeed, from taking government jobs in the first place. It is quite another thing to propose that federal claims should be boxed
out of federal habeas corpus on the theory that statejudges acted in "good faith" when they reached
erroneous judgments. Judges are charged, and properly so, to be fully aware of the legal standards
they enforce. Moreover, they are not exposed to any risk of suit for damages stemming from their
decisions. They are called to account for their judgments only in the common and essential sense
that other courts, with jurisdiction to determine the same claims on appeal or in habeas corpus, may
conclude that they have reached the wrong result. If, indeed, there is any analogy to civil suits, it is
not to damage actions against governmental officials sued in their individual capacity, but to equitable actions against governmental defendants in their official capacity-where no immunity attaches.
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exposing state decisions to repetitive attacks whenever constitutional
safeguards evolve can be addressed by establishing time limitations for
habeas petitions and restricting multiple applications for federal relief.
Of course, subparagraph (B) revives the traditional standard for harmless
error.
Paragraph (2) explicitly disclaims any deference to (and therefore
any preclusive effect for) prior state determinations of the facts underlying a prisoner's claim or the federal legal basis for it. As to questions of
fact, the existing requirement in section 2254(d) that the federal courts
presume that state findings are correct is abandoned. In its place, paragraph (2) substitutes a general permission to use state fact finding appropriately. This flexible scheme would permit a federal court to accept
facts found in state court when there is sufficient reason to think they are
reliable and it would be impractical or wasteful for the federal court to
begin anew-either by holding another hearing or by basing findings on
an independent appraisal of the state record. As to questions of law and
law application, existing law already has it that the federal courts are to
exercise fresh, independent judgment. Yet the Court's treatment of
Fourth Amendment claims, its interpretations of section 2254(d), the
West case, the definitions of "new rules" in the Teague cases, and the
relaxed test for harmless error in Brecht, together with the persistence of
the full-and-fair program, make it essential that Congress' rejection of
deference in this context be made explicit.
The adoption of this provision to govern the federal courts' substantive authority in habeas corpus would have implications for other, subsidiary elements of habeas law. This is not the place to explore the
adjustments that would be warranted in the exhaustion doctrine, time
limits for fMling petitions, the appropriate response to procedural default
in state court, or the best rules respecting multiple petitions from a single
petitioner. Let me mention the conclusions I would reach regarding
those matters in a footnote and leave an elaboration for another time and
place.32 4
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). On the differences between the Teague line of cases and suits
for damages and other forms of relief, see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 316, at 1746-49; Kit
Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and CrystalBalls: Predictingthe Course of Constitutional Law, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 115, 171-81 (1991).
324. Briefly, I think we should reconceptualize the exhaustion doctrine to require not that prisoners pursue all currently available state means for adjudicating federal claims, but only that the
federal courts avoid interfering with the prosecution function in state court. When state officials
have gone far enough in state proceedings to make a prisoner's conviction and sentence final for
state-law purposes, federal habeas should be considered timely whether or not state opportunities for
litigating federal claims remain open. If prisoners are assured of effective legal counsel, it would be
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CONCLUSION

If I have convinced you of nothing else in these pages, I hope I have
persuaded you that the debate over habeas corpus for state prisoners is
charged by ideological differences that have changed very little over the
years. Old ideas for undermining the federal courts' jurisdiction in
habeas do not die easily. They live on and constantly resurface in new
places. Proposals that originated as legitimate (if misguided) legislative
proposals to subject habeas to preclusion are recast as lawyers' arguments presented to the Court in the absence of statutory change. And in
the current climate, those arguments typically find a warm reception. I
do not say that the record is relentlessly bleak, even from my point of
view; nor do I mean to discount important recent instances in which even
the Rehnquist Court has resisted imaginative efforts to bring preclusion
to bear on the writ. I do think, however, that habeas has now suffered
too much to survive on its own as the formidable safeguard for federal
claims that I, for one, wish it to be. Accordingly, I have offered a concrete legislative proposal to set right what has recently gone so terribly
wrong. If this program, or something like it, is not enacted, I fear that
we will have let slip a vital element in the machinery of American justice.

fair to require them to file in federal court within a fixed period of time. By analogy to the current
statute regarding new federal civil actions, a period of four years would be appropriate. See 28
U.S.C. § 1658 (1988). We should abandon the current forfeiture framework governing claims the
state courts decline to consider because of procedural default and substitute either the Warren
Court's waiver standard or no standard at all. Once habeas is understood as an independent form of
original federal jurisdiction, it should not matter whether petitioners raised federal claims previously
in related litigation in another court system. Finally, harsh as it may sound, I have reached the
conclusion that the federal courts' doors should be closed to all but the most compelling successive
applications for habeas relief. I will expand on these conclusions and the reasoning behind them in
Yackle, supra note 4.

